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REESE  LIBRARY 


OF  THE 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 


Class  No. 


— u— u— u — l? 


RECENT  WORKS  BY  G.J.  ROMANES,  M.  A. 

DARWIN,  AND  AFTER  DARWIN :  An  Exposition  of 
the  Darwinian  Theory,  and  a  Discussion  of  Post -Dar- 
winian Questions. 

Part  i.    The  Darwinian  Theory.    Cloth,  $2.00. 

Part  2.    Post- Darwinian  Questions.     (In  press.) 
Edited  by  C.  Lloyd  Morgan. 

AN  EXAMINATION  OF  WEISMANNISM.  Cloth  $2.00. 


CHICAGO 

The  Open  Court  Publishing  Co. 


THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION. 


THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION 


BY  THE    LATE 


GEORGE   JOHN    ROMANES 


M.A.,  LL.D.,  F.R.S, 


EDITED   BY 

CHARLES    GORE,  M.A. 

CANON  OF  WESTMINSTER 


FIFTH  EDITION 


OF 


CHICAGO 
THE  OPEN  COURT  PUBLISHING  COMPANY 

1902 


BEESE 

r    > 


t     24  o 

His- 

iloz 


CONTENTS. 


PAGE 

Editor's  Preface 5 


PART  I. 

The  Influence  of  Science  upon  Religion. 

Essay  I -37 

Essay  II •         58 

PART   II. 

Notes  for  a  Work  on  a  Candid  Examination 

of  Religion. 

Introductory  Note  by  the  Editor    ...  97 

§  1.  Introductory 104 

§  2.  Definition    of    Terms    and   Purpose    of    this 

Treatise no 

§  3.  Causality 123 

§  4.  Faith .  140 

§  5.  Faith  in  Christianity 164 

Concluding  Note  by  the  Editor       ....  196 


EDITOR'S   PREFACE. 

The  late  Mr.  George  John  Romanes  —  the 
author  within  the  last  few  years  of  Darwin  and 
After  Darwin,  and  of  the  Examinatioji  of  Weismann- 
ism — occupied  a  distinguished  place  in  contem- 
porary biology.  But  his  mind  was  also  continu- 
ously and  increasingly  active  on  the  problems  of 
metaphysics  and  theology.  And  at  his  death  in 
the  early  summer  of  this  year  (1894),  he  left 
among  his  papers  some  notes,  made  mostly  in  the 
previous  winter,  for  a  work  which  he  was  intend- 
ing to  write  on  the  fundamental  questions  of 
religion.  He  had  desired  that  these  notes  should 
be  given  to  me  and  that  I  should  do  with  them  as 
I  thought  best.  His  literary  executors  accord- 
ingly handed  them  over  to  me,  in  company  with 
some  unpublished  essays,  two  of  which  form  the 
first  part  of  the  present  volume. 

After  reading  the  notes  myself,  and  obtaining 
the  judgment  of  others  in  whom  I  feel  confidence 
upon  them,  I  have  no  hesitation  either  in  publishing 
by  far  the  greater  part  of  them,  or  in  publishing 
them  with  the  author's  name  in  spite  of  the  fact 
that  the  book  as  originally  projected  was  to  have 
been  anonymous.  From  the  few  words  which 
George  Romanes  said  to  me  on  the  subject,  I  have 

5 


6  THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION. 

no  doubt  that  he  realized  that  the  notes  if  pub- 
lished after  his  death  must  be  published  with  his 
name. 

I  have  said  that  after  reading  these  notes  I 
feel  no  doubt  that  they  ought  to  be  published. 
They  claim  it  both  by  their  intrinsic  value  and  by 
the  light  they  throw  on  the  religious  thought  of 
a  scientific  man  who  was  not  only  remarkably  able 
and  clear-headed,  but  also  many-sided,  as  few 
men  are,  in  his  capacities,  and  singularly  candid 
and  open-hearted.  To  all  these  qualities  the 
notes  which  are  now  offered  to  the  public  will 
bear  unmistakable  witness. 

With  more  hesitation  it  has  been  decided  to 
print  also  the  unpublished  essays  already  referred 
to.  These,  as  representing  an  earlier  stage  of 
thought  than  is  represented  in  the  notes,  naturally 
appear  first. 

Both  Essays  and  Notes,  however,  represent 
the  same  tendency  of  mind  from  a  position  of 
unbelief  in  the  Christian  Revelation  toward  one 
of  belief  in  it.  They  represent,  I  say,  a  tendency 
of  one  '  seeking  after  God  if  haply  he  might  feel 
after  Him  and  find  Him,'  and  not  a  position  of 
settled  orthodoxy.  Even  the  Notes  contain  in 
fact  many  things  which  could  not  come  from  a 
settled  believer.  This  being  so  it  is  natural  that 
I  should  say  a  word  as  to  the  way  in  which  I  have 
understood  my  function  as  an  editor.  I  have 
decided   the   question   of    publishing   each    Note 


EDITOR'S  PREFACE.  7 

solely  by  the  consideration  whether  or  no  it  was 
sufficiently  finished  to  be  intelligible.  I  have 
rigidly  excluded  any  question  of  my  own  agree- 
ment or  disagreement  with  it.  In  the  case  of  one 
Note  in  particular,  I  doubt  whether  I  should  have 
published  it  had  it  not  been  that  my  decided  dis- 
agreement with  its  contents  made  me  fear  that  I 
might  be  prejudiced  in  withholding  it. 

The  Notes,  with  the  papers  which  precede 
them,  will,  I  think,  be  better  understood  if  I  give 
some  preliminary  account  of  their  antecedents, 
that  is,  of  Romanes'  previous  publications  on  the 
subject  of  religion. 

In  1873  an  essay  of  George  Romanes  gained 
the  Burney  Prize  at  Cambridge,  the  subject  being 
Christia?i  Prayer  considered  in  relation  to  the  belief 
that  the  Almighty  governs  the  world  by  general  laws. 
This  was  published  in  1874,  with  an  appendix  on 
The  Physical  Efficacy  of  Prayer.  In  this  essay,  writ- 
ten when  he  was  twenty-five  years  old,  Romanes 
shows  the  characteristic  qualities  of  his  mind  and 
style  already  developed.  The  sympathy  with 
the  scientific  point  of  view  is  there,  as  might  be 
expected  perhaps  in  a  Cambridge  'Scholar  in 
Natural  Science:'  the  logical  acumen  and  love 
of  exact  distinctions  is  there :  there  too  the  nat- 
ural piety  and  spiritual  appreciation  of  the  nature 
of  Christian  prayer — a  piety  and  appreciation 
which  later  intellectual  habits  of  thought  could 
never   eradicate.      The   essay,   as  judged  by  the 


8  THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION. 

standard  of  prize  compositions,  is  of  remarkable 
ability,  and  strictly  proceeds  within  the  limits  of 
the  thesis.  On  the  one  side,  for  the  purpose  of 
the  argument,  the  existence  of  a  Personal  God  is 
assumed,1  and  also  the  reality  of  the  Christian 
Revelation  which  assures  us  that  we  have  reason 
to  expect  real  answers,  even  though  conditionally 
and  within  restricted  limits,  to  prayers  for  physical 
goods.2  On  the  other  side,  there  is  taken  for 
granted  the  belief  that  general  laws  pervade  the 
observable  domain  of  physical  nature.  Then  the 
question  is  considered — how  is  the  physical  effi- 
cacy of  prayer  which  the  Christian  accepts  on 
the  authority  of  revelation  compatible  with  the 
scientifically  known  fact  that  God  governs  the 
world  by  general  laws?  The  answer  is  mainly 
found  in  emphasizing  the  limited  sphere  within 
which  scientific  inquiry  can  be  conducted  and 
scientific  knowledge  can  obtain.  Special  divine 
acts  of  response  to  prayer,  even  in  the  physical 
sphere,  may  occur — force  may  be  even  originated 
in  response  to  prayer  —  and  still  not  produce  any 
phenomenon  such  as  science  must  take  cogni- 
zance of  and  regard  as  miraculous  or  contrary  to 
the  known  order. 

On  one  occasion  the  Notes  refer  back  to  this 
essay,3  and  more  frequently,  as  we  shall  have 
occasion  to  notice,  they  produce  thoughts  which 
had  already  been  expressed  in  the  earlier  work  but 

*p.  6  2p.  183.  3See  p.  115. 


EDITOR'S  PREFACE.  9 

had  been  obscured  or  repudiated  in  the  interval. 
I  have  no  grounds  for  knowing  whether  in  the  main 
Romanes  remained  satisfied  with  the  reasoning  and 
conclusion  of  his  earliest  essay,  granted  the  theistic 
hypothesis  on  which  it  rests.  But  this  hypothesis 
itself,  very  shortly  after  publishing  this  essay,  he 
was  led  to  repudiate.  In  other  words,  his  mind 
moved  rapidly  and  sharply  into  a  position  of 
reasoned  scepticism  about  the  existence  of  God 
at  all.  The  Burney  Essay  was  published  in 
1874.  Already  in  1876  at  least  he  had  written 
an  anonymous  work  with  a  wholly  sceptical  con- 
clusion, entitled  ■  A  Candid  Examination  of  The- 
ism,' by  Physicus}  As  the  Notes  were  written 
with  direct  reference  to  this  work,  some  detailed 
account  of  its  argument  seems  necessary  ;  and 
this  is  to  be  found  in  the  last  chapter  of  the  work 
itself,  where  the  author  summarizes  his  arguments 
and  draws  his  conclusions.  I  venture  therefore 
to  reproduce  this  chapter  at  length.2 

'§  1.  Our  analysis  is  now  at  an  end,  and  a 
very  few   words   will   here   suffice  to  convey  an 

Published  in  Triibner's  English  and  Foreign  Philosophical 
Library  in  1878,  but  written 'several  years  ago'  (preface).  'I 
have  refrained  from  publishing  it,'  the  author  explains,  '  lest,  after 
having  done  so,  I  should  find  that  more  mature  thought  had  mod- 
ified the  conclusions  which  the  author  sets  forth.' 

2At  times  I  have  sought  to  make  the  argument  of  the  chap- 
ter more  intelligible  by  introducing  references  to  earlier  parts  of 
the  book  or  explanations  in  my'  own  words.  These  latter  I  have 
inserted  in  square  brackets. 


io  THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION. 

epitomized  recollection  of  the  numerous  facts 
and  conclusions  which  we  have  found  it  necessary 
to  contemplate.  We  first  disposed  of  the  con- 
spicuously absurd  supposition  that  the  origin  of 
things,  or  the  mystery  of  existence  [i.  e.  the  fact 
that  anything  exists  at  all],  admits  of  being 
explained  by  the  theory  of  Theism  in  any  further 
degree  than  by  the  theory  of  Atheism.  Next  it 
was  shown  that  the  argument  "Our  heart  requires 
a  God  "  is  invalid,  seeing  that  such  a  subjective 
necessity,  even  if  made  out,  could  not  be  sufficient 
to  prove — or  even  to  render  probable — an  object- 
ive existence.  And  with  regard  to  the  further 
argument  that  the  fact  of  our  theistic  aspirations 
points  to  God  as  to  their  explanatory  cause,  it 
became  necessary  to  observe  that  the  argument 
could  only  be  admissible  after  the  possibility  of 
the  operation  of  natural  causes  [in  the  production 
of  our  theistic  aspirations]  had  been  excluded. 
Similarly  the  argument  from  the  supposed  intui- 
tive necessity  of  individual  thought  [i.  e.  the 
alleged  fact  that  men  find  it  impossible  to  rid 
themselves  of  the  persuasion  that  God  exists]  was 
found  to  be  untenable,  first,  because  even  if  the 
supposed  necessity  were  a  real  one,  it  would  only 
possess  an  individual  applicability ;  and  second, 
that,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  it  is  extremely  improbable 
that  the  supposed  necessity  is  a  real  necessity  even 
for  the  individual  who  asserts  it,  while  it  is  abso- 
lutely   certain    that   it   is   not    such    to   the    vast 


EDITOR'S  PREFACE.  n 

majority  of  the  race.  The  argument  from  the 
general  consent  of  mankind,  being  so  obviously 
fallacious  both  as  to  facts  and  principles,  was  passed 
over  without  comment;  while  the  argument  from 
a  first  cause  was  found  to  involve  a  logical  suicide. 
Lastly,  the  argument  that,  as  human  volition  is 
a  cause  in  nature,  therefore  all  causation  is  probably 
volitional  in  character,  was  shown  to  consist  in 
a  stretch  of  inference  so  outrageous  that  the 
argument  had  to  be  pronounced  worthless. 

'§  2.  Proceeding  next  to  examine  the  less 
superficial  arguments  in  favor  of  Theism,  it  was 
first  shown  that  the  syllogism,  All  known  minds 
are  caused  by  an  unknown  mind ;  our  mind  is  a 
known  mind  ;  therefore  our  mind  is  caused  by  an 
unknown  mind  —  is  asyllogism  that  is  inadmissible 
for  two  reasons.  In  the  first  place,  it  does  not 
account  for  mind  (in  the  abstract)  to  refer  it  to  a 
prior  mind  for  its  origin;  and  therefore,  although 
the  hypothesis,  if  admitted,  would  be  an  explana- 
tion of  known  mind,  it  is  useless  as  an  argument  for 
the  existence  of  the  unknown  mind,  the  assump- 
tion of  which  forms  the  basis  of  that  explanation. 
Again,  in  the  next  place,  if  it  be  said  that  mind 
is  so  far  an  entity  sui  generis  that  it  must  be  either 
self-existing  or  caused  by  another  mind,  there  is 
no  assignable  warrant  for  the  assertion.  And  this 
is  the  second  objection  to  the  above  syllogism; 
for  anything  within  the  whole  range  of  the  possi- 
ble may,  for  aught  that  we  can  tell,  be  competent 


12  THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION. 

to  produce  a  self-conscious  intelligence.  Thus 
an  objector  to  the  above  syllogism  need  not  hold 
any  theory  of  things  at  all;  but  even  as  opposed 
to  the  definite  theory  of  materialism,  the  above 
syllogism  has  not  so  valid  an  argumentative  basis 
to  stand  upon.  We  know  that  what  we  call  matter 
and  force  are  to  all  appearances  eternal,  while  we 
have  no  corresponding  evidence  of  a  mind  that 
is  even  apparently  eternal.  Further,  within  expe- 
rience mind  is  invariably  associated  with  highly 
differentiated  collocations  of  matter  and  distribu- 
tions of  force,  and  many  facts  go  to  prove,  and 
none  to  negative,  the  conclusion  that  the  grade 
of  intelligence  invariably  depends  upon,  or  at 
least  is  associated  with,  a  corresponding  grade  of 
cerebral  development.  There  is  thus  both  a  quali- 
tative and  a  quantitative  relation  between  intelli- 
gence and  a  cerebral  organization.  And  if  it  is 
said  that  matter  and  motion  cannot  produce  con- 
sciousness because  it  is  inconceivable  that  they 
should,  we  have  seen  at  some  length  that  this  is 
no  conclusive  consideration  as  applied  to  a  sub- 
ject of  the  confessedly  transcendental  nature,  and 
that  in  the  present  case  it  is  particularly  inconclu- 
sive, because,  as  it  is  speculatively  certain  that 
the  substance  of  mind  must  be  unknowable,  it 
seems  a  priori  probable  that,  whatever  is  the  cause 
of  the  unknowable  reality,  this  cause  should  be 
more  difficult  to  render  into  thought  in  that 
relation  than  would  some  other  hypothetical  sub- 


EDITOR'S  PREFACED  13 

stance  which  is  imagined  as  more  akin  to  mind. 
And  if  it  is  said  that  the  more  conceivable  cause 
is  the  more  probable  cause,  we  have  seen  that  it 
is  in  this  case  impossible  to  estimate  the  validity 
of  the  remark.  Lastly,  the  statement  that  the 
cause  must  contain  actually  all  that  its  effects  can 
contain,  was  seen  to  be  inadmissible  in  logic  and 
contradicted  by  everyday  experience;  while  the 
argument  from  the  supposed  freedom  of  the 
will  and  the  existence  of  the  moral  sense  was 
negatived  both  deductively  by  the  theory  of 
evolution,  and  inductively  by  the  doctrine  of 
utilitarianism.'  The  theory  of  the  freedom  of 
the  will  is  indeed  at  this  stage  of  thought 
utterly  untenable ; l  the  evidence  is  overwhelm- 
ing that  the  moral  sense  is  the  result  of  a  purely 
natural  evolution,2  and  this  result,  arrived  at 
on  general  grounds,  is  confirmed  with  irresist- 
ible force  by  the  account  of  our  human  con- 
science which  is  supplied  by  the  theory  of  utilita- 
rianism, a  theory  based  on  the  widest  and  most 
unexceptionable  of  inductions.3  '  On  the  whole, 
then,  with  regard  to  the  argument  from  the  exist- 
ence of  the  human  mind,  we  were  compelled  to 
decide  that  it  is  destitute  of  any  assignable  weight, 
there  being  nothing  more  to  lead  to  the  conclusion 
that  our  mind  has  been  caused  by  another  mind, 
than  to  the  conclusion  that  it  has  been  caused  by 
anything  else  whatsoever. 

'p*  25  2P-  29.  3p.  29. 


H  THOUGHTS  ON   RELIGION. 

'  §  3.  With  regard  to  the  argument  from  Design, 
it  was  observed  that  Mill's  presentation  of  it  [in 
his  Essay  on  Theisnt\  is  merely  a  resuscitation  of 
the  argument  as  presented  by  Paley,  Bell,  and 
Chalmers.  And  indeed  we  saw  that  the  first- 
named  writer  treated  this  whole  subject  with  a 
feebleness  and  inaccuracy  very  surprising  in  him; 
for  while  he  has  failed  to  assign  anything  like  due 
weight  to  the  inductive  evidence  of  organic 
evolution,  he  did  not  hesitate  to  rush  into  a 
supernatural  explanation  of  biological  phenomena. 
Morever,  he  has  failed  signally  in  his  analysis 
of  the  Design  argument,  seeing  that,  in  common 
with  all  previous  writers,  he  failed  to  observe  that 
it  is  utterly  impossible  for  us  to  know  the  relations 
in  which  the  supposed  Designer  stands  to  the 
Designed  —  much  less  to  argue  from  the  fact  that 
the  Supreme  Mind,  even  supposing  it  to  exist, 
caused  the  observable  products  by  any  particular 
intellectual  process.  In  other  words,  all  advocates 
of  the  Design  argument  have  failed  to  perceive 
that,  even  if  we  grant  nature  to  be  due  to  a  creat- 
ing Mind,  still  we  have  no  shadow  of  a  right  to 
conclude  that  this  Mind  can  only  have  exerted  its 
creative  power  by  means  of  such  and  such  cogi- 
tative operations.  How  absurd,  therefore,  must 
it  be  to  raise  the  supposed  evidence  of  such  cogi- 
tative operations  into  evidences  of  the  existence 
of  a  creating  Mind!  If  a  theist  retorts  that  it  is, 
after  all,  of  very  little  importance  whether  or  not 


EDITOR'S  PREFACE.  15 

we  are  able  to  divine  the  methods  of  creation,  so 
long  as  the  facts  are  there  to  attest  that,  in  some 
way  or  other,  the  observable  phenomena  of  nature 
must  be  due  to  Intelligence  of  some  kind  as  their 
ultimate  cause,  then  I  am  the  first  to  endorse  this 
remark.  It  has  always  appeared  to  me  one  of  the 
most  unaccountable  things  in  the  history  of  specu- 
lation that  so  many  competent  writers  can  have 
insisted  upon  Design  as  an  argument  for  Theism, 
when  they  must  all  have  known  perfectly  well 
that  they  have  no  means  of  ascertaining  the 
subjective  psychology  of  that  Supreme  Mind 
whose  existence  the  argument  is  adduced  to 
demonstrate.  The  truth  is,  that  the  argument, 
from  teleology  must,  and  can  only,  rest  upon  the 
observable  facts  of  nature,  without  reference  to 
the  intellectual  processes  by  which  these  facts  may 
be  supposed  to  have  been  accomplished.  But, 
looking  to  the  "  present  state  of  our  knowledge," 
this  is  merely  to  change  the  teleological  argument 
in  its  gross  Paleyian  form,  into  the  argument  from 
the  ubiquitous  operation  of  general  laws.' 

'§4.'  This  argument  was  thus1  stated  in  con- 
trast with  the  argument  from  design.  '  The  argu- 
ment from  design  says,  There  must  be  a  God, 
because  such  and  such  an  organic  structure  must 
have  been  due  to  such  and  such  an  intellectual 
process.  The  argument  from  general  laws  says, 
There  must  be  a  God,  because  such  and  such  an 

!P-45- 


16  THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION. 

organic  structure  must  in  some  way  or  other  have  been 
ultimately  due  to  intelligence.'  Every  structure 
exhibits  with  more  or  less  of  complexity  the 
principle  of  order  ;  it  is  related  to  all  other  things 
in  a  universal  order.  This  universality  of  order 
renders  irrational  the  hypothesis  of  chance  in 
accounting  for  the  universe.  '  Let  us  think  of  the 
supreme  causality  as  we  may,  the  fact  remains 
that  from  it  there  emanates  a  directive  influence  of 
uninterrupted  consistency,  on  a  scale  of  stupendous 
magnitude  and  exact  precision  worthy  of  our 
highest  conception  of  deity."  The  argument 
was  developed  in  the  words  of  Professor  Baden 
Powell.  '  That  which  requires  reason  and  thought 
to  understand  must  be  itself  thought  and  reason. 
That  which  mind  alone  can  investigate  or  express 
must  be  itself  mind.  And  if  the  highest  con- 
ception attained  is  but  partial,  then  the  mind  and 
reason  studied  is  greater  than  the  mind  and  reason 
of  the  student.  If  the  more  it  is  studied  the 
more  vast  and  complex  is  the  necessary 
connection  in  reason  disclosed,  then  the  more 
evident  is  the  vast  extent  and  compass  of  the 
reason  thus  partially  manifested  and  its  reality  as 
existi?ig  i?i  the  immutably  comiected  order  of  objects 
examined,  independently  of  the  mind  of  the 
investigator.'  This  argument  from  the  universal 
Kosmos  has  the  advantage  of  being  wholly  inde- 
pendent of  the  method  by  which  things  came 
!p.  47- 


EDITOR'S  PREFACE  17 

to  be  what  they  are.  It  is  unaffected  by  the 
acceptance  of  evolution.  Till  quite  recently  it 
seemed  irrefutable.1 

1  But  nevertheless  we  are  constrained  to 
acknowledge  that  its  apparent  power  dwindles  to 
nothing  in  view  of  the  indisputable  fact  that,  if 
force  and  matter  have  been  eternal,  all  and  every 
natural  law  must  have  resulted  by  way  of 
necessary  consequence.  ...  It  does  not  admit 
of  one  moment's  questioning  that  it  is  as  certainly 
true  that  all  the  exquisite  beauty  and  melodious 
harmony  of  nature  follow  necessarily  as  inevi- 
tably from  the  persistence  of  force  and  the 
primary  qualities  of  matter  as  it  is  certainly  true 
that  force  is  persistent  or  that  matter  is  extended 
or  impenetrable.2  ...  It  will  be  remembered 
that  I  dwelt  at  considerable  length  and  with  much 
earnestness  upon  this  truth,  not  only  because  of 
its  enormous  importance  in  its  bearing  upon  our 
subject,  but  also  because  no  one  has  hitherto  con- 
sidered it  in  that  relation.'  It  was  also  pointed 
out  that  the  coherence  and  correspondence  of  the 
macrocosm  of  the  universe  with  the  microcosm  of 
the  human  mind  can  be  accounted  for  by  the  fact 
that  the  human  mind  is  only  one  of  the  products 
of  general  evolution,  its  subjective  relations 
necessarily  reflecting  those  external  relations  of 
which  they  themselves  are  the  product.3 

'§  5.  The  next  step,  however,  was  to  mitigate 
!p.  51.    2p.  62.    3p.  60. 


18  THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION. 

the  severity  of  the  conclusion  that  was  liable  to  be 
formed  upon  the  utter  and  hopeless  collapse  of  all 
the  possible  arguments  in  favour  of  Theism. 
Having  fully  demonstrated  that  there  is  no  shadow 
of  a  positive  argument  in  support  of  the  theistic 
theory,  there  arose  the  danger  that  some  persons 
might  erroneously  conclude  that  for  this  reason 
the  theistic  theory  must  be  untrue.  It  therefore 
became  necessary  to  point  out  that  although,  as 
far  as  we  can  see,  nature  does  not  require  an 
Intelligent  Cause  to  account  for  any  of  her  phe- 
nomena, yet  it  is  possible  that,  if  we  could  see 
farther,  we  should  see  that  nature  could  not  be 
what  she  is  unless  she  had  owed  her  existence  to 
an  Intelligent  Cause.  Or,  in  other  words,  the 
probability  there  is  that  an  Intelligent  Cause  is 
unnecessary  to  explain  any  of  the  phenomena  of 
nature  is  only  equal  to  the  probability  there  is 
that  the  doctrine  of  the  persistence  of  force  is 
everywhere  and  eternally  true. 

1  As  a  final  step  in  our  analysis,  therefore,  we 
altogether  quitted  the  region  of  experience,  and 
ignoring  even  the  very  foundations  of  science, 
and  so  all  the  most  certain  of  relative  truths,  we 
carried  the  discussion  into  the  transcendental 
region  of  purely  formal  considerations.  And  here 
we  laid  down  the  canon,  "that  the  value  of  any 
probability,  in  its  last  analysis,  is  determined  by 
the  number,  the  importance,  and  the  definiteness 
of  the  relations  known,  as  compared  with  those  of 


EDITOR'S  PREFACE.  19 

the  relations  unknown  ;"  and,  consequently,  that 
in  cases  where  the  unknown  relations  are  more 
numerous,  more  important,  or  more  indefinite  than 
are  the  known  relations,  the  value  of  our  inference 
varies  inversely  as  the  difference  in  these  respects 
between  the  relations  compared.  From  which 
canon  it  followed,  that  as  the  problem  of  Theism 
is  the  most  ultimate  of  all  problems,  and  so 
contains  in  its  unknown  relations  all  that  is  to  man 
unknown  and  unknowable,  these  relations  must  be 
pronounced  the  most  indefinite  of  all  relations 
that  it  is  possible  for  man  to  contemplate ;  and, 
consequently,  that  although  we  have  here  the 
entire  range  of  experience  from  which  to  argue, 
we  are  unable  to  estimate  the  real  value  of  any 
argument  whatsoever.  The  unknown  relations 
in  our  attempted  mduction  being  wholly  indefinite, 
both  in  respect  of  their  number  and  importance, 
as  compared  with  the  known  relations,  it  is 
impossible  for  us  to  determine  any  definite  prob- 
ability either  for  or  against  the  being  of  a  God. 
Therefore,  although  it  is  true  that,  so  far  as  human 
science  can  penetrate  or  human  thought  infer,  we 
can  perceive  no  evidence  of  God,  yet  we  have  no 
right  on  this  account  to  conclude  that  there  is  no 
God.  The  probability,  therefore,  that  nature  is 
devoid  of  Deity  while  it  is  of  the  strongest  kind 
if  regarded  scientifically  —  amounting,  in  fact,  to 
a  scientific  demonstration  —  is  nevertheless  wholly 
worthless  if  regarded  logically.     Although   it    is 


20  THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION. 

as  true  as  is  the  fundamental  basis  of  all  science 
and  of  all  experience  that,  if  there  is  a  God,  His 
existence,  considered  as  a  cause  of  the  universe, 
is  superfluous,  it  may  nevertheless  be  true  that,  if 
there  had  never  been  a  God,  the  universe  could 
never  have  existed. 

1  Hence  these  formal  considerations  proved 
conclusively  that,  no  matter  how  great  the  proba- 
bility of  Atheism  might  appear  to  be  in  a  relative 
sense,  we  have  no  means  of  estimating  such 
probability  in  an  absolute  sense.  From  which 
position  there  emerged  the  possibility  of  another 
argument  in  favour  of  Theism  —  or  rather,  let  us 
say,  of  a  reappearance  of  the  teleological  argu- 
ment in  another  form.  For,  it  may  be  said,  seeing 
that  these  formal  considerations  exclude  legiti- 
mate reasoning  either  for  or  against  Deity  in  an 
absolute  sense,  while  they  do  not  exclude  such 
reasoning  in  a  relative  sense,  if  there  yet  remain 
any  theistic  deductions  which  may  properly  be 
drawn  from  experience,  these  may  now  be 
adduced  to  balance  the  atheistic  deductions  from 
the  persistence  of  force.  For  although  the  latter 
deductions  have  clearly  shown  the  existence  of 
Deity  to  be  superfluous  in  a  scientific  sense,  the 
formal  considerations  in  question  have  no  less 
clearly  opened  up  beyond  the  sphere  of  science  a 
possible  locus  for  the  existence  of  Deity ;  so  that 
if  there  are  any  facts  supplied  by  experience  for 
which  the  atheistic  deductions  appear  insufficient 


EDITOR'S  PREFACE.  21 

to  account,  we  are  still  free  to  account  for  them 
in  a  relative  sense  by  the  hypothesis  of  Theism. 
And,  it  may  be  urged,  we  do  find  such  an  unex- 
plained residuum  in  the  correlation  of  general 
laws  in  the  production  of  cosmic  harmony.  It 
signifies  nothing,  the  argument  may  run,  that  we 
are  unable  to  conceive  the  methods  whereby  the 
supposed  Mind  operates  in  producing  cosmic 
harmony ;  nor  does  it  signify  that  its  operation 
must  now  be  relegated  to  a  super-scientific 
province.  What  does  signify  is  that,  taking  a 
general  view  of  nature,  we  find  it  impossible  to 
conceive  of  the  extent  and  variety  of  her  har- 
monious processes  as  other  than  products  of 
intelligent  causation.  Now  this  sublimated  form  of 
the  teleological  argument,  it  will  be  remembered, 
I  denoted  a  metaphysical  teleology,  in  order 
sharply  to  distinguish  it  from  all  previous  forms 
of  that  argument,  which,  in  contradistinction,  I 
denoted  scientific  teleologies.  And  the  distinc- 
tion, it  will  be  remembered,  consisted  in  this  — 
that  while  all  previous  forms  of  teleology,  by 
resting  on  a  basis  which  was  not  beyond  the 
possible  reach  of  science,  laid  themselves  open  to 
the  possibility  of  scientific  refutation,  the  meta- 
physical system  of  teleology,  by  resting  on  a 
basis  which  is  clearly  beyond  the  possible  reach 
of  science,  can  never  be  susceptible  of  scientific 
refutation.  And  that  this  metaphysical  system  of 
teleology  does  rest  on  such  a  basis  is  indisputable  ; 


22  THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION. 

for  while  it  accepts  the  most  ultimate  truths  of 
which  science  can  ever  be  cognizant  —  viz.  the 
persistence  of  force  and  the  consequently  neces- 
sary genesis  of  natural  law — it  nevertheless 
maintains  that  the  necessity  of  regarding  Mind  as 
the  ultimate  cause  of  things  is  not  on  this  account 
removed ;  and,  therefore,  that  if  science  now 
requires  the  operation  of  a  Supreme  Mind  to  be 
posited  in  a  super-scientific  sphere,  then  in  a 
super-scientific  sphere  it  ought  to  be  posited.  No 
doubt  this  hypothesis  at  first  sight  seems  gratui- 
tous, seeing  that,  so  far  as  science  can  penetrate, 
there  is  no  need  of  any  such  hypothesis  at  all  — 
cosmic  harmony  resulting  as  a  physically  neces- 
sary consequence  from  the  combined  action  of 
natural  laws,  which  in  turn  result  as  a  physically 
necessary  consequence  of  the  persistence  of  force 
and  the  primary  qualities  of  matter.  But  although 
it  is  thus  indisputably  true  that  metaphysical  tele- 
ology is  wholly  gratuitous  if  considered  scientific- 
ally, it  may  not  be  true  that  it  is  wholly  gratui- 
tous if  considered  psychologically.  In  other  words, 
if  it  is  more  conceivable  that  Mind  should  be  the 
ultimate  cause  of  cosmic  harmony  than  that  the 
persistence  of  force  should  be  so,  then  it  is  not 
irrational  to  accept  the  more  conceivable  hypoth- 
esis in  preference  to  the  less  conceivable  one,  pro- 
vided that  the  choice  is  made  with  the  diffidence 
which  is  required  by  the  considerations  adduced 
in  Chapter  V   [especially  the    Canon  of  probability 


EDITOR'S  PREFACE.  23 

laid  down  in  the  second  paragraph  of  this  section, 

§5]- 

'I  conclude,  therefore,  that  the  hypothesis  of 

metaphysical  teleology,  although  in  a  physical 
sense  gratuitous,  may  be  in  a  psychological  sense 
legitimate.  But  as  against  the  fundamental  posi- 
tion on  which  alone  this  argument  can  rest  —  viz. 
the  position  that  the  fundamental  postulate  of 
Atheism  is  more  inconceivable  than  is  the  funda- 
mental postulate  of  Theism — we  have  seen  two 
important  objections  to  lie. 

'  For,  in  the  first  place,  the  sense  in  which  the 
word  "inconceivable"  is  here  used  is  that  of  the 
impossibility  of  framing  realizable  relations  in  the 
thought ;  not  that  of  the  impossibility  of  framing 
abstract  relations  in  thought.  In  the  same  sense, 
though  in  a  lower  degree,  it  is  true  that  the  com- 
plexity'of  the  human  organization  and  its  func- 
tions is  inconceivable ;  but  in  this  sense  the  word 
"inconceivable"  has  much  less  weight  in  an 
argument  than  it  has  in  its  true  sense.  And,  with- 
out waiting  again  to  dispute  (as  we  did  in  the  case 
of  the  speculative  standing  of  Materialism)  how 
far  even  the  genuine  test  of  inconceivability  ought 
to  be  allowed  to  make  against  an  inference  which 
there  is  a  body  of  scientific  evidence  to  substan- 
tiate, we  went  on  to  the  second  objection  against 
this  fundamental  position  of  metaphysical  tele- 
ology. This  objection,  it  will  be  remembered, 
was,  that  it  is  as  impossible  to  conceive  of  cosmic 


N 


24  THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION. 

harmony  as  an  effect  of  Mind  [i.  e.  Mind  being 
what  we  know  it  in  experience  to  be]  as  it  is  to 
conceive  of  it  as  an  effect  of  mindless  evolution. 
The  argument  from  inconceivability,  therefore, 
admits  of  being  turned  with  quite  as  terrible  an 
effect  on  Theism,  as  it  can  possibly  be  made  to 
exert  on  Atheism. 

'  Hence  this  more  refined  form  of  teleology 
which  we  are  considering,  and  which  we  saw  to 
be  the  last  of  the  possible  arguments  in  favour  of 
Theism,  is  met  on  its  own  ground  by  a  very  crush- 
ing opposition :  by  its  metaphysical  character  it 
has  escaped  the  opposition  of  physical  science, 
only  to  encounter  a  new  opposition  in  the  region 
of  pure  psychology  to  which  it  fled.  As  a  con- 
clusion to  our  whole  inquiry,  therefore,  it  devolved 
on  us  to  determine  the  relative  magnitudes  of  these 
opposing  forces.  And  in  doing  this  we  first  ob- 
served that,  if  the  supporters  of  metaphysical  tele- 
ology objected  a  priori  to  the  method  whereby 
the  genesis  of  natural  law  was  deduced  from  the 
datum  of  the  persistence  of  force,  in  that  this 
method  involved  an  unrestricted  use  of  illegiti- 
mate symbolic  conceptions  ;  then  it  is  no  less  open 
to  an  atheist  to  object  a  priori  to  the  method 
whereby  a  directing  Mind  was  inferred  from  the 
datum  of  cosmic  harmony,  in  that  this  method 
involved  the  postulation  of  an  unknowable  cause, — 
and  this  of  a  character  which  the  whole  history 
of  human  thought  has  proved  the  human  mind 


EDITOR'S  PREFACE.  25 

to  exhibit  an  overweening  tendency  to  postulate 
as  the  cause  of  natural  phenomena.  On  these 
grounds,  therefore,  I  concluded  that,  so  far  as 
their  respective  standing  a  priori  is  concerned, 
both  theories  may  be  regarded  as  about  equally 
suspicious.  And  similarly  with  regard  to  their 
standing  a  posteriori;  for  as  both  theories  require 
to  embody  at  least  one  infinite  term,  they  must 
each  alike  be  pronounced  absolutely  inconceiv- 
able. But,  finally,  if  the  question  were  put  to  me 
which  of  the  two  theories  I  regarded  as  the  more 
rational,  I  observed  that  this  is  a  question  which 
no  one  man  can  answer  for  another.  For  as  the 
test  of  absolute  inconceivability  is  equally 
destructive  of  both  theories,  if  a  man  wishes  to 
choose  between  them,  his  choice  can  only  be 
determined  by  what  I  have  designated  relative 
inconceivability — i.e.  in  accordance  with  the 
verdict  given  by  his  individual  sense  of  probabil- 
ity as  determined  by  his  previous  habit  of  thought. 
And  forasmuch  as  the  test  of  relative  inconceiv- 
ability may  be  held  in  this  matter  legitimately  to 
vary  with  the  character  of  the  mind  which  applies 
it,  the  strictly  rational  probability  of  the  question 
to  which  it  is  applied  varies  in  like  manner.  Or 
otherwise  presented,  the  only  alternative  for  any 
man  in  this  matter  is  either  to  discipline  himself 
into  an  attitude  of  pure  scepticism,  and  thus  to 
refuse  in  thought  to  entertain  either  a  probability 
or  an  improbability  concerning  the  existence  of 


26  THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION. 

a  God ;  or  else  to  incline  in  thought  towards  an 
affirmation  or  a  negation  of  God,  according  as  his 
previous  habits  of  thought  have  rendered  such 
an  inclination  more  facile  in  the  one  direction  than 
in  the  other.  And  although,  under  such  circum- 
stances, I  should  consider  that  man  the  more 
rational  who  carefully  suspended  his  judgment, 
I  conclude  that  if  this  course  is  departed  from, 
neither  the  metaphysical  teleologist  nor  the  scien- 
tific atheist  has  any  perceptible  advantage  over 
the  other  in  respect  to  rationality.  For  as  the 
formal  conditions  of  a  metaphysical  teleology  are 
undoubtedly  present  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  for- 
mal conditions  of  a  speculative  atheism  are  as 
undoubtedly  present  on  the  other,  there  is  thus 
in  both  cases  a  logical  vacuum  supplied  wherein 
the  pendulum  of  thought  is  free  to  swing  in  which- 
ever direction  it  may  be  made  to  swing  by  the 
momentum  of  preconceived  ideas. 

'&  6.  Such  is  the  outcome  of  our  investigation, 
and  considering  the  abstract  nature  of  the  subject, 
the  immense  divergence  of  opinion  which  at  the 
present  time  is  manifested  with  regard  to  it,  as 
well  as  the  confusing  amount  of  good,  bad  and 
indifferent  literature  on  both  sides  of  the  contro- 
versy which  is  extant ; — considering  these  things, 
I  do  not  think  that  the  result  of  our  inquiry  can 
be  justly  complained  of  on  the  score  of  its  lack- 
ing precision.  At  a  time  like  the  present,  when 
traditional    beliefs    respecting    Theism    are    so 


EDITOR'S  PREFACE.  27 

generally  accepted,  and  so  commonly  concluded 
as  a  matter  of  course  to  have  a  large  and  valid 
basis  of  induction  whereon  to  rest,  I  cannot  but 
feel  that  a  perusal  of  this  short  essay,  by  showing 
how  very  concise  the  scientific  stat?is  of  the  sub- 
ject really  is,  will  do  more  to  settle  the  minds  of 
most  readers  as  to  the  exact  standing  at  the 
present  time  of  all  the  probabilities  of  the 
question,  than  could  a  perusal  of  all  the  rest  of 
the  literature  upon  this  subject.  And,  looking  to 
the  present  condition  of  speculative  philosophy, 
I  regard  it  as  of  the  utmost  importance  to  have 
clearly  shown  that  the  advance  of  science  has 
now  entitled  us  to  assert,  without  the  least  hesita- 
tion, that  the  hypothesis  of  Mind  in  nature  is  as 
certainly  superfluous  to  account  for  any  of  the 
phenomena  of  nature,  as  the  scientific  doctrine  of 
the  persistence  of  force  and  the  indestructibility 
of  matter  is  certainly  true. 

'On  the  other  hand,  if  any  one  is  inclined  to 
complain  that  the  logical  aspect  of  the  question 
has  not  proved  itself  so  unequivocally  definite  as 
has  the  scientific,  I  must  ask  him  to  consider  that, 
in  any  matter  which  does  not  admit  of  actual 
demonstration,  some  margin  must  of  necessity  be 
left  for  variations  of  individual  opinion.  And,  if  he 
bears  this  consideration  in  mind,  I  feel  sure  that  he 
cannot  properly  complain  of  my  not  having  done 
my  utmost  in  this  case  to  define  as  sharply  as  pos- 
sible the  character  and  the  limits  of  this  margin.- 


28  THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION. 

4§  7.  And  now,  in  conclusion,  I  feel  it  is 
desirable  to  state  that  any  antecedent  bias  with 
regard  to  Theism  which  I  individually  possess  is 
unquestionably  on  the  side  of  traditional  beliefs. 
It  is  therefore  with  the  utmost  sorrow  that  I  find 
myself  compelled  to  accept  the  conclusions  here 
worked  out;  and  nothing  would  have  induced  me 
to  publish  them,  save  the  strength  of  my  convic- 
tion that  it  is  the  duty  of  every  member  of 
society  to  give  his  fellows  the  benefit  of  his 
labours  for  whatever  they  may  be  worth.  Just  as 
I  am  confident  that  truth  must  in  the  end  be  the 
most  profitable  for  the  race,  so  I  am  persuaded 
that  every  individual  endeavour  to  attain  it,  pro- 
vided only  that  such  endeavour  is  unbiased  and 
sincere,  ought  without  hesitation  to  be  made  the 
common  property  of  all  men,  no  matter  in  what 
direction  the  results  of  its  promulgation  may 
appear  to  tend.  And  so  far  as  the  ruination  of 
individual  happiness  is  concerned,  no  one  can 
have  a  more  lively  perception  than  myself  of  the 
possibly  disastrous  tendency  of  my  work.  So  far 
as  I  am  individually  concerned,  the  result  of  this 
analysis  has  been  to  show  that,  whether  I  regard 
the  problem  of  Theism  on  the  lower  plane  of 
strictly  relative  probability,  or  on  the  higher 
plane  of  purely  formal  considerations,  it  equally 
becomes  my  obvious  duty  to  stifle  all  belief  of  the 
kind  which  I  conceive  to  be  the  noblest,  and  to 
discipline  my  intellect  with  regard  to  this  matter 


EDITOR'S  PREFACE.  29 

into  an  attitude  of  the  purest  scepticism.  And 
forasmuch  as  I  am  far  from  being  able  to  agree 
with  those  who  affirm  that  the  twilight  doctrine 
of  the  "new  faith"  is  a  desirable  substitute  for 
the  waning  splendour  of  "the  old,"  I  am  not 
ashamed  to  confess  that  with  this  virtual  negation 
of  God  the  universe  to  me  has  lost  its  soul  of 
loveliness  ;  and  although  from  henceforth  the  pre- 
cept to  "work  while  it  is  day"  will  doubtless  but 
gain  an  intensified  force  from  the  terribly  intensi- 
fied meaning  of  the  words  that  "the  night  cometh 
when  no  man  can  work,"  yet  when  at  times  I 
think,  as  think  at  times  I  must,  of  the  appalling 
contrast  between  the  hallowed  glory  of  that  creed 
which  once  was  mine,  and  the  lonely  mystery  of 
existence  as  now  I  find  it, —  at  such  times  I  shall 
ever  feel  it  impossible  to  avoid  the  sharpest  pang 
of  which  my  nature  is  susceptible.  For  whether 
it  be  due  to  my  intelligence  not  being  sufficiently 
advanced  to  meet  the  requirements  of  the  age,  or 
whether  it  be  due  to  the  memory  of  those  sacred 
associations  which  to  me  at  least  were  the  sweet- 
est that  life  has  given,  I  cannot  but  feel  that  for 
me,  and  for  others  who  think  as  I  do,  there  is  a 
dreadful  truth  in  those  words  of  Hamilton, — 
Philosophy  having  become  a  meditation,  not 
merely  of  death,  but  of  annihilation,  the  precept 
know  thyself  has  become  transformed  into  the 
terrific  oracle  to  CEdipus  — 

"  Mayest  thou  ne'er  know  the  truth  of  what  thou  art." ' 


30  THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION. 

This  analysis  will  have  been  at  least  sufficient 
to  give  a  clear  idea  of  the  general  argument  of 
the  Candid  Examination  and  of  its  melancholy  con- 
clusions. What  will  most  strike  a  somewhat 
critical  reader  is  perhaps  ( I )  the  tone  of  certainty, 
and  (2)  the  belief  in  the  almost  exclusive  right 
of  the  scientific  method  in  the  court  of  reason. 

As  evidence  of  ( 1 )  I  would  adduce  the  follow- 
ing brief  quotations : — 

P.  xi.  '  Possible  errors  in  reasoning  apart,  the 
rational  position  of  Theism  as  here  defined  must 
remain  without  material  modification  as  long  as 
our  intelligence  remains  human.' 

P.  24.  'I  am  quite  unable  to  understand  how 
any  one  at  the  present  day,  and  with  the  most 
moderate  powers  of  abstract  thinking,  can  possibly 
bring  himself  to  embrace  the  theory  of  Free-will.' 

P.  64.  'Undoubtedly  we  have  no  alternative 
but  to  conclude  that  the  hypothesis  of  mind  in 
nature  is  now  logically  proved  to  be  as  certainly 
superfluous  as  the  very  basis  of  all  science  is  cer- 
tainly true.  There  can  no  longer  be  any  more 
doubt  that  the  existence  of  a  God  is  wholly 
unnecessary  to  explain  any  of  the  phenomena  of 
the  universe,  than  there  is  doubt  that  if  I  leave 
go  of  my  pen  it  will  fall  upon  the  table.' 

As  evidence  of  (2)  I  would  adduce  from  the 
preface — 

'To  my   mind,  therefore,  it  is  impossible  to 


EDITOR'S  PREFACE.  31 

resist  the  conclusion  that,  lookingto  this  undoubted 
pre-eminence  of  the  scientific  methods  as  ways  to 
truth,  whether  or  not  there  is  a  God,  the  question 
as  to  his  existence  is  both  more  morally  and  more 
reverently  contemplated  if  we  regard  it  purely  as 
a  problem  for  methodical  analysis  to  solve,  than 
if  we  regard  it  in  any  other  light.' 

It  is  in  respect  both  of  (1)  and  (2)  that  the 
change  in  Romanes'  thought  as  exhibited  in  his 
later  Notes  is  most  conspicuous.1 

At  what  date  George  Romanes'  mind  began  to 
react  from  the  conclusions  of  the  Candid  Exam- 
ination I  cannot  say.  But  after  a  period  of  ten 
years — in  his  Rede  lecture  of  1885 2 — we  find 
his   frame  of    mind  very   much    changed.     This 

IWith  reference  to  the  views  and  arguments  of  the  Candid 
Examination,  it  may  be  interesting  to  notice  here  in  detail  that 
George  Romanes  (1)  came  to  attach  much  more  importance  to  the 
subjective  religious  needs  and  intuitions  of  the  human  spirit  (pp. 
131  ff.);  (2)  perceived  that  the  subjective  religious  consciousness 
can  be  regarded  objectively  as  a  broad  human  phenomenon  (pp. 
147  f.);  (3)  criticized  his  earlier  theory  of  causation  and  returned 
towards  the  theory  that  all  causation  is  volitional  (pp.  102,  118); 
(4)  definitely  repudiated  the  materialistic  account  of  the  origin  of 
mind  (pp.  30,  31);  (5)  returned  to  the  use  of  the  expression  'the 
argument  from  design,'  and  therefore  presumably  abandoned  his 
strong  objection  to  it;  (6)  'saw  through'  Herbert  Spencer's  refu- 
tation of  the  wider  teleology  expressed  by  Baden  Powell,  and  felt 
the  force  of  the  teleology  again  (p.  72);  (7)  recognized  that  the 
scientific  objections  to  the  doctrine  of  the  freedom  of  the  will  are 
not  finally  valid  (p.  128). 

9  See  Contemporary  Review,  July,  1885,  p.  93. 


32  THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION. 

lecture,  on  Mind  a?id  Motion,  consists  of  a  severe 
criticism  of  the  materialistic  account  of  mind. 
On  the  other  hand  'spiritualism' — or  the  theory 
which  would  suppose  that  mind  is  the  cause  of 
motion  —  is  pronounced  from  the  point  of  view 
of  science  not  impossible  indeed  but  'unsatisfac- 
tory,' and  the  more  probable  conclusion  is  found 
in  a  'monism'  like  Bruno's — according  to  which 
mind  and  motion  are  co-ordinate  and  probably 
co-extensive  aspects  of  the  same  universal  fact  — 
a  monism  which  may  be  called  Pantheism,  but 
may  also  be  regarded  as  an  extension  of  con- 
tracted views  of  Theism.1  The  position  repre- 
sented by  this  lecture  may  be  seen  sufficiently 
from  its  conclusion  : — 

'If  the  advance  of  natural  science  is  now 
steadily  leading  us  to  the  conclusion  that  there  is 
no  motion  without  mind,  must  we  not  see  how  the 
independent  conclusion  of  mental  science  is  thus 
independently  confirmed  —  the  conclusion,  I  mean, 

JIn  some  'Notes'  of  the  Summer  of  1893  I  find  the  statement, 
'The  result  (of  philosophical  inquiry)  has  been  that  in  his  millen- 
nial contemplation  and  experience  man  has  attained  certainty  with 
regard  to  certain  aspects  of  the  world  problem,  no  less  secure  than 
that  which  he  has  gained  in  the  domain  of  physical  science,  e.  g. 
Logical  priority  of  mind  over  matter. 
Consequent  untenability  of  materialism. 
Relativity  of  knowledge. 

The  order  of  nature,  conservation  of  energy  and  indestructibility 
of  matter  within  human  experience,  the  principle  of  evolution 
and  survival  of  the  fittest.' 


EDITOR'S  PREFACE.  33 

that  there  is  no  being  without  knowing  ?  To  me, 
at  least,  it  does  appear  that  the  time  has  come 
when  we  may  begin,  as  it  were  in  a  dawning  light, 
to  see  that  the  study  of  Nature  and  the  study  of 
Mind  are  meeting  upon  this  greatest  of  possible 
truths.  And  if  this  is  the  case  — if  there  is  no 
motion  without  mind,  no  beingwithout  knowing  — 
shall  we  infer,  with  Clifford,  that  universal  being 
is  mindless,  or  answer  with  a  dogmatic  negative 
that  most  stupendous  of  questions, —  Is  there 
knowledge  with  the  Most  High  ?  If  there  is  no 
motion  without  mind,  no  being  without  knowing, 
may  we  not  rather  infer,  with  Bruno,  that  it  is  in 
the  medium  of  mind,  and  in  the  medium  of 
knowledge,  we  live,  and  move,  and  have  our 
being? 

'This,  I  think,  is  the  direction  in  which  the 
inference  points,  if  we  are  careful  to  set  out  the 
logical  conditions  with  complete  impartiality.  But 
the  ulterior  question  remains,  whether,  so  far  as 
science  is  concerned,  it  is  here  possible  to  point 
any  inference  at  all ;  the  whole  orbit  of  human 
knowledge  may  be  too  narrow  to  afford  a  parallax 
for  measurements  so  vast.  Yet  even  here,  if  it  be 
true  that  the  voice  of  science  must  thus  of  neces- 
sity speak  the  language  of  agnosticism,  at  least 
let  us  see  to  it  that  the  language  is  pure ; x  let  us 
not  tolerate  any  barbarisms  introduced  from  the 
side  of  aggressive  dogma.     So  shall  we  find  that 

*For  the  meaning  of  'pure'  agnosticism  see  below,  p.  1 13. 


34  THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION. 

this  new  grammar  of  thought  does  not  admit  of 
any  constructions  radically  opposed  to  more  ven- 
erable ways  of  thinking ;  even  if  we  do  not  find 
that  the  often-quoted  words  of  its  earliest  formu- 
lator  apply  with  special  force  to  its  latest  dialects 
—  that  if  a  little  knowledge  of  physiology  and  a 
little  knowledge  of  psychology  dispose  men  to 
atheism,  a  deeper  knowledge  of  both,  and,  still 
more,  a  deeper  thought  upon  their  relations  to 
one  another,  will  lead  men  back  to  some  form  of 
religion,  which  if  it  be  more  vague,  may  also  be 
more  worthy  than  that  of  earlier  days.' 

Some  time  before  1889  three  articles  were  writ- 
ten for  the  Nineteenth  Century  on  the  Influence  of 
Science  upon  Religion.  They  were  never  published, 
for  what  reason  I  am  not  able  to  ascertain.  But 
I  have  thought  it  worth  while  to  print  the  first 
two  of  them  as  a  'first  part'  of  this  volume,  both 
because  they  contain — written  in  George  Romanes' 
own  name — an  important  criticism  upon  the  Can- 
did Examination  which  he  had  published  anony- 
mously, and  also  because,  with  their  entirely  scep- 
tical result,  they  exhibit  very  clearly  a  stage  in 
the  mental  history  of  their  author.  The  antece- 
dents of  these  papers  those  who  have  read  this 
Introduction  will  now  be  in  a  position  to  under- 
stand. What  remains  to  be  said  by  way  of  fur- 
ther introduction  to  the  Notes  had  better  be 
reserved  till  later.  C.  G. 


PART  I. 


35 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  SCIENCE 
UPON   RELIGION. 

I. 

I  propose  to  consider,  in  a  series  of  three 
papers,  the  influence  of  Science  upon  Religion. 
In  doing  this  I  shall  seek  to  confine  myself  to  the 
strictly  rational  aspect  of  the  subject,  without 
travelling  into  matters  of  sentiment.  Moreover, 
I  shall  aim  at  estimating  in  the  first  instance  the 
kind  and  degree  of  influence  which  has  been 
exerted  by  Science  upon  Religion  in  the  past,  and 
then  go  on  to  estimate  the  probable  extent  of  this 
influence  in  the  future.  The  first  two  papers  will 
be  devoted  to  the  past  and  prospective  influence 
of  Science  upon  Natural  Religion,  while  the  third 
will  be  devoted  to  the  past  and  prospective  influ- 
ence of  Science  upon  Revealed  Religion.1 

Few  subjects  have  excited  so  much  interest  of 
late  years  as  that  which  I  thus  mark  out  for  dis- 
cussion. This  can  scarcely  be  considered  a  mat- 
ter of  surprise,  seeing  that  the  influence  in  ques- 
tion is  not  only  very  direct,  but   also   extremely 

1  [The  third  paper  is  not  published  because  Romanes'  views 
on  the  relation  between  science  and  faith  in  Revealed  Religion 
are  better  and  more  maturely  expressed  in  the  Notes. —  Ed.] 

37 


38  THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION. 

important  from  every  point  of  view.  For  genera- 
tions and  for  centuries  in  succession  Religion 
maintained  an  undisputed  sway  over  men's  minds 
— if  not  always  as  a  practical  guide  in  matters  of 
conduct,  at  least  as  a  regulator  of  belief.  Even 
among  the  comparatively  few  who  in  previous 
centuries  professedly  rejected  Christianity,  there 
can  be  no  doubt  that  their  intellectual  conceptions 
were  largely  determined  by  it :  for  Christianity 
being  then  the  only  court  of  appeal  with  reference 
to  all  these  conceptions,  even  the  few  minds  which 
were  professedly  without  its  jurisdiction  could 
scarcely  escape  its  indirect  influence  through  the 
minds  of  others.  But  as  side  by  side  with  the 
venerable  institution  a  new  court  of  appeal  was 
gradually  formed,  we  cannot  wonder  that  it  should 
have  come  to  be  regarded  in  the  light  of  a  rival 
to  the  old — more  especially  as  the  searching 
methods  of  its  inquiry  and  the  certain  character 
of  its  judgments  were  much  more  in  consonance 
with  the  requirements  of  an  age  disposed  to  scep- 
ticism. And  this  spirit  of  rivalry  is  still  further 
fostered  by  the  fact  that  Science  has  unquestion- 
ably exerted  upon  Religion  what  Mr.  Fiske  terms 
a  'purifying  influence.'  That  is  to  say,  not  only 
are  the  scientific  methods  of  inquiry  after  truth 
more  congenial  to  sceptical  minds  than  are  the 
religious  methods  (which  may  be  broadly  defined 
as  accepting  truth  on  authority),  but  the  results  of 
the  former  have  more  than  once  directly  contra- 


INFLUENCE  OF  SCIENCE  UPON  RELIGION.       39 

dieted  those  of  the  latter:  science  has  in  several 
cases  incontestably  demonstrated  that  religious 
teaching  has  been  wrong  as  to  matters  of  fact. 
Further  still,  the  great  advance  of  natural  knowl- 
edge which  has  characterized  the  present  century, 
has  caused  our  ideas  upon  many  subjects  con- 
nected with  philosophy  to  undergo  a  complete 
metamorphosis.  A  well-educated  man  of  the 
present  day  is  absolutely  precluded  from  regard- 
ing some  of  the  Christian  dogmas  from  the  same 
intellectual  standpoint  as  his  forefathers,  even 
though  he  may  still  continue  to  accept  them  in 
some  other  sense.  In  short,  our  whole  key  of 
thinking  or  tone  of  thought  having  been  in  cer- 
tain respects  changed,  we  can  no  longer  anticipate 
that  in  these  respects  it  should  continue  to  har- 
monize with  the  unalterable  system  of  theology. 
Such  I  conceive  to  be  the  ways  in  which 
Science  has  exerted  her  influence  upon  Religion, 
and  it  is  needless  to  dwell  upon  the  potency  of 
their  united  effect.  No  one  can  read  even  a 
newspaper  without  perceiving  how  great  this 
effect  has  been.  On  the  one  hand,  sceptics  are 
triumphantly  confident  that  the  light  of  dawning 
knowledge  has  begun  finally  to  dispel  the  darkness 
of  superstition,  while  religious  persons,  on  the 
other  hand,  tremble  to  think  what  the  future,  if 
judged  by  the  past,  is  likely  to  bring  forth.  On 
both  sides  we  have  free  discussion,  strong  lan- 
guage, and  earnest  canvassing.    Year  by  year  stock 


40  THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION. 

is  taken,  and  year  by  year  the  balance  is  found 
to  preponderate  in  favour  of  Science. 

This  being  the  state  of  things  of  the  present 
time,  I  think  that  with  the  experience  of  the  kind 
and  degree  of  influence  which  Science  has  exerted 
upon  Religion  in  the  past,  we  have  material 
enough  whereby  to  estimate  the  probable  extent 
of  such  influence  in  the  future.  This,  therefore, 
I  shall  endeavour  to  do  by  seeking  to  define,  on 
general  principles,  the  limits  within  which  it  is 
antecedently  possible  that  the  influence  in  question 
can  be  exercised.  But  in  order  to  do  this,  it  is 
necessary  to  begin  by  estimating  the  kind  and 
degree  of  the  influence  which  has  been  exerted  by 
Science  upon  Religion  in  the  past. 

Thus  much  premised,  we  have  in  the  first  place 
to  define  the  essential  nature  both  of  Science  and 
of  Religion  :  for  this  is  clearly  the  first  step  in  an 
analysis  which  has  for  its  object  an  estimation  of 
the  actual  and  possible  effects  of  one  of  these 
departments  of  thought  upon  the  other. 

Science,  then,  is  essentially  a  department  of 
thought  having  exclusive  reference  to  the  Proxi- 
mate. More  particularly,  it  is  a  department  of 
thought  having  for  its  object  the  explanation  of 
natural  phenomena  by  the  discovery  of  natural 
(or  proximate)  causes.  In  so  far  as  Science 
ventures  to  trespass  beyond  this  her  only  legiti- 
mate domain,  and  seeks  to  interpret  natural 
phenomena  by   the  immediate  agency   of  super- 


INFLUENCE  OF  SCIENCE  UPON  RELIGION.      41 

natural  or  ultimate  causes,  in  that  degree  has  she 
ceased  to  be  physical  science,  and  become  onto- 
logical  speculation.  The  truth  of  this  statement 
has  now  been  practically  recognized  by  all 
scientific  workers  ;  and  terms  describing  final 
causes  have  been  banished  from  their  vocabulary 
in  astronomy,  chemistry,  geology,  biology,  and 
even  in  psychology. 

Religion,  on  the  other  hand,  is  a  department 
of  thought  having  no  less  exclusive  reference  to 
the  Ultimate.  More  particularly,  it  is  a  depart- 
ment of  thought  having  for  its  object  a  self- 
conscious  and  intelligent  Being,  which  it  regards 
as  a  personal  God,  and  the  fountain-head  of  all 
causation.  I  am,  of  course,  aware  that  the  term 
Religion  has  been  of  late  years  frequently  used 
in  senses  which  this  definition  would  not  cover  ; 
but  I  conceive  that  this  only  shows  how  frequently 
the  term  in  question  has  been  abused.  To  call 
any  theory  of  things  a  Religion  which  does  not' 
present  any  belief  in  any  form  of  Deity,  is  to 
apply  the  word  to  the  very  opposite  of  that  which 
it  has  hitherto  been  used  to  denote.  To  speak  of 
the  Religion  of  the  Unknowable,  the  Religion  of 
Cosmism,  the  Religion  of  Humanity,  and  so  forth, 
where  the  personality  of  the  First  Cause  is  not 
recognized,  is  as  unmeaning  as  it  would  be  to 
speak  of  the  love  of  a  triangle,  or  the  rationality 
of  the  equator.  That  is  to  say,  if  any  meaning  is 
to  be  extracted  from  the  terms  at  all,  it  is  only  to 


42  THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION.    ' 

be  so  by  using  them  in  some  metaphorical  sense. 
We  may,  for  instance,  say  that  there  is  such  a 
thing  as  a  Religion  of  Humanity,  because  we  may 
begin  by  deifying  Humanity  in  our  own  estima- 
tion, and  then  go  on  to  worship  our  ideal.  But 
by  thus  giving  Humanity  the  name  of  Deity  we 
are  not  really  creating  a  new  religion  :  we  are 
merely  using  a  metaphor,  which  may  or  may  not 
be  successful  as  a  matter  of  poetic  diction,  but 
which  most  assuredly  presents  no  shred  of  value 
as  a  matter  of  philosophical  statement.  Indeed, 
in  this  relation  it  is  worse  than  valueless :  it  is 
misleading.  Variations  or  reversals  in  the  mean- 
ings of  words  are  not  of  uncommon  occurrence  in 
the  ordinary  growth  of  languages  ;  but  it  is  not 
often  that  we  find,  as  in  this  case,  the  whole  mean- 
ing of  a  term  intentionally  and  gratuitously 
changed  by  the  leaders  of  philosophical  thought. 
Humanity,  for  example,  is  an  abstract  idea  of  our 
own  making  :  it  is  not  an  object  any  more  than 
the  equator  is  an  object.  Therefore,  if  it  were 
possible  to  construct  a  religion  by  this  curious 
device  of  metaphorically  ascribing  to  Humanity 
the  attributes  of  Deity,  it  ought  to  be  as  logically 
possible  to  construct,  let  us  say,  a  theory  of 
brotherly  regard  towards  the  equator,  by  meta- 
phorically ascribing  to  it  the  attributes  of  man. 
The  distinguishing  features  of  any  theory  which 
can  properly  be  termed  a  Religion,  is  that  it 
should  refer  to  the  ultimate  source,  or  sources  of 


INFLUENCE  OF  SCIENCE  UPON  RELIGION.      43 

things :  and  that  it  should  suppose  this  source  to 
be  of  an  objective,  intelligent,  and  personal 
nature.  To  apply  the  term  Religion  to  any  other 
theory  is  merely  to  abuse  it. 

From  these  definitions,  then,  it  appears  that 
the  aims  and  methods  of  Science  are  exclusively 
concerned  with  the  ascertaining  and  the  proof  of 
the  proximate  How  of  things  and  processes 
physical  :  her  problem  is,  as  Mill  states  it,  to 
discover  what  are  the  fewest  number  of  (phe- 
nomenal) data  which,  being  granted,  will  explain 
the  phenomena  of  experience.  On  the  other 
hand,  Religion  is  not  in  any  way  concerned  with 
causation,  further  than  to  assume  that  all  things 
and  all  processes  are  ultimately  due  to  intelligent 
personality.  Religion  is  thus,  as  Mr.  Spencer 
says,  '  an  a  priori  theory  of  the  universe' — to 
which,  however,  we  must  add, '  and  a  theory  which 
assumes  intelligent  personality  as  the  originating 
source  of  the  universe.'  Without  this  needful 
addition,  a  religion  would  be  in  no  way  logically 
distinguished  from  a  philosophy. 

From  these  definitions,  then,  it  clearly  follows 
that  in  their  purest  forms,  Science  and  Religion 
really  have  no  point  of  logical  contact.  Only  if 
Science  could  transcend  the  conditions  of  space 
and  time,  of  phenomenal  relativity,  and  of  all 
human  limitations,  only  then  could  Science  be  in 
a  position  to  touch  the  supernatural  theory  of 
Religion.    But  obviously,  if  Science  could  do  this, 


44  THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION. 

she  would  cease  to  be  Science.  In  soaring  above 
the  region  of  phenomena  and  entering  the  tenuous 
aether  of  noumena,  her  present  wings,  which  we 
call  her  methods,  would  in  such  an  atmosphere  be 
no  longer  of  any  service  for  movement.  Out  of 
time,  out  of  place,  and  out  of  phenomenal  relation, 
Science  could  no  longer  exist  as  such. 

On  the  other  hand,  Religion  in  its  purest  form 
is  equally  incompetent  to  affect  Science.  For,  as 
we  have  already  seen,  Religion  as  such  is  not  con- 
cerned with  the  phenomenal  sphere :  her  theory 
of  ontology  cannot  have  any  reference  to  the  How 
of  phenomenal  causation.  Hence  it  is  evident 
that,  as  in  their  purest  or  most  ideal  forms  they 
move  in  different  mental  planes,  Science  and 
Religion  cannot  exhibit  interference. 

Thus  far  the  remarks  which  I  have  made  apply 
equally  to  all  forms  of  Religion,  as  such,  whether 
actual  or  possible,  and  in  so  far  as  the  Religion  is 
pure.  But  it  is  notorious  that  until  quite  recently 
Religion  did  exercise,  upon  Science,  not  only  an 
influence,  but  an  overpowering  influence.  Belief 
in  divine  agency  being  all  but  universal,  while  the 
methods  of  scientific  research  had  not  as  yet  been 
distinctly  formulated,  it  was  in  previous  genera- 
tions the  usual  habit  of  mind  to  refer  any  natural 
phenomenon,  the  physical  causation  of  which  had 
not  been  ascertained,  to  the  more  or  less  imme- 
diate causal  action  of  the  Deity.  But  we  now  see 
that  this  habit  of  mind  arose  from  a  failure  to 


INFLUENCE  OF  SCIENCE  UPON  RELIGION.      45 

distinguish  between  the  essentially  distinct  char- 
acters of  Science  and  Religion  as  departments  of 
thought,  and  therefore  that  it  was  only  so  far  as 
the  Religion  of  former  times  was  impure  —  or 
mixed  with  the  ingredients  of  thought  which 
belong  to  Science  —  that  the  baleful  influence  in 
question  was  exerted.  The  gradual,  successive, 
and  now  all  but  total  abolition  of  final  causes  from 
the  thoughts  of  scientific  men,  to  which  allusion 
has  already  been  made,  is  merely  an  expression  of 
the  fact  that  scientific  men  as  a  body  have  come 
fully  to  recognize  the  fundamental  distinction 
between  Science  and  Religion  which  I  have  stated. 
Or,  to  put  the  matter  in  another  way,  scientific 
men  as  a  body  —  and,  indeed,  all  persons  whose 
ideas  on  such  matters  are  abreast  of  the  times  — 
perceive  plainly  enough  that  a  religious  explana- 
tion of  any  natural  phenomenon  is,  from  a  scien- 
tific point  of  view,  no  explanation  at  all.  For  a 
religious  explanation  consists  in  referring  the 
observed  phenomenon  to  the  First  Cause  —  i.  e.  to 
merge  that  particular  phenomenon  in  the  general 
or  final  mystery  of  things.  A  scientific  explana- 
tion, on  the  other  hand,  consists  in  referring  the 
observed  phenomenon  to  its  physical  causes,  and 
in  no  case  can  such  an  explanation  entertain  the 
hypothesis  of  a  final  cause  without  abandoning  its 
character  as  a  scientific  explanation.  For  example, 
if  a  child  brings  me  a  flower  and  asks  why  it  has 
such  a  curious  form,  bright  colour,  sweet  perfume, 


46  THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION. 

and  so  on,  and  if  I  answer,  Because  God  made  it 
so,  I  am  not  really  answering  the  child's  question : 
I  am  merely  concealing  my  ignorance  of  Nature 
under  a  guise  of  piety,  and  excusing  my  indolence 
in  the  study  of  botany.  It  was  the  appreciation 
of  this  fact  that  led  Mr.  Darwin  to  observe  in  his 
Origin  of  Species  that  the  theory  of  creation  does 
not  serve  to  explain  any  of  the  facts  with  which  it 
is  concerned,  but  merely  re-states  these  facts  as 
they  are  observed  to  occur.  That  is  to  say,  by 
thus  merging  the  facts  as  observed  into  the  final 
mystery  of  things,  we  are  not  even  attempting  to 
explain  them  in  any  scientific  sense  :  for  it  would 
be  obviously  possible  to  get  rid  of  the  necessity 
of  thus  explaining  any  natural  phenomenon  what- 
soever by  referring  it  to  the  immediate  causal 
action  of  the  Deity.  If  any  phenomenon  were 
actually  to  occur  which  did  proceed  from  the 
immediate  causal  action  of  the  Deity,  then  ex 
hypothesis  there  would  be  no  physical  causes  to 
investigate,  and  the  occupation  of  Othello,  in  the 
person  of  a  man  of  science,  would  be  gone.  Such 
a  phenomenon  would  be  miraculous,  and  therefore 
from  its  very  nature  beyond  the  reach  of  scientific 
investigation. 

Properly  speaking,  then,  the  religious  theory  of 
final  causes  does  not  explain  any  of  the  phenomena 
of  Nature :  it  merely  re-states  the  phenomena  as 
observed  —  or,  if  we  prefer  so  to  say,  it  is  itself  an 
ultimate  and  universal  explanation  of  all  possible 


INFLUENCE  OF  SCIENCE  UPON  RELIGION.       47 

phenomena  taken  collectively.  For  it  must  be 
admitted  that  behind  all  possible  explanations  of  a 
scientific  kind,  there  lies  a  great  inexplicable,  which 
just  because  of  its  ultimate  character,  cannot  be 
merged  into  anything  further — that  is  to  say, 
cannot  be  explained.  '  It  is  what  it  is,'  is  all  that 
we  can  say  of  it :  'I  am  that  I  am '  is  all  that  it 
could  say  of  itself.  And  it  is  in  referring  phe- 
nomena to  this  inexplicable  source  of  physical 
causation  that  the  theory  of  Religion  essentially 
consists.  The  theory  of  Science,  on  the  other  hand, 
consists  in  the  assumption  that  there  is  always 
a  practically  endless  chain  of  physical  causation  to 
investigate  —  i.  e.  an  endless  series  of  phenomena 
to  be  explained.  So  that,  if  we  define  the  process 
of  explanation  as  the  process  of  referring  observed 
phenomena  to  their  adequate  causes,  we  may  say 
that  Religion,  by  the  aid  of  a  general  theory  of 
things  in  the  postulation  of  an  intelligent  First 
Cause,  furnishes  to  her  own  satisfaction  an  ulti- 
mate explanation  of  the  universe  as  a  whole,  and 
therefore  is  not  concerned  with  any  of  those  proxi- 
mate explanations  or  discovery  of  second  causes 
which  form  the  exclusive  subject-matter  of  Science. 
In  other  words,  we  recur  to  the  definitions  already 
stated,  to  the  effect  that  Religion  is  a  department 
of  thought  having,  as  such,  exclusive  reference  to 
the  Ultimate,  while  Science  is  a  department  of 
thought  having,  as  such,  no  less  exclusive  reference 
to  the  Proximate.     When  these  two  departments 


48  THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION. 

of  thought  overlap,  interference  results,  and  we 
find  confusion.  Therefore  it  was  that  when  the 
religious  theory  of  final  causes  intruded  upon  the 
field  of  scientific  inquiry,  it  was  passing  beyond  its 
logical  domain  ;  and  seeking  to  arrogate  the  func- 
tion of  explaining  this  or  that  phenomenon  in 
detail,  it  ceased  to  be  a  purely  religious  theory, 
while  at  the  same  time  and  for  the  same  reason 
it  blocked  the  way  of  scientific  progress.1 

This  remark  serves  to  introduce  one  of  the  chief 
topics  with  which  I  have  to  deal  —  viz.  the  doc- 
trine of  Design  in  Nature,  and  thus  the  whole 
question  of  Natural  Religion  in  its  relation  to 
Natural  Science.  In  handling  this  topic  I  shall 
endeavor  to  take  as  broad  and  deep  a  view  as  I 
can  of  the  present  standing  of  Natural  Religion, 
without  waiting  to  show  step  by  step  the  ways  and 
means  by  which  it  has  been  brought  into  this 
position,  by  the  influence  of  Science. 

In  the  earliest  dawn  of  recorded  thought, 
teleology  in  some  form  or  another  has  been  the 
most  generally  accepted  theory  whereby  the 
order  of  Nature  is  explained.     It  is  not,  however, 

fTo  avoid  misunderstanding  I  may  observe  that  in  the  above 
definitions  I  am  considering  Religion  and  Science  under  the  con- 
ditions in  which  they  actually  exist.  It  is  conceivable  that  under 
other  conditions  these  two  departments  of  thought  might  not  be 
so  sharply  separated.  Thus,  for  instance,  if  a  Religion  were  to 
appear  carrying  a  revelation  to  Science  upon  matters  of  physical 
causation,  such  a  Religion  (supposing  the  revelation  were  found 
by  experiment  to  be  true)  ought  to  be  held  to  exercise  upon 
Science  a  strictly  legitimate  influence. 


INFLUENCE  OF  SCIENCE  UPON  RELIGION.      49 

my  object  in  this  paper  to  trace  the  history  of 
this  theory  from  its  first  rude  beginnings  in 
Fetichism  to  its  final  development  in  Theism.  I 
intend  to  devote  myself  exclusively  to  the  ques- 
tion as  to  the  present  standing  of  this  theory, 
and  I  allude  to  its  past  history  only  in  order  to 
examine  the  statement  which  is  frequently  made, 
to  the  effect  that  its  general  prevalence  in  all  ages 
and  among  all  peoples  of  the  world  lends  to  it  a 
certain  degree  of  'antecedent  credibility.'  With 
reference  to  this  point,  I  should  say,  that,  whether 
or  not  the  order  of  Nature  is  due  to  a  disposing 
Mind,  the  hypothesis  of  mental  agency  in  Nature 
—  or,  as  the  Duke  of  Argyll  terms  it,  the  hypoth- 
esis of  'anthropopsychism'  —  must  necessarily 
have  been  the  earliest  hypothesis.  What  we  find 
in  Nature  is  the  universal  prevalence  of  causation, 
and  long  before  the  no  less  universal  equivalency 
between  causes  and  effects  —  i.  e.  the  universal 
prevalence  of  natural  law  —  became  a  matter  of 
even  the  [vaguest]  appreciation,  the  general  fact 
that  nothing  happens  without  a  cause  of  some 
kind  was  fully  recognized.  Indeed,  the  recogni- 
tion of  this  fact  is  not  only  presented  by  the  lowest 
races  of  the  present  day,  but,  as  I  have  myself 
given  evidence  to  show,  likewise  by  animals  and 
infants.1  And  therefore,  it  appears  to  me  probable 
that  those  psychologists  are  right  who  argue  that 
the   idea  of   cause   is  intuitive,  in  the  same  sense 

1  Mental  Evolution  in  Animals,  pp.  I55~8. 


5°  THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION. 

that  the  ideas  of  space  and  time  are  intuitive- — 
i.  e.  the  instinctive  or  [inherited]  effect  of  ances- 
tral experience. 

Now  if  it  is  thus  a  matter  of  certainty  that 
the  recognition  of  causality  in  Nature  is  co-exten- 
sive with,  and  even  anterior  to,  the  human  mind, 
it  appears  to  me  no  less  certain  that  the  first 
attempt  at  assigninga  cause  to  this  or  that  observed 
event  in  Nature  —  i.  e.  the  first  attempts  at  a 
rational  explanation  of  the  phenomena  of  Nature 
— must  have  been  of  an  anthropopsychic  kind. 
No  other  explanation  was,  as  it  were,  so  ready  to 
hand  as  that  of  projecting  into  external  Nature 
the  agency  of  volition,  which  was  known  to  each 
individual  as  the  apparent  fountain-head  of  causal 
activity  so  far  as  he  and  his  neighbors  were  con- 
cerned. To  reach  this  most  obvious  explanation 
of  causality  in  Nature,  it  did  not  require  that 
primitive  man  should  know,  as  we  know,  that  the 
very  conception  of  causality  arises  out  of  our 
sense  of  effort  in  voluntary  action  ;  it  only  required 
that  this  should  be  the  fact,  and  then  it  must 
needs  follow  that  when  any  natural  phenomenon 
was  thought  about  at  all  with  reference  to  its 
causality,  the  cause  should  be  one  of  a  psychical 
kind.  I  need  not  wait  to  trace  the  gradual  inte- 
gration of  this  anthropopsychic  hypothesis  from 
its  earliest  and  most  diffused  form  of  what  we 
may  term  polypsychism  (wherein  the  causes 
inferred  were  almost  as  personally  numerous  as 


INFLUENCE  OF  SCIENCE  UPON  RELIGION.       51 

the  effects  contemplated),  through  polytheism 
(wherein  many  effects  of  a  like  kind  were 
referred  to  one  deity,  who,  as  it  were,  took  spe- 
cial charge  over  that  class),  up  to  monotheism 
(wherein  all  causation  is  gathered  up  into  the 
monopsychism  of  a  single  personality) :  it  is 
enough  thus  briefly  to  show  that  from  first  to  last 
the  hypothesis  of  anthropopsychism  is  a  neces- 
sary phase  of  mental  evolution  under  existing 
conditions,  and  this  whether  or  not  the  hypothesis 
is  true. 

Thus  viewed,  I  do  not  think  that  'the  general 
consent  of  mankind '  is  a  fact  of  any  argumenta- 
tive weight  in  favour  of  the  anthropopsychic 
theory  —  so  far,  I  mean,  as  the  matter  of  causa- 
tion is  concerned  —  whether  this  be  in  fetichism 
or  in  the  teleology  of  our  own  day :  the  general 
consent  of  mankind  in  the  larger  question  of  the- 
ism (where  sundry  other  matters  besides  causa- 
tion fall  to  be  considered)  does  not  here  concern 
us.  Indeed,  it  appears  to  me  that  if  we  are  to 
go  back  to  the  savages  for  any  guarantee  of  our 
anthropopsychic  theory,  the  pledge  which  we 
receive  is  of  worse  than  no  value.  As  well  might 
we  conclude  that  a  match  is  a  living  organism, 
because  this  is  to  the  mind  of  a  savage  the  most 
obvious  explanation  of  its  movements,  as  con- 
clude on  precisely  similar  grounds  that  our  belief 
in  teleology  derives  any  real  support  from  any  of 
the  more  primitive  phases  of  anthropopsychism. 


52  THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION. 

It  seems  to  me,  therefore,  that  in  seeking  to 
estimate  the  evidence  of  design  in  Nature,  we 
must  as  it  were  start  de  novo,  without  reference  to 
anterior  beliefs  upon  the  subject.  The  question 
is  essentially  one  to  be  considered  in  the  light  of 
all  the  latest  knowledge  that  we  possess,  and  by 
the  best  faculties  of  thinking  that  we  (the  heirs 
of  all  the  ages)  are  able  to  bring  to  bear  upon  it. 
I  shall,  therefore,  only  allude  to  the  history  of 
anthropopsychism  in  so  far  as  I  may  find  it  neces- 
sary to  do  so  for  the  sake  of  elucidating  my 
argument. 

And  here  it  is  needful  to  consider  first  what 
Paley  called  '  the  state  of  the  argument '  before 
the  Darwinian  epoch.  This  is  clearly  and  tersely 
presented  by  Paley  in  his  classical  illustration  of 
finding  a  watch  upon  a  heath  —  an  illustration  so 
well  known  that  I  need  not  here  re-state  it.  I 
will  merely  observe,  therefore,  that  it  conveys,  as 
it  were  in  one's  watch-pocket,  the  whole  of  the 
argument  from  design ;  and  that  it  is  not  in  my 
opinion  open  to  the  stricture  which  was  passed 
upon  it  by  Mill  where  he  says, — 'The  inference 
would  not  be  from  marks  of  design,  but  because 
I  already  know  by  direct  experience  that  watches 
are  made  by  men.'  This  appears  to  me  to  miss 
the  whole  point  of  Paley's  meaning,  for  there 
would  be  obviously  no  argument  at  all  unless  he 
be  understood  to  mean  that  the  evidence  of 
design    which    is    supposed    to    be    afforded    by 


INFLUENCE  OF  SCIENCE  UPON  RELIGION.       53 

examination  of  the  watch,  is  supposed  to  be 
afforded  by  this  examination  only,  and  not  from 
any  of  the  direct  knowledge  alluded  to  by  Mill. 
For  the  purposes  of  the  illustration,  it  must  clearly 
be  assumed  that  the  finder  of  the  watch  has  no 
previous  or  direct  knowledge  touching  the  manu- 
facture of  watches.  Apart  from  this  curious  mis- 
understanding, Mill  was  at  one  with  Paley  upon 
the  whole  subject. 

Again,  it  is  no  real  objection  to  the  argument 
or  illustration  to  say,  as  we  often  have  said,  that 
it  does  not  account  for  the  watchmaker.  The 
object  of  the  argument  from  design  is  to  prove 
the  existence  of  a  designer :  not  to  explain  that 
existence.  Indeed,  it  would  be  suicidal  to 
the  whole  argument  in  its  relation  to  Theism,  if 
the  possibility  of  any  such  explanation  were 
entertained ;  for  such  a  possibility  could  only  be 
entertained  on  the  supposition  that  the  being  of 
the  Deity  admits  of  being  explained  —  i.  e.  that 
the  Deity  is  not  ultimate. 

Lastly,  the  argument  is  precisely  the  same  as 
that  which  occurs  in  numerous  passages  of  Scrip- 
ture and  in  theological  writings  all  over  the  world 
down  to  the  present  time.  That  is  to  say,  every- 
where in  organic  nature  we  meet  with  innumerable 
adaptations  of  means  to  ends,  which  in  very  many 
cases  present  a  degree  of  refinement  and  com- 
plexity in  comparison  with  which  the  adaptations 
of   means  to   ends  in  a  watch   are  but  miserable 


54  THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION. 

and  rudimentary  attempts  at  mechanism.  No  one 
can  know  so  well  as  the  modern  biologist  in 
what  an  immeasurable  degree  the  mechanisms 
which  occur  in  such  profusion  in  nature  surpass, 
in  every  form  of  excellence,  the  highest  triumphs 
of  human  invention.  Hence  at  first  sight  it  does 
unquestionably  appear  that  we  could  have  no 
stronger  or  better  evidence  of  purpose  than  is 
thus  afforded.  In  the  words  of  Paley  :  'arrange- 
ment, disposition  of  parts,  subserviency  of  means 
to  an  end,  relation  of  instruments  to  a  use,  imply 
the  presence  of  intelligence  and  mind.' 

But  next  the  question  arises,  Although  such 
things  certainly  [may]1  imply  the  presence  of 
mind  as  their  explanatory  cause,  are  we  entitled 
to  assume  that  there  can  be  in  nature  no  other 
cause  competent  to  produce  these  effects  ?  This 
is  a  question  which  never  seems  to  have  occurred 
to  Paley,  Bell,  Chalmers,  or  indeed  to  any  of  the 
natural  theologians  up  to  the  time  of  Darwin. 
This,  I  think,  is  a  remarkable  fact,  because  the 
question  is  one  which,  as  a  mere  matter  of  logical 
form,  appears  to  lie  so  much  upon  the  surface. 
But  nevertheless  the  fact  remains  that  natural 
theologians,  so  far  as  I  know  without  exception, 
were  satisfied  to  assume  as  an  axiom  that  mechan- 
ism could  have  no  cause  other  than  that  of  a 
designing  mind ;  and   therefore    their  work  was 

1  [I  have  put  'may'  in  place  of  'do '  for  the  sake  of  argument. 
—Ed.] 


INFLUENCE  OF  SCIENCE  UPON  RELIGION.       55 

restricted  to  tracing  out  in  detail  the  number  and 
the  excellency  of  the  mechanisms  which  were  to  be 
met  with  in  nature.  It  is,  however,  obvious  that 
the  mere  accumulation  of  such  cases  can  have  no 
real,  or  logical,  effect  upon  the  argument.  The 
mechanisms  which  we  encounter  in  nature  are  so 
amazing  in  their  perfections,  that  the  attentive 
study  of  any  one  of  them  would  (as  Paley  in  his 
illustration  virtually,  though  not  expressly,  con- 
tends) be  sufficient  to  carry  the  whole  position, 
if  the  assumption  be  conceded  that  mechanism 
can  only  be  due  to  mind.  Therefore  the  argu- 
ment is  not  really,  or  logically,  strengthened  by 
the  mere  accumulation  of  any  number  of  special 
cases  of  mechanism  in  nature,  all  as  mechanisms 
similar  in  kind.  Let  us  now  consider  this  argu- 
ment. 

If  we  are  disposed  to  wonder  why  natural 
theologians  prior  to  the  days  of  Darwin  were 
content  to  assume  that  mind  is  the  only  possible 
cause  of  mechanism,  I  think  we  have  a  ready 
answer  in  the  universal  prevalence  of  their  belief 
in  special  creation.  For  I  think  it  is  unquestion- 
able that,  upon  the  basis  of  this  belief,  the  assump- 
tion is  legitimate.  That  is  to  say,  if  we  start  with 
the  belief  that  all  species  of  plants  and  animals 
were  originally  introduced  to  the  complex  con- 
ditions of  their  several  environments  suddenly 
and  ready  made  (in  some  such  manner  as  watches 
are  turned  out  from  a  manufactory),  then  I  think 


56  THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION. 

we  are  reasonably  entitled  to  assume  that  no  con- 
ceivable cause,  other  than  that  of  intelligent  pur- 
pose, could  possibly  be  assigned  in  explanation 
of  the  effects.  It  is,  of  course,  needless  to  observe 
that  in  so  far  as  this  previous  belief  in  special 
creation  was  thus  allowed  to  affect  the  argument 
from  design,  that  argument  became  an  instance  of 
circular  reasoning.  And  it  is,  perhaps,  equally 
needless  to  observe  that  the  mere  fact  of  evolution, 
as  distinguished  from  special  creation  —  or  of  the 
gradual  development  of  living  mechanisms,  as 
distinguished  from  their  sudden  and  ready-made 
apparition  —  would  not  in  any  way  affect  the 
argument  from  design,  unless  it  could  be  shown 
that  the  process  of  evolution  admits  the  possibil- 
ity of  some  other  cause  which  is  not  admitted 
by  the  hypothesis  of  special  creation.  But  this 
is  precisely  what  is  shown  by  the  theory  of  evolu- 
tion as  propounded  by  Darwin.  That  is  to  say, 
the  theory  of  the  gradual  development  of  living 
mechanisms  propounded  by  Darwin,  is  something 
more  than  a  theory  of  gradual  development  as 
distinguished  from  sudden  creation.  It  is  this, 
but  it  is  also  a  theory  of  a  purely  scientific  kind 
which  seeks  to  explain  the  purely  physical  causes 
of  that  development.  And  this  is  the  point  where 
natural  science  begins  to  exert  her  influence  upon 
natural  theology  —  or  the  point  where  the  theory 
of  evolution  begins  to  affect  the  theory  of  design. 
As  this  is  a  most  important  part  of  our  subject, 


INFLUENCE  OF  SCIENCE  UPON  RELIGION.      57 

and  one  upon  which  an  extraordinary  amount  of 
confusion  at  the  present  time  prevails,  I  shall  in 
my  next  paper  carefully  consider  it  in  all  its 
bearings. 


II. 

Suppose  the  man  who  found  the  watch  upon 
a  heath  to  continue  his  walk  till  he  comes  down  to 
the  sea-shore,  and  suppose  further  that  he  is  as 
ignorant  of  physical  geography  as  he  is  of  watch- 
making. He  soon  begins  to  observe  a  number 
of  adaptations  of  means  to  ends,  which,  if  less 
refined  and  delicate  than  those  that  formed  the 
object  of  his  study  in  the  watch,  are  on  the  other 
hand  much  more  impressive  from  the  greatly 
larger  scale  on  which  they  are  displayed.  First, 
he  observes  that  there  is  a  beautiful  basin  hollowed 
out  in  the  land  for  the  reception  of  a  bay;  that 
the  sides  of  this  basin,  which  from  being  near  its 
opening  are  most  exposed  to  the  action  of  large 
rolling  billows,  are  composed  of  rocky  cliffs, 
evidently  in  order  to  prevent  the  further  encroach- 
ment of  the  sea,  and  the  consequent  destruction 
of  the  entire  bay ;  that  the  sides  of  the  basin, 
which  from  beingsuccessively  situated  more  inland 
are  successively  less  and  less  exposed  to  the  action 
of  large  waves,  are  constituted  successively  of 
smaller  rocks,  passing  into  shingle,  and  eventually 
into  the  finest  sand  :  that  as  the  tides  rise  and  fall 
with  as  great  regularity  as  was  exhibited  by  the 
movements  of  the  watch,  the  stones  are  carefully 

58 


INFLUENCE  OF  SCIENCE  UPON  RELIGION.       59 

separated  out  from  the  sand  to  be  arranged  in 
sloping  layers  of  themselves,  and  this  always 
with  a  most  beautiful  reference  to  the  places  round 
the  margin  of  the  basin  which  are  most  in  danger 
of  being  damaged  by  the  action  of  the  waves.  He 
would  further  observe,  upon  closer  inspection,  that 
this  process  of  selective  arrangement  goes  into 
matters  of  the  most  minute  detail.  Here,  for 
instance,  he  would  observe  a  mile  or  two  of  a 
particular  kind  of  seaweed  artistically  arranged  in 
one  long  sinuous  line  upon  the  beach  ;  there  he 
would  see  a  wonderful  deposit  of  shells  ;  in  another 
place  a  lovely  little  purple  heap  of  garnet  sand,  the 
minute  particles  of  which  have  all  been  carefully 
picked  out  from  the  surrounding  acres  of  yellow 
sand.  Again,  he  would  notice  that  the  streams 
which  come  down  to  the  bay  are  all  flowing  in 
channels  admirably  dug  out  for  the  purpose  ;  and, 
being  led  by  curiosity  to  investigate  the  teleology 
of  these  various  streams,  he  would  find  that  they 
serve  to  supply  the  water  which  the  sea  loses  by 
evaporation,  and  also,  by  a  wonderful  piece  of 
adjustment,  to  furnish  fresh  water  to  those  animals 
and  plants  which  thrive  best  in  fresh  water,  and 
yet  by  their  combined  action  to  carry  down  suffi- 
cient mineral  constituents  to  give  that  precise 
degree  of  saltness  to  the  sea  as  a  whole  which 
is  required  for  the  maintenance  of  a  pelagic  life. 
Lastly,  continuing  his  investigations  along  this 
line  of  inquiry,   he  would  find   that  a  thousand 


60  THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION. 

different  habitats  were  all  thoughtfully  adapted 
to  the  needs  of  a  hundred  thousand  different  forms 
of  life,  none  of  which  could  survive  if  these 
habitats  were  reversed.  Now,  I  think  that  our 
imaginary  inquirer  would  be  a  dull  man  if,  as  the 
result  of  all  this  study,  he  failed  to  conclude  that 
the  evidence  of  Design  furnished  by  the  marine 
bay  was  at  least  as  cogent  as  that  which  he  had 
previously  found  in  his  study  of  the  watch. 

But  there  is  this  great  difference  between  the 
two  cases.  Whereas  by  subsequent  inquiry  he 
could  ascertain  as  a  matter  of  fact  that  the  watch 
was  due  to  intelligent  contrivance,  he  could  make 
no  such  discovery  with  reference  to  the  marine 
bay  :  in  the  one  case  intelligent  contrivance  as  a 
cause  is  independently  demonstrable,  while  in  the 
other  case  it  can  only  be  inferred.  What,  then, 
is  the  value  of  the  inference? 

If,  after  the  studies  of  our  imaginary  teleolo- 
gist  had  been  completed,  he  were  introduced  to 
the  library  of  the  Royal  Society,  and  if  he  were 
then  to  spend  a  year  or  two  in  making  himself 
acquainted  with  the  leading  results  of  modern 
science,  I  fancy  that  he  would  end  by  being  both 
a  wiser  and  a  sadder  man.  At  least  I  am  certain 
that  in  learning  more  he  would  feel  that  he  is 
understanding  less  —  that  the  archaic  simplicity 
of  his  earlier  explanations  must  give  place  to  a 
matured  perplexity  upon  the  whole  subject.  To 
begin  with,  he  would  now  find  that  every  one  of 


INFLUENCE  OF  SCIENCE  UPON  RELIGION.      6 1 

the  adjustments  of  means  to  ends  which  excited 
his  admiration  on  the  sea-coast  were  due  to  phys- 
ical causes  which  are  perfectly  well  understood. 
The  cliffs  stood  at  the  opening  of  the  bay  because 
the  sea  in  past  ages  had  encroached  upon  the 
coast-line  until  it  met  with  these  cliffs,  which  then 
opposed  its  further  progress ;  the  bay  was  a 
depression  in  the  land  which  happened  to  be  there 
when  the  sea  arrived,  and  into  which  the  sea  con- 
sequently flowed ;  the  successive  occurrence  of 
rocks,  shingle,  and  sand  was  due  to  the  actions 
of  the  waves  themselves  ;  the  segregation  of  sea- 
weeds, shells,  pebbles,  and  different  kinds  of 
sand,  was  due  to  their  different  degrees  of  specific 
gravity ;  the  fresh-water  streams  ran  in  channels 
because  they  had  themselves  been  the  means  of 
excavating  them  ;  and  the  multitudinous  forms 
of  life  were  all  adapted  to  their  several  habitats 
simply  because  the  unsuited  forms  were  not  able 
to  live  in  them.  In  all  these  cases,  therefore,  our 
teleologist  in  the  light  of  fuller  knowledge  would 
be  compelled  to  conclude  at  least  this  much — that 
the  adaptations  which  he  had  so  greatly  admired 
when  he  supposed  that  they  were  all  due  to  con- 
trivance in  anticipation  of  the  existing  phenomena, 
cease  to  furnish  the  same  evidence  of  intelligent 
design  when  it  is  found  that  no  one  of  them 
was  prepared  beforehand  by  any  independent  or 
external  cause. 

He  would  therefore  be  led  to  conclude  that  if 


62  THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION. 

the  teleological  interpretation  of  the  facts  were  to 
be  saved  at  all,  it  could  only  be  so  by  taking  a 
much  wider  view  of  the  subject  than  was  afforded 
by  the  particular  cases  of  apparent  design  which 
at  first  appeared  so  cogent.  That  is  to  say,  he 
would  feel  that  he  must  abandon  the  supposition 
of  any  special  design  in  the  construction  of  that 
particular  bay,  and  fall  back  upon  the  theory  of 
a  much  more  general  design  in  the  construction  of 
one  great  scheme  of  Nature  as  a  whole.  In  short 
he  would  require  to  dislodge  his  argument  from 
the  special  adjustments  which  in  the  first  instance 
appeared  to  him  so  suggestive,  to  those  general 
laws  of  Nature  which  by  their  united  operation 
give  rise  to  a  cosmos  as  distinguished  from  a 
chaos. 

Now  I  have  been  careful  thus  to  present  in  all 
its  more  important  details  an  imaginary  argument 
drawn  from  inorganic  nature,  because  it  furnishes 
a  complete  analogy  to  the  actual  argument  which 
is  drawn  from  organic  nature.  Without  any  ques- 
tion, the  instances  of  apparent  design,  or  of  the 
apparently  intentional  adaptation  of  means  to 
ends,  which  we  meet  with  in  organic  nature,  are 
incomparably  more  numerous  and  suggestive  than 
anything  with  which  we  meet  in  inorganic  nature. 
But  if  once  we  find  good  reason  to  conclude  that 
the  former,  like  the  latter,  are  all  due,  not  to  the 
immediate,  special  and  prospective  action  of  a 
contriving  intelligence    (as   in  watch-making  or 


INFLUENCE  OF  SCIENCE  UPON  RELIGION.      63 

creation),  but  to  the  agency  of  secondary  or  phys- 
ical causes  acting  under  the  influence  of  what  we 
call  general  laws,  then  it  seems  to  me  that  no 
matter  how  numerous  or  how  wonderful  the  adap- 
tations of  means  to  ends  in  organic  nature  may 
be,  they  furnish  one  no  other  or  better  evidence 
of  design  than  is  furnished  by  any  of  the  facts  of 
inorganic  nature. 

For  the  sake  of  clearness  let  us  take  any  special 
case.  Paley  says,  'I  know  of  no  better  method  of 
introducing  so  large  a  subject  than  that  of  com- 
paring a  single  thing  with  a  single  thing ;  an  eye, 
for  example,  with  a  telescope.'  He  then  goes 
on  to  point  out  the  analogies  between  these  two 
pieces  of  apparatus,  and  ends  by  asking,  ■  How 
is  it  possible,  under  circumstances  of  such  close 
affinity,  and  under  the  operation  of  equal  evidence, 
to  exclude  contrivance  in  the  case  of  the  eye,  yet 
to  acknowledge  the  proof  of  contrivance  having 
been  employed,  as  the  plainest  and  clearest  of  all 
propositions  in  the  case  of  the  telescope?' 

Well,  the  answer  to  be  made  is  that  only  upon 
the  hypothesis  of  special  creation  can  this  analogy 
hold :  on  the  hypothesis  of  evolution  by  physical 
causes  the  evidence  in  the  two  cases  is  not  equal. 
For,  upon  this  hypothesis  we  have  the  eye  begin- 
ning, not  as  a  ready-made  structure  prepared 
beforehand  for  the  purposes  of  seeing,  but  as  a 
mere  differentiation  of  the  ends  of  nerves  in  the 
skin,  probably  in  the  first  instance  to  enable  them 


64  THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION. 

better  to  discriminate  changes  of  temperature. 
Pigment  having  been  laid  down  in  these  places 
the  better  to  secure  this  purpose  (I  use  teleologi- 
cal  terms  for  the  sake  of  brevity) ,  the  nerve-ending 
begins  to  distinguish  between  light  and  darkness. 
The  better  to  secure  this  further  purpose  the  sim- 
plest conceivable  form  of  lens  begins  to  appear 
in  the  shape  of  small  refractive  bodies.  Behind 
these  sensory  cells  are  developed,  forming  the 
earliest  indication  of  a  retina  presenting  a  single 
layer.  And  so  on,  step  by  step,  till  we  reach  the 
eye  of  an  eagle. 

Of  course  the  teleologist  will  here  answer  — 
'The  fact  of  such  a  gradual  building  up  is  no 
argument  against  design :  whether  the  structure 
appeared  on  a  sudden  or  was  the  result  of  a  slow 
elaboration,  the  marks  of  design  in  either  case 
occur  in  the  structure  as  it  stands.'  All  of  which 
is  very  true ;  but  I  am  not  maintaining  that  the 
fact  of  a  gradual  development  in  itself  does  affect 
the  argument  from  design.  I  am  maintaining 
that  it  only  does  so  because  it  reveals  the  possi- 
bility (excluded  by  the  hypothesis  of  sudden  or 
special  creation)  of  the  structure  having  been 
proximately  due  to  the  operation  of  physical 
causes.  Thus,  for  the  value  of  argument,  let  us 
assume  that  natural  selection  has  been  satisfac- 
torily established  as  a  cause  adequate  to  account 
for  all  these  effects.  Given  the  facts  of  heredity, 
variation,  struggle  for  existence,  and  the  conse- 


INFLUENCE  OF  SCIENCE  UPON  RELIGION.      65 

quent  survival  of  the  fittest,  what  follows  ?  Why 
that  each  step  in  the  prolonged  and  gradual 
development  of  the  eye  was  brought  about  by  the 
elimination  of  all  the  less  adapted  structures  in 
any  given  generation,  i.  e.  the  selection  of  all  the 
better  adapted  to  perpetuate  the  improvement  of 
heredity.  Will  the  teleologist  maintain  that  this 
selective  process  is  itself  indicative  of  special 
design  ?  If  so,  it  appears  to  me  that  he  is  logi- 
cally bound  to  maintain  that  the  long  line  of  sea- 
weed, the  shells,  the  stones  and  the  little  heap  of 
garnet  sand  upon  the  sea-coast  are  all  equally 
indicative  of  special  design.  The  general  laws 
relating  to  specific  gravity  are  at  least  of  as  much 
importance  in  the  economy  of  nature  as  are  the 
general  laws  relating  to  specific  differentiation ; 
and  in  each  illustration  alike  we  find  the  result 
of  the  operation  of  known  physical  causes  to  be 
that  of  selection.  If  it  should  be  argued  in  reply 
that  the  selection  in  the  one  case  is  obviously 
purposeless,  wrhile  in  the  other  it  is  as  obviously 
purposive,  I  answer  that  this  is  pure  assumption. 
It  is  perhaps  not  too  much  to  say  that  every 
geological  formation  on  the  face  of  the  globe  is 
either  wholly  or  in  part  due  to  the  selective  influ- 
ence of  specific  gravity,  and  who  shall  say  that  the 
construction  of  the  earth's  crust  is  a  less  important 
matter  in  the  general  scheme  of  things  (if  there  is 
such  a  scheme)  than  is  the  evolution  of  an  eye  ? 
Or  who  shall  say  that  because  we  see  an  appar- 


66  THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION. 

ently  intentional  adaptation  of  means  to  ends  as 
the  result  of  selection  in  the  case  of  the  eye,  there 
is  no  intention  served  by  the  result  of  selection 
in  the  case  of  the  sea-weeds,  stones,  sand,  mud  ? 
For  anything  that  we  can  know  to  the  contrary, 
the  supposed  intelligence  may  take  a  greater 
delight  in  the  latter  than  in  the  former  process. 
For  the  sake  of  clearness  I  have  assumed  that 
the  physical  causes  with  which  we  are  already 
acquainted  are  sufficient  to  explain  the  observed 
phenomena  of  organic  nature.  But  it  clearly 
makes  no  difference  whether  or  not  this  assump- 
tion is  conceded,  provided  we  allow  that  the 
observed  phenomena  are  all  due  to  physical  causes 
of  some  kind,  be  they  known  or  unknowrn.  That 
is  to  say,  in  whatever  measure  we  exclude  the 
hypothesis  of  the  direct  or  immediate  intervention 
of  the  Deity  in  organic  nature  (miracle),  in  that 
measure  we  are  reducing  the  evidence  of  design 
in  organic  nature  to  precisely  the  same  logical 
position  as  that  which  is  occupied  by  the  evidence 
of  design  in  organic  nature.  Hence  I  conceive 
that  Mill  has  shown  a  singular  want  of  penetra- 
tion where,  after  observing  with  reference  to 
natural  selection,  '  creative  forethought  is  not 
absolutely  the  only  link  by  which  the  origin  of 
the  wonderful  mechanism  of  the  eye  may  be  con- 
nected with  the  fact  of  sight,'  he  goes  on  to  say, 
'leaving  this  remarkable  speculation  (i.  e.  that  of 
natural  selection)  to  whatever  fate  the  progress 


INFLUENCE  OF  SCIENCE  UPON  RELIGION.       67 

of  discovery  may  have  in  store  for  it,  in  the  pres- 
ent state  of  knowledge  the  adaptations  in  nature 
afford  a  large  balance  of  probability  in  favor  of 
creation  by  intelligence.'  I  say  this  passage 
seems  to  me  to  show  a  singular  want  of  penetra- 
tion, and  I  say  so  because  it  appears  to  argue  that 
the  issue  lies  between  the  hypothesis  of  special 
design  and  the  hypothesis  of  natural  selection. 
But  it  does  not  do  so.  The  issue  really  lies 
between  special  design  and  natural  causes.  Sur- 
vival of  the  fittest  is  one  of  these  causes  which 
has  been  suggested,  and  shown  by  a  large  accu- 
mulation of  evidence  to  be  probably  a  true  cause. 
But  even  if  it  were  to  be  disproved  as  a  cause, 
the  real  argumentative  position  of  teleology  would 
not  thereby  be  effected,  unless  we  were  to  con- 
clude that  there  can  be  no  other  causes  of  a 
secondary  or  physical  kind  concerned  in  the  pro- 
duction of  the  observed  adaptations. 

I  trust  that  I  have  now  made  it  sufficiently 
clear  why  I  hold  that  if  we  believe  the  reign  of 
natural  law,  or  the  operation  of  physical  causes, 
to  extend  throughout  organic  nature  in  the  same 
universal  manner  as  we  believe  this  in  the  case  of 
inorganic  nature,  then  we  can  find  no  better  evi- 
dence of  design  in  the  one  province  than  in  the 
other.  The  mere  fact  that  we  meet  with  more 
numerous  and  apparently  more  complete  instances 
of  design  in  the  one  province  than  in  the  other  is,  ex 
hypothesis  merely  due  to  our  ignorance  of  the  nat- 


68  THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION. 

ural  causation  in  the  more  intricate  province.  In 
studying  biological  phenomena  we  are  all  at  pres- 
ent in  the  intellectual  position  of  our  imaginary 
teleologist  when  studying  the  marine  bay  :  we  do 
not  know  the  natural  causes  which  have  produced 
the  observed  results.  But  if,  after  having  obtained 
a  partial  key  in  the  theory  of  natural  selection, 
we  trust  to  the  large  analogy  which  is  afforded 
by  the  simpler  provinces  of  Nature,  and  conclude 
that  physical  causes  are  everywhere  concerned  in 
the  production  of  organic  structures,  then  we 
have  concluded  that  any  evidence  of  design  which 
these  structures  present  is  of  just  the  same  logi- 
cal value  as  that  which  we  may  attach  to  the  evi- 
dence of  design  in  inorganic  nature.  If  it  should 
still  be  urged  that  the  adaptations  met  with  in 
organic  nature  are  from  their  number  and  unity 
much  more  suggestive  of  design  than  anything 
met  with  in  inorganic  nature,  I  must  protest  that 
this  is  to  change  the  ground  of  argument  and  to 
evade  the  only  point  in  dispute.  No  one  denies 
the  obvious  fact  stated :  the  only  question  is 
whether  any  number  and  any  quantity  of  adapta- 
tions in  any  one  department  of  nature  afford  other 
or  better  evidence  of  design  than  is  afforded  by 
adaptations  in  other  departments,  when  all  depart" 
ments  alike  are  supposed  to  be  equally  the  out- 
come of  physical  causation.  And  this  question 
I  answer  in  the  negative,  because  we  have  no 
means   of  ascertaining  the  extent   to  which   the 


INFLUENCE  OF  SCIENCE  UPON  RELIGION.      69 

process  of  natural  selection,  or  any  other  physi- 
cal cause,  is  competent  to  produce  adaptations  of 
the  kind  observed. 

Thus  to  take  another  instance  of  apparent 
design  from  inorganic  nature,  it  has  been  argued 
that  the  constitution  of  the  atmosphere  is  clearly 
designed  for  the  support  of  vegetable  and  animal 
life.  But  before  this  conclusion  can  be  estab- 
lished upon  the  facts,  it  must  be  shown  that  life 
could  exist  under  no  other  material  conditions 
than  those  which  are  furnished  to  it  by  the  ele- 
mentary constituents  of  the  atmosphere.  This, 
however,  it  is  clearly  impossible  to  show.  For 
anything  that  we  can  know  to  the  contrary,  life 
may  actually  be  existing  upon  some  of  the  other 
heavenly  bodies  under  totally  different  conditions 
as  to  atmosphere ;  and  the  fact  that  on  this  planet 
all  life  has  come  to  be  dependent  upon  the  gases 
which  occur  in  our  atmosphere,  may  be  due  sim- 
ply to  the  fact  that  it  was  only  the  forms  of  life 
which  were  able  to  adapt  themselves  (through 
natural  selection  or  other  physical  causes)  to 
these  particular  gases  which  could  possibly  be 
expected  to  occur — just  as  in  matters  of  still 
smaller  detail,  it  was  only  those  forms  of  life 
that  were  suited  to  their  several  habitats  in  the 
marine  bay,  which  could  possibly  be  expected 
to  be  found  in  these  several  situations.  Now,  if  a 
set  of  adjustments  so  numerous  and  so  delicate 
as  those  on  which  the  relations  of  every  known 


70  THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION. 

form  of  life  to  the  constituent  gases  of  the 
atmosphere  are  seen  to  depend,  can  thus  be  shown 
not  necessarily  to  imply  the  action  of  any  dispos- 
ing intelligence,  how  is  it  possible  to  conclude 
that  any  less  general  exhibitions  of  adjustment 
imply  this,  so  long  as  every  case  of  adjustment, 
whether  or  not  ultimately  due  to  design,  is 
regarded  as  proximately  due  to  physical  causes  ? 
In  view  of  these  considerations,  therefore,  I 
think  it  is  perfectly  clear  that  if  the  argument 
from  teleology  is  to  be  saved  at  all,  it  can  only 
be  so  by  shifting  it  from  the  narrow  basis  of  spe- 
cial adaptations,  to  the  broad  area  of  Nature  as  a 
whole.  And  here  I  confess  that  to  my  mind  the 
argument  does  acquire  a  weight  which,  if  long  and 
attentively  considered,  deserves  to  be  regarded 
as  enormous.  For,  although  this  and  that  par- 
ticular adjustment  in  Nature  may  be  seen  to  be 
proximately  due  to  physical  causes,  and  although 
we  are  prepared  on  the  grounds  of  the  largest 
possible  analogy  to  infer  that  all  other  such  par- 
ticular cases  are  likewise  due  to  physical  causes, 
the  more  ultimate  question  arises,  How  is  it  that 
all  physical  causes  conspire,  by  their  united 
action,  to  the  production  of  a  general  order  of 
Nature  ?  It  is  against  all  analogy  to  suppose 
that  such  an  end  as  this  can  be  accomplished  by 
such  means  as  those,  in  the  way  of  mere  chance 
or  'the  fortuitous  concourse  of  atoms.'  We  are 
led  by  the  most  fundamental  dictates  of  our  rea- 


INFLUENCE  OF  SCIENCE  UPON  RELIGION.       71 

son  to  conclude  that  there  must  be  some  cause 
for  this  cooperation  of  causes.  I  know  that  from 
Lucretius'  time  this  has  been  denied  ;  but  it  has 
been  denied  only  on  grounds  of  feeling.  No 
possible  reason  can  be  given  for  the  denial  which 
does  not  run  counter  to  the  law  of  causation 
itself.  I  am  therefore  perfectly  clear  that  the 
only  question  which,  from  a  purely  rational  point 
of  view,  here  stands  to  be  answered  is  this  —  Of 
what  nature  are  we  to  suppose  the  causa  cansarum 
to  be  ? 

On  this  point  only  two  hypotheses  have  ever 
been  advanced,  and  I  think  it  is  impossible  to 
conceive  that  any  third  one  is  open.  Of  these 
two  hypotheses  the  earliest,  and  of  course  the 
most  obvious,  is  that  of  mental  purpose.  The 
other  hypothesis  is  one  which  we  owe  to  the  far- 
reaching  thought  of  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer.  In 
Chapter  VII  of  his  First  Principles  he  argues  that 
all  causation  arises  immediately  out  of  existence 
as  such,  or,  as  he  states  it,  that  'uniformity  of  law 
inevitably  follows  from  the  persistence  of  force.' 
For  'if  in  any  two  cases  there  is  exact  likeness 
not  only  between  those  most  conspicuous  ante- 
cedents which  we  distinguish  as  the  causes,  but  also 
between  those  accompanying  antecedents  which 
we  call  the  conditions,  we  cannot  affirm  that  the 
effects  will  differ,  without  affirming  either  that 
some  force  has  come  into  existence  or  that  some 
force  has  ceased  to   exist.     If  the   co-operative 


72  THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION. 

forces  in  the  one  case  are  equal  to  those  in  the 
other,  each  to  each,  in  distribution  and  amount; 
then  it  is  impossible  to  conceive  the  product  of 
their  joint  action  in  the  one  case  as  unlike  that  in 
the  other,  without  conceiving  one  or  more  of  the 
forces  to  have  increased  or  diminished  in  quantity  ; 
and  this  is  conceiving  that  force  is  not  persistent.' 
Now  this  interpretation  of  causality  as  the 
immediate  outcome  of  existence  must  be  consid- 
ered first  as  a  theory  of  causation,  and  next  as  a 
theory  in  relation  to  Theism.  As  a  theory  of 
causation  it  has  not  met  with  the  approval  of 
mathematicians,  physicists  or  logicians,  leading 
representatives  of  all  these  departments  of  thought 
having  expressly  opposed  it,  while,  so  far  as  I  am 
aware,  no  representative  of  any  one  of  them  has 
spoken  in  its  favor.1  But  with  this  point  I  am  not 
at  present  concerned,  for  even  if  the  theory  were 
admitted  to  furnish  a  full  and  complete  explana- 
tion of  causality,  it  would  still  fail  to  account  for 
the  harmonious  relation  of  causes,  or  the  fact  with 
which  we  are  now  alone  concerned.     This  distinc- 

1 A  note  (of  1893)  contains  the  following:  'Being,  considered 
in  the  abstract,  is  logically  equivalent  to  Not-Being  or  Nothing. 
For  if  by  successive  stages  of  abstraction,  we  divest  the  concep- 
tion of  Being  of  attribute  and  relation,  we  reach  the  conception  of 
that  which  cannot  be,  i.  e.  a  logical  contradiction,  or  the  logical 
correlative  of  Being  which  is  Nothing.  (All  this  is  well  expressed 
in  Caird's  Evolution  of  Religion.)  The  failure  to  perceive  this 
fact  constitutes  a  ground  fallacy  in  my  Candid  Examination  of 
Theism,  where  I  represent  Being  as  being  a  sufficient  explanation 
of  the  Order  of  Nature  or  the  law  of  Causation.' 


INFLUENCE  OF  SCIENCE  UPON  RELIGION.      73 

tion  is  not  perceived  by  the  anonymous  author 
'  Physicus,'   who    in    his     Candid  Examination   of 
Theism,  lays  great  stress  upon  Mr.  Spencer's  theory 
of  causation  as   subversive  of  Theism,  or  at  least 
as  superseding  the  necessity  of  theistic  hypothesis 
by  furnishing  a  full   explanation   of  the  order  of 
nature  on  purely  physical  grounds.     But  he  fails 
to  perceive  that  even  if  Mr.  Spencer's  theory  were 
conceded  fully  to  explain  all  the  facts  of  causality, 
it  would  in  no  wise  tend  to  explain  the  cosmos  in 
which  these  facts  occur.     It   may  be  that  causa- 
tion depends   upon  the  'persistence  of  force:'  it 
does  not  follow  that  all   manifestations  of  force 
should  on  this  account  have  been  directed  to  occur 
as  they   do   occur.      For,  if  we  follow  back  any 
sequence  of  physical  causation,  we  soon  find  that 
it  spreads  out  on  all  sides  into  a  network  of  phys- 
ical relations  which  are  literally  infinite  both  in 
space  (conditions)  and  in  time  (antecedent  causes). 
Now,  even  if  we  suppose  that  the  persistence  of 
force  is  a  sufficient  explanation  of  the  occurrence 
of  the  particular  sequence  contemplated  so  far  as 
the  exhibition  of  force  is  there  concerned,  we  are 
thus  as  far  as  ever  from  explaining  the  determina- 
tion of  this  force  into  the  particular  channel  through 
which  it  flows.     It  may  be   quite  true  that  the 
resultant  is  determined  as  to  magnitude  and  direc- 
tion  by    the   components  ;    but   what   about  the 
magnitude  and  direction  of  the  components  ?     If 
it  is  said  that  they  in  turn  were  determined  by  the 


74  THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION. 

outcome  of  previous  systems,  how  about  these 
systems  ?  And  so  on  till  we  spread  away  into 
the  infinite  network  already  mentioned.  Only  it 
we  knew  the  origin  of  all  series  of  such  systems, 
could  we  be  in  a  position  to  say  that  an  adequate 
intelligence  might  determine  beforehand  by  calcu- 
lation the  state  of  any  one  part  of  the  universe  at 
any  given  instant  of  time.  But,  as  the  series  are 
infinite  both  in  number  and  extent,  this  knowledge 
is  clearly  out  of  the  question.  Moreover,  even  if 
it  could  be  imagined  as  possible,  it  could  only 
be  so  imagined  at  the  expense  of  supposing  an 
origin  of  physical  causation  in  time  ;  and  this 
amounts  to  supposing  a  state  of  things  prior  to 
such  causation,  and  out  of  which  it  arose.  But 
to  suppose  this  is  to  suppose  some  extra-physical 
source  of  physical  causation  ;  and  whether  this 
supposition  is  made  with  reference  to  a  physical 
event  occurring  under  immediate  observation 
(miracle),  or  to  a  physical  event  in  past  time,  or 
to  the  origin  of  all  physical  events,  it  is  alike 
incompatible  with  any  theory  that  seeks  to  give  a 
purely  physical  explanation  of  the  physical  uni- 
verse as  a  whole.  It  is,  in  short,  the  old  story 
about  a  stream  not  being  able  to  rise  above  its 
source.  Physical  causation  cannot  be  made  to 
supply  its  own  explanation,  and  the  mere  persist- 
ence of  force,  even  if  it  were  conceded  to  account 
for  particular  cases  of  physical  sequence,  can  give 
no  account  of  the  ubiquitous  and  eternal  direction 


INFLUENCE  OF  SCIENCE  UPON  RELIGION.       75 

of  force  in  the  construction  and  maintenance  of 
universal  order. 

We  are  thus,  as  it  were,  driven  upon  the  theory 
of  Theism  as  furnishing  the  only  namable  expla- 
nation of  this  universal  order.  That  is  to  say,  by 
no  logical  artifice  can  we  escape  from  the  conclu- 
sion that,  so  far  as  we  can  see,  this  universal 
order  must  be  regarded  as  due  to  some  one 
integrating  principle  ;  and  that  this,  so  far  as  we 
can  see,  is  most  probably  of  the  nature  of  mind. 
At  least  it  must  be  allowed  that  we  can  conceive 
of  it  under  no  other  aspect ;  and  that  if  any  par- 
ticular adaptation  in  organic  nature  is  held  to  be 
suggestive  of  such  an  agency,  the  sum  total  of  all 
adaptations  in  the  universe  must  be  held  to  be 
incomparably  more  so.  I  shall  not,  however, 
dwell  on  this  theme  since  it  has  been  well  treated 
by  several  modern  writers,  and  with  special  cogency 
by  the  Rev.  Baden  Powell.  I  will  merely  observe 
that  I  do  not  consider  it  necessary  to  the  display 
of  this  argument  in  favour  of  Theism  that  we 
should  speak  of  'natural  laws.'  It  is  enough  to 
take  our  stand  upon  the  [broadest]  general  fact 
that  Nature  is  a  system,  and  that  the  order  observ- 
able in  this  system  is  absolutely  universal,  eternally 
enduring,  and  infinitely  exact ;  while  only  upon 
the  supposition  of  its  being  such  is  our  experience 
conceived  as  possible,  or  our  knowledge  conceived 
as  attainable. 

Having  thus  stated  as  emphatically  as  I  can 


76  THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION. 

that  in  my  opinion  no  explanation  of  natural  order 
can  be  either  conceived  or  named  other  than  that 
of  intelligence  as  the  supreme  directing  cause,  I 
shall  proceed  to  two  other  questions  which  arise 
immediately  out  of  this  conclusion.  The  first  of 
these  questions  is  as  to  the  presumable  character 
of  this  supreme  Intelligence  so  far  as  any  data  of 
inference  upon  this  point  are  supplied  by  our 
observation  of  Nature  ;  and  the  other  question  is 
as  to  the  strictly  formal  cogency  of  any  con- 
clusions either  with  reference  to  the  existence  or 
the  character  of  such  an  intelligence.1  I  shall 
consider  these  two  points  separately. 

No  sooner  have  we  reached  the  conclusion 
that  the  only  hypothesis  whereby  the  general 
order  of  Nature  admits  of  being  in  any  degree 
accounted  for  is  that  it  is  due  to  a  cause  of  a 
mental  kind,  than  we  confront  the  fact  that  this 
cause  must  be  widely  different  from  anything  that 
we  know  of  Mind  in  ourselves.  And  we  soon 
discover  that  this  difference  must  be  conceived  as 
not  merely  of  degree,  however  great,  but  of  kind. 
In  other  words,  although  we  may  conclude  that 
the  nearest  analogue  of  the  causa  caiisarum  given 
in  experience  is  the  human  mind,  we  are  bound  to 
acknowledge  that  in  all  fundamental  points  the 
analogy  is  so  remote  that  it  becomes  a  question 
whether  we  are  really  very  much  nearer  the  truth 

1  [This  promise  is  only  partially  fulfilled  in  the  penultimate 
paragraph  of  the  essay. — Ed.] 


INFLUENCE  OF  SCIENCE  UPON  RELIGION.       77 

by  entertaining  it.  Thus,  for  instance,  as  Mr. 
Spencer  has  pointed  out,  our  only  conception  of 
that  which  we  know  as  Mind  in  ourselves  is  the 
conception  of  a  series  of  states  of  consciousness. 
But,  he  continues,  ■  Put  a  series  of  states  of  con- 
sciousness as  cause  and  the  evolving  universe  as 
effect,  and  then  endeavour  to  see  the  last  as  flow- 
ing from  the  first.  I  find  it  possible  to  imagine 
in  some  dim  way  a  series  of  states  of  conscious- 
ness serving  as  antecedent  to  any  one  of  the 
movements  I  see  going  on  ;  for  my  own  states  of 
consciousness  are  often  indirectly  the  antecedents 
to  such  movements.  But  how  if  I  attempt  to 
think  of  such  a  series  as  antecedent  to  all  actions 
throughout  the  universe  .  .  .  ?  If  to  account  for 
this  infinitude  of  physical  changes  everywhere 
going  on,  "  Mind  must  be  conceived  as  there," 
"under  the  guise  of  simple  dynamics,"  then  the 
reply  is,  that,  to  be  so  conceived,  Mind  must  be 
divested  of  all  attributes  by  which  it  is  distin- 
guished ;  and  that,  when  thus  divested  of  its 
distinguishing  attributes  the  conception  dis- 
appears^—  the  word  Mind  stands  for  a  blank.' 

Moreover,  \  How  is  the  "originating  Mind  "to 
be  thought  of  as  having  states  produced  by  things 
objective  to  it,  as  discriminating  among  these 
states,  and  classing  them  as  like  and  unlike  ;  and 
as  preferring  one  objective  result  to  another  V  x 

1  Essays,  vol.  iii.  p,  246  et  seq.  The  whole  passage  ought  to 
be  consulted,  being  too  long  to  quote  here. 


78  THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION. 

Hence,  without  continuing  this  line  of  argu- 
ment which  it  would  not  be  difficult  to  trace 
through  every  constitutent  branch  of  human 
psychology,  we  may  take  it  as  unquestionable 
that,  if  there  is  a  Divine  Mind,  it  must  differ  so 
essentially  from  the  human  mind,  that  it  becomes 
illogical  to  designate  the  two  by  the  same  name : 
the  attributes  of  eternity  and  ubiquity  are  in 
themselves  enough  to  place  such  a  Mind  in  a 
category  sui  ge?ieris,  wholly  different  from  any- 
thing which  the  analogy  furnished  by  our  own 
mind  enables  us  even  dimly  to  conceive.  And 
this,  of  course,  is  no  more  than  theologians  admit. 
God's  thoughts  are  above  our  thoughts,  and  a  God 
who  would  be  comprehensible  to  our  intelligence 
would  be  no  God  at  all,  they  say.  Which  may  be 
true  enough,  only  we  must  remember  that  in  what- 
ever measure  we  are  thus  precluded  from  under- 
standing the  Divine  Mind,  in  that  measure  are  we 
precluded  from  founding  any  conclusions  as  to  its 
nature  upon  analogies  furnished  by  the  human 
mind.  The  theory  ceases  to  be  anthropomorphic  : 
it  ceases  to  be  even  'anthropopsychic :'  it  is 
affiliated  with  the  conception  of  mind  only  in 
virtue  of  the  one  fact  that  it  serves  to  give  the 
best  provisional  account  of  the  order  of  Nature, 
by  supposing  an  infinite  extension  of  some  of  the 
faculties  of  the  human  mind,  with  a  concurrent 
obliteration  of  all  the  essential  conditions  under 
which  alone   these  faculties  are  known  to  exist. 


INFLUENCE  OF  SCIENCE  UPON  RELIGION.       79 

Obviously  of  such  a  Mind  as  this  no  predication 
is  logically  possible.  If  such  a  Mind  exists,  it  is 
not  conceivable  as  existing,  and  we  are  precluded 
from  assigning  to  it  any  attributes. 

Thus  much  on  general  grounds.  Descending 
now  to  matters  of  more  detail,  let  us  assume  with 
the  natural  theologians  that  such  a  Mind  does 
exist,  that  it  so  far  resembles  the  human  mind  as 
to  be  a  conscious,  personal  intelligence,  and  that 
the  care  of  such  a  mind  is  over  all  its  works. 
Even  upon  the  grounds  of  this  supposition  we 
meet  with  a  number  of  large  and  general  facts 
which  indicate  that  this  mind  ought  still  to  be 
regarded  as  apparently  very  unlike  its  'image'  in 
the  mind  of  man.  I  will  not  here  dwell  upon 
the  argument  of  seeming  waste  and  purposeless 
action  in  Nature,  because  I  think  that  this  may 
be  fairly  met  by  the  ulterior  argument  already 
drawn  from  Nature  as  a  whole  —  viz.  that  as  a 
whole,  Nature  is  a  cosmos,  and  therefore  that 
what  to  us  appears  wasteful  and  purposeless  in 
matters  of  detail  may  not  be  so  in  relation  to  the 
scheme  of  things  as  a  whole.  But  I  am  doubt- 
ful whether  this  ulterior  argument  can  be  adduced 
to  meet  the  apparent  absence  in  Nature  of  that 
which  in  man  we  term  morality.  For  in  the 
human  mind  the  sense  of  right  and  wrong — 
with  all  its  accompanying  or  constituting  emo- 
tions of  love,  sympathy,  justice,  etc. —  is  so 
important  a  factor,  that  however  greatly  we  may 


So  THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION. 

imagine  the  intellectual  side  of  the  human  mind 
to  be  extended,  we  can  scarcely  imagine  that  the 
moral  side  could  ever  become  so  apparently 
eclipsed  as  to  end  in  the  authorship  of  such  a 
work  as  we  find  in  terrestrial  nature.  It  is  use- 
less to  hide  our  eyes  to  the  state  of  matters  which 
meets  us  here.  Most  of  the  instances  of  special 
design  which  are  relied  upon  by  the  natural  theo- 
logian to  prove  the  intelligent  nature  of  the  First 
Cause,  have  as  their  end  or  object  the  infliction 
of  painful  death  or  the  escape  from  remorseless 
enemies ;  and  so  far  the  argument  in  favour  of 
the  intelligent  nature  of  the  First  Cause  is  an 
argument  against  its  morality.  Again,  even  if 
we  quit  the  narrower  basis  on  which  teleological 
argument  has  rested  in  the  past,  and  stand  that 
argument  upon  the  broader  ground  of  Nature  as 
a  whole,  it  scarcely  becomes  less  incompatible 
with  any  inference  to  the  morality  of  that  Cause, 
seeing  that  the  facts  to  which  I  have  alluded  are 
not  merely  occasional  and,  as  it  were,  outweighed 
by  contrary  facts  of  a  more  general  kind,  but 
manifestly  constitute  the  leading  feature  of  the 
scheme  of  organic  nature  as  a  whole :  or,  if  this 
were  held  to  be  questionable,  it  could  only  follow 
that  we  are  not  entitled  to  infer  that  there  is  any 
such  scheme  at  all. 

Nature,  as  red  in  tooth  and  claw  with  ravin,  is 
thus  without  question  a  large  and  general  fact 
that  must  be   considered   by  any  theory  of  tele- 


INFLUENCE  OF  SCIENCE  UPON  RELIGION.       81 

ology  which  can  be  propounded.  I  do  not  think 
that  this  aspect  of  the  matter  could  be  conveyed 
in  stronger  terms  than  it  is  by  'Physicus,'1  whom 
I  shall  therefore  quote:  — 

'Supposing  the  Deity  to  be,  what  Professor 
Flint  maintains  that  he  is  —  viz.  omnipotent,  and 
there  can  be  no  inference  more  transparent  than 
that  such  wholesale  suffering,  for  whatever  ends 
designed,  exhibits  an  incalculably  greater  defici- 
ency of  beneficence  in  the  divine  character  than 
that  which  we  know  in  any,  the  very  worst,  of 
human  characters.  For  let  us  pause  for  one 
moment  to  think  of  what  suffering  in  Nature 
means.  Some  hundreds  of  millions  of  years  ago 
some  millions  of  millions  of  animals  must  be 
supposed  to  have  become  sentient.  Since  that 
time  till  the  present,  there  must  have  been  millions 
and  millions  of  generations  of  millions  and  mill- 
ions of  individuals.  And  throughout  all  this 
period  of  incalculable  duration,  this  inconceivable 
host  of  sentient  organisms  have  been  in  a  state 
of  unceasing  battle,  dread,  ravin,  pain.  Looking 
to  the  outcome,  we  find  that  more  than  one-half 
of  the  species  which  have  survived  the  ceaseless 
struggle  are  parasitic  in  their  habits,  lower  and 
insentient  forms  of  life  feasting  on  higher  and 
sentient  forms ;  we  find  teeth  and  talons  whetted 
for  slaughter,   hooks   and    suckers    moulded   for 

fIn  an  essay  on  Prof.  Flint's  Theism,  appended  to  the  Can- 
did Examination. 


82  THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION. 

torment  —  everywhere  a  reign  of  terror,  hunger, 
sickness,  with  oozing  blood  and  quivering  limbs, 
with  gasping  breath  and  eyes  of  innocence  that 
dimly  close  in  deaths  of  cruel  torture !  Is  it  said 
that  there  are  compensating  enjoyments  ?  I  care 
not  to  strike  the  balance  ;  the  enjoyments  I  plainly 
perceive  to  be  as  physically  necessary  as  the 
pains,  and  this  whether  or  not  evolution  is  due  to 
design.  .  .  .  Am  I  told  that  I  am  not  competent 
to  judge  the  purposes  of  the  Almighty  ?  I 
answer  that  if  there  are  purposes,  I  am  able  to 
judge  of  them  so  far  as  I  can  see ;  and  if  I  am 
expected  to  judge  of  His  purposes  when  they 
appear  to  be  beneficent,  I  am  in  consistency 
obliged  also  to  judge  of  them  when  they  appear  to 
be  malevolent.  And  it  can  be  no  possible  exten- 
uation of  the  latter  to  point  to  the  "final  result" 
as  "order  and  beauty,"  so  long  as  the  means 
adopted  by  the  "  Omnipotent  Designer"  are  known 
to  have  been  so  [terrible].  All  that  we  could 
legitimately  assert  in  this  case  would  be  that,  so 
far  as  observation  can  extend,  "He  cares  for 
animal  perfection"  to  the  exclusio?i  of  "animal 
enjoyment,"  and  even  to  the  total  disregard 
of  animal  suffering.  But  to  assert  this  would 
merely  be  to  deny  beneficence  as  an  attribute  of 
God.'1 

The  reasoning  here  appears  as  unassailable  as 
it  is  obvious.     If,  as  the  writer  goes  on  to  say,  we 

SA  Candid  Examination  of  Theism,  pp.  17 1-2. 


INFLUENCE  OF  SCIENCE  UPON  RELIGION.       83 

see  a  rabbit  panting  in  the  iron  jaws  of  a  spring 
trap,  and  in  consequence  abhor  the  devilish  nature 
of  the  being  who,  with  full  powers  of  realizing 
what  pain  means,  can  deliberately  employ  his 
whole  faculties  of  invention  in  contriving  a  thing 
so  hideously  cruel ;  what  are  we  to  think  of  a 
Being  who,  with  yet  higher  faculties  of  thought 
and  knowledge,  and  with  an  unlimited  choice  of 
means  to  secure  His  ends,  has  contrived  untold 
thousands  of  mechanisms  no  less  diabolical  ?  In 
short,  so  far  as  Nature  can  teach  us,  or  'observa- 
tion can  extend,'  it  does  appear  that  the  scheme, 
if  it  is  a  scheme,  is  the  product  of  a  Mind  which 
differs  from  the  more  highly  evolved  type  of 
human  mind  in  that  it  is  immensely  more  intel- 
lectual without  being  nearly  so  moral.  And  the 
same  thing  is  indicated  by  the  rough  and  indis- 
criminate manner  in  which  justice  is  allotted  — 
even  if  it  can  be  said  to  be  allotted  at  all.  When 
we  contrast  the  certainty  and  rigour  with  which 
any  offence  against  'physical  law'  is  punished 
by  Nature  (no  matter  though  the  sin  be  but 
one  of  ignorance),  with  the  extreme  uncertainty 
and  laxity  with  which  she  meets  any  offence 
against  'moral  law,'  we  are  constrained  to  feel 
that  the  system  of  legislation  (if  we  may  so 
term  it)  is  conspicuously  different  from  that 
which  would  have  been  devised  by  any  intelli- 
gence which  in  any  sense  could  be  called  'anthro- 
popsychic' 


84  THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION. 

The  only  answer  to  these  difficulties  open  to 
the  natural  theologian  is  that  which  is  drawn  from 
the  constitution  of  the  human  mind.  It  is  argued 
that  the  fact  of  this  mind  having  so  large  an 
ingredient  of  morality  in  its  constitution  may  be 
taken  as  proof  that  its  originating  source  is  like- 
wise of  a  moral  character.  This  argument,  how- 
ever, appears  to  me  of  a  questionable  character, 
seeing  that,  for  anything  we  can  tell  to  the  con- 
trary, the  moral  sense  may  have  been  given  to, 
or  developed  in,  man  simply  on  account  of  its 
utility  to  the  species — just  in  the  same  way  as 
teeth  in  the  shark  or  poison  in  the  snake.  If  so, 
the  occurrence  of  the  moral  sense  in  man  would 
merely  furnish  one  other  instance  of  the  intellec- 
tual, as  distinguished  from  the  moral,  nature  of 
God ;  and  there  seems  to  be  in  itself  no  reason 
why  we  should  take  any  other  view.  The  mere  fact 
that  to  us  the  moral  sense  seems  such  a  great  and 
holy  thing,  is  doubtless  (under  any  view)  owing 
to  its  importance  to  the  well-being  of  our  species. 
In  itself,  or  as  it  appears  to  other  possible  beings 
intellectual  like  ourselves,  but  existing  under 
unlike  conditions,  the  moral  sense  of  man  may  be 
regarded  as  of  no  more  significance  than  the 
social  instincts  of  bees.  More  particularly  may 
this  consideration  apply  to  the  case  of  a  Mind 
existing,  according  to  the  theological  theory  of 
things,  wholly  beyond  the  pale  of  anything  anal- 
ogous to  those  social  relations  out  of  which,  accord- 


INFLUENCE  OF  SCIENCE  UPON  RELIGION.       85 

ing  to  the  scientific  theory  of  evolution,  the  moral 
sense  has  been  developed  in  ourselves.1 

The  truth  is  that  in  this  matter  natural  theo- 
logians begin  by  assuming  that  the  First  Cause, 
if  intelligent,  must  be  moral ;  and  then  they  are 
blinded  to  the  strictly  logical  weakness  of  the 
argument  whereby  they  endeavor  to  sustain  their 
assumption.  For  aught  that  we  can  tell  to  the 
contrary,  it  may  be  quite  as  'anthropomorphic'  a 
notion  to  attribute  morality  to  God  as  it  would  be 
to  attribute  those  capacities  for  sensuous  enjoy- 
ment with  which  the  Greeks  endowed  their 
divinities.  The  Deity  may  be  as  high  above 
the  one  as  the  other  —  or  rather  perhaps  we  may 
say  as  much  external  to  the  one  as  to  the  other. 
Without  being  supra-moral,  and  still  less  immoral, 
He  may  be  un-moral :  our  ideas  of  morality  may 
have  no  meaning  as  applied  to  Him. 

But  if  we  go  thus  far  in  one  direction,  I  think, 
per  contra,  it  must  in  consistency  be  allowed  that  the 
argument  from  the  constitution  of  the  human  mind 
acquires  more  weight  when  it  is  shifted  from  the 
moral  sense  to  the  religious  instincts.    For,  on  the 

1  [  I  have,  as  Editor,  resisted  a  temptation  to  intervene  in  the 
above  argument.  But  I  think  I  may  intervene  on  a  matter  of 
fact,  and  point  out  that  '  according  to  the  theological  theory  of 
things,'  i.  e.  according  to  the  Trinitarian  doctrine,  God's  Nature 
consists  in  what  is  strictly  'analogous  to  social  relations,'  and  He 
not  merely  exhibits  in  His  creation,  but  Himself  is  Love.  See,  on 
the  subject,  especially,  R.  H.  Hutton's  essay  on  the  Incarnation 
in  his  Theological  Essays  (Macmillan). — Ed.] 


86  THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION. 

one  hand,  these  instincts  are  not  of  such  obvious 
use  to  the  species  as  are  those  of  morality ;  and, 
on  the  other  hand,  while  they  are  unquestionably 
very  general,  very  persistent,  and  very  powerful, 
they  do  not  appear  to  serve  any  '  end '  or  '  purpose  ' 
in  the  scheme  of  things,  unless  we  accept  the  theory 
which  is  given  of  them  by  those  in  whom  they  are 
most  strongly  developed.  Here  I  think  we  have 
an  argument  of  legitimate  force,  although  it  does 
not  appear  that  such  was  the  opinion  entertained 
of  it  by  Mill.  I  think  the  argument  is  of  legiti- 
mate force,  because  if  the  religious  instincts  of  the 
human  race  point  to  no  reality  as  their  object,  they 
are  out  of  analogy  with  all  other  instinctive  endow- 
ments. Elsewhere  in  the  animal  kingdom  we 
never  meet  with  such  a  thing  as  an  instinct  pointing 
aimlessly,  and  therefore  the  fact  of  man  being, 
as  it  is  said,  (a  religious  animal'  —  i.  e,  presenting 
a  class  of  feelings  of  a  peculiar  nature  directed  to 
particular  ends,  and  most  akin  to,  if  not  identical 
with,  true  instinct  —  is  so  far,  in  my  opinion,  a 
legitimate  argument  in  favor  of  the  reality  of  some 
object  towards  which  the  religious  side  of  this 
animal's  nature  is  directed.  And  I  do  not  think 
that  this  argument  is  invalidated  by  such  facts  as 
that  widely  different  intellectual  conceptions 
touching  the  character  of  this  object  are  enter- 
tained by  different  races  of  mankind  ,  that  the  force 
of  the  religious  instincts  differs  greatly  in  different 
individuals  even   of    the   same   race ;  that  these 


INFLUENCE  OF  SCIENCE  UPON  RELIGION.      87 

instincts  admit  of  being  greatly  modified  by  edu- 
cation ;  that  they  would  probably  fail  to  be  devel- 
oped in  any  individual  without  at  least  so  much  edu- 
cation as  is  required  to  furnish  the  needful  intel- 
lectual conceptions  on  which  they  are  founded  ;  or 
that  we  may  not  improbably  trace  their  origin,  as 
Mr.  Spencer  traces  it,  to  a  primitive  mode  of  inter- 
preting dreams.  For  even  in  view  of  all  these 
considerations  the  fact  remains  that  these  instincts 
exist,  and  therefore,  like  all  other  instincts,  may  be 
supposed  to  have  a  definite  meaning,  even  though, 
like  all  other  instincts,  they  may  be  supposed  to 
have  had  a  natural  cause,  which  both  in  the  indi- 
vidual and  in  the  race  requires,  as  in  the  natural 
development  of  all  other  instincts,  the  natural 
conditions  for  its  occurrence  to  be  supplied.  In 
a  word,  if  animal  instincts  generally,  like  organic 
structures  or  inorganic  systems,  are  held  to 
betoken  purpose,  the  religious  nature  of  man 
would  stand  out  as  an  anomaly  in  the  general 
scheme  of  things  if  it  alone  were  purposeless. 
Hence  we  have  here  what  seems  to  me  a  valid 
inference,  so  far  as  it  goes,  to  the  effect  that,  if 
the  general  order  of  Nature  is  due  to  Mind,  the 
character  of  that  Mind  is  such  as  it  is  conceived  to 
be  by  the  most  highly  developed  form  of  religion. 
A  conclusion  which  is  no  doubt  the  opposite  of 
that  which  we  reached  by  contemplating  the  phe- 
nomena of  biology  ;  and  a  contradiction  which  can 
only  be  overcome  by  supposing,  either  that  Nature 


88  THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION. 

conceals  God,  while  man  reveals  Him,  or  that 
Nature  reveals  God  while  man  misrepresents 
him. 

There  is  still  one  other  fact  of  a  very  wide  and 
general  kind  presented  by  Nature,  which,  if  the 
order  of  Nature  is  taken  to  be  the  expression  of 
intelligent  purpose,  ought  in  my  opinion  to  be 
regarded  as  of  great  weight  in  furnishing  evidence 
upon  the  ethical  quality  of  that  purpose.  It  is  a 
fact  which,  so  far  as  I  know,  has  not  been  consid- 
ered by  any  other  writer  ;  but  from  its  being  one  of 
the  most  general  of  all  the  facts  relating  to  the 
sentient  creation,  and  from  its  admitting  of  no  one 
single  exception,  I  feel  that  I  am  not  able  too 
strongly  to  emphasize  its  argumentative  impor- 
tance. This  fact  is,  as  I  have  stated  it  on  a  former 
occasion, '  that  amid  all  the  millions  of  mechanisms 
and  instincts  in  the  animal  kingdom,  there  is  no 
one  instance  of  mechanism  or  instinct  occurring 
in  one  species  for  the  exclusive  benefit  of  another 
species,  although  there  are  a  few  cases  in  which 
a  mechanism  or  instinct  that  is  of  benefit  to  its 
possessor  has  come  also  to  be  utilized  by  other 
species.  Now,  on  the  beneficent  design  theory  it 
is  impossible  to  explain  why,  when  all  the  mechan- 
isms in  the  same  species  are  invariably  correlated 
for  the  benefit  of  that  species,  there  should  never 
be  any  such  correlation  between  mechanisms  in 
different  species,  or  why  the  same  remark  should 
apply   to   instincts.      For  how  magnificent  a  dis- 


INFLUENCE  OF  SCIENCE  UPON  RELIGION.      89 

play  of  Divine  beneficence  would  organic  nature 
have  afforded,  if  all,  or  even  some,  species  had 
been  so  inter-related  as  to  minister  to  each  other's 
necessities.  Organic  species  might  then  have 
been  likened  to  a  countless  multitude  of  voices 
all  singing  in  one  harmonious  psalm  of  praise. 
But,  as  it  is,  we  see  no  vestige  of  such  co-ordina- 
tion ;  every  species  is  for  itself,  and  for  itself 
alone  —  an  outcome  of  the  always  and  everywhere 
fiercely  raging  struggle  for  life.'1 

The  large  and  general  fact  thus  stated  consti- 
tutes, in  my  opinion,  the  strongest  of  all  argu- 
ments in  favour  of  Mr.  Darwin's  theory  of  natural 
selection,  and  therefore  we  can  see  the  proba- 
ble reason  why  it  is  what  it  is,  so  far  as  the 
question  of  its  physical  causation  is  concerned. 
But  where  the  question  is,  Supposing  the  physical 
causation  ultimately  due  to  Mind,  what  are  we 
to  infer  concerning  the  character  of  the  Mind 
which  has  adopted  this  method  of  causation?  — 
then  we  again  reach  the  answer  that,  so  far  as  we 
can  judge  from  a  conscientious  examination  of 
these  facts,  this  Mind  does  not  show  that  it  is  of 
a  nature  which  in  man  we  should  call  moral.  Of 
course  behind  the  physical  appearances  there  may 
be  a  moral  justification,  so  that  from  these  appear- 
ances we  are  not  entitled  to  say  more  than  that 
from  the  fact  of  its  having  chosen  a  method  of 
physical  causation  leading  to  these  results,  it  has 

1  Scientific  Evidences  of  Organic  Evolution,  pp.  76-7. 


90  THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION. 

presented  to  us  the  appearance,  as  before  observed, 
of  caring  for  animal  perfection  to  the  exclusion  of 
animal  enjoyment,  and  even  to  the  total  disregard 
of  animal  suffering. 

In  conclusion,  it  is  of  importance  to  insist 
upon  a  truth  which  in  discussions  of  this  kind  is 
too  often  disregarded  —  viz.  that  all  our  reason- 
ings being  of  a  character  relative  to  our  knowl- 
edge, our  inferences  are  uncertain  in  a  degree 
proportionate  to  the  extent  of  our  ignorance ; 
and  that  as  with  reference  to  the  topics  which  we 
have  been  considering  our  ignorance  is  of  im- 
measurable extent,  any  conclusions  that  we  may 
have  formed  are,  as  Bishop  Butler  would  say, 
'infinitely  precarious.'  Or,  as  I  have  previously 
presented  this  formal  aspect  of  the  matter  while 
discussing  the  teleological  argument  with  Profes- 
sor Asa  Gray, — 'I  suppose  it  will  be  admitted 
that  the  validity  of  an  inference  depends  upon 
the  number,  the  importance,  and  the  definiteness 
of  the  things  or  ratios  known,  as  compared 
with  the  number,  importance,  and  definiteness 
of  the  things  or  ratios  unknown,  but  inferred.  If 
so,  we  should  be  logically  cautious  in  drawing 
inferences  from  the  natural  to  the  supernatural : 
for  although  we  have  the  entire  sphere  of  experi- 
ence from  which  to  draw  an  inference,  we  are 
unable  to  gauge  the  probability  of  the  inference 
when  drawn  —  the  unknown  ratios  being  con- 
fessedly  of   unknown   number,   importance,    and 


INFLUENCE  OF  SCIENCE  UPON  RELIGION.        91 

degree  of  definiteness  :  the  whole  orbit  of  human 
knowledge  is  insufficient  to  obtain  a  parallax 
whereby  to  institute  the  required  measurements 
or  to  determine  the  proportion  between  the  terms 
known  and  the  terms  unknown.  Otherwise 
phrased,  we  may  say  —  as  our  knowledge  of  a 
part  is  to  our  knowledge  of  a  whole,  so  is  our 
inference  from  that  part  to  the  reality  of  that 
whole.  Who,  therefore,  can  say,  even  upon  the 
hypothesis  of  Theism,  that  our  inferences  or 
"idea  of  design"  would  have  any  meaning  if 
applied  to  the  "All-Upholder,"  whose  thoughts 
are  not  as  our  thoughts  ?x '  And  of  course,  mutatis 
mutandis,  the  same  remarks  apply  to  all  inferences 
having  a  negative  tendency. 

As  an  outcome  of  the  whole  of  this  discussion, 
then,  I  think  it  appears  that  the  influence  of 
Science  upon  Natural  Religion  has  been  uniformly 
of  a  destructive  character.  Step  by  step  it  has 
driven  back  the  apparent  evidence  of  direct  or 
special  design  in  Nature,  until  now  this  evidence 
resides  exclusively  in  the  one  great  and  general 
fact  that  Nature  as  a  whole  is  a  Cosmos.  Further 
than  this  it  is  obviously  impossible  that  the 
destructive  influence  of  Science  can  extend, 
because  Science  can  only  exist  upon  the  basis  of 
this  fact.  But  when  we  allow  that  this  great  and 
universal  fact  —  which  but  for  the  effects  of 
unremitting  familiarity  could   scarcely  fail  to  be 

1  Nature,  April  5,  1883. 


92  THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION. 

intellectually  overwhelming — does  betoken  mental 
agency  in  Nature,  we  immediately  find  it  impos- 
sible to  determine  the  probable  character  of  such 
a  mind,  even  supposing  that  it  exists.  We  can- 
not conceive  of  it  as  presenting  any  one  of  the 
qualities  which  essentially  characterize  what  we 
know  as  mind  in  ourselves ;  and  therefore  the 
word  Mind,  as  applied  to  the  supposed  agency, 
stands  for  a  blank.  Further,  even  if  we  disregard 
this  difficulty,  and  assume  that  in  some  way  or 
other  incomprehensible  to  us  a  Mind  does  exist 
as  far  transcending  the  human  mind  as  the  human 
mind  transcends  mechanical  motion ;  still  we  are 
met  by  some  very  large  and  general  facts  in 
Nature  which  seem  strongly  to  indicate  that  this 
Mind,  if  it  exists,  is  either  deficient  in,  or  wholly 
destitute  of,  that  class  of  feelings  which  in  man 
we  term  moral ;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
religious  aspirations  of  man  himself  may  be  taken 
to  indicate  the  opposite  conclusion.  And,  lastly, 
with  reference  to  the  whole  course  of  such 
reasonings,  we  have  seen  that  any  degree  of 
measurable  probability,  as  attaching  to  the  con- 
clusions, is  unattainable.  From  all  which  it  appears 
that  Natural  Religion  at  the  present  time  can 
only  be  regarded  as  a  system  full  of  intellectual 
contradictions  and  moral  perplexities ;  so  that  if 
we  go  to  her  with  these  greatest  of  all  questions : 
1  Is  there  knowledge  with  the  Most  High  ? '  *  Shall 
not  the  Judge  of  all  the  earth  do  right  ?'  the  only 


INFLUENCE  OF  SCIENCE  UPON  RELIGION.        93 

clear  answer  which  we  receive  is  the  one  that 
comes  back  to  us  from  the  depths  of  our  own 
heart — 'When  I  thought  upon  this  it  was  too 
painful  for  me.' 


PART  II. 


«5 


INTRODUCTORY  NOTE  BY  THE 

EDITOR. 

Little  more  requires  to  be  said  by  way  of 
introduction  to  the  Notes-  which  are  all  that 
George  Romanes  was  able  to  write  of  a  work  that 
was  to  have  been  entitled  A  Candid  Examina- 
Hon  of  Religion.  What  little  does  require  to  be 
said  must  be  by  way  of  bridging  the  interval  of 
thought  which  exists  between  the  Essays  which 
have  just  preceded  and  the  Notes  which  represent 
more  nearly  his  final  phase  of  mind. 

The  most  anti-theistic  feature  in  the  Essays 
is  the  stress  laid  in  them  on  the  evidence 
which  Nature  supplies,  or  is  supposed  to  supply, 
antagonistic  to  the  belief  in  the  goodness  of 
God. 

On  this  mysterious  and  perplexing  subject 
George  Romanes  appears  to  have  had  more  to 
say  but  did  not  live  to  say  it1.  We  may  notice 
however  that  in  1889,  m  a  paper  read  before  the 
Aristotelian  Society,  on  'the  Evidence  of  Design 

xSee  below  p.  152  and  note.  I  find  also  the  following  note  of 
a  date  subsequent  to  1889.  'It  is  a  fact  that  pessimism  is  illogical, 
simply  because  we  are  inadequate  judges  of  the  world,  and 
pessimism  would  therefore  be  opposed  to  agnosticism.  We  may 
know  that  there  is  something  out  of  joint  between  the  world  and 
ourselves ;  but  we  cannot  know  how  far  this  is  the  fault  of  the 
world  or  of  ourselves.' 

97 


98  THOUGHTS   ON   RELIGION. 

in  Nature1,'  he  appears  to  allow  more  weight 
than  before  to  the  argument  that  the  method  of 
physical  development  must  be  judged  in  the  light 
of  its  result.  This  paper  was  part  of  a  Symposium, 
Mr.  S.  Alexander  has  argued  in  a  previous  paper 
against  the  hypothesis  of  'design'  in  Nature  on 
the  ground  that  'the  fair  order  of  Nature  is  only 
acquired  by  a  wholesale  waste  and  sacrifice.' 
This  argument  was  developed  by  pointing  to  the 
obvious  'mal-adjustments,'  'aimless  destructions,' 
&c,  which  characterize  the  processes  of  Nature. 
But  these,  Romanes  replies,  necessarily  belong  to 
the  process  considered  as  one  of  'natural  selec- 
tion.' The  question  is  only :  Is  such  a  process 
per  se  incompatible  with  the  hypothesis  of 
design  ?     And  he  replies  in  the  negative. 

'"The  fair  order  of  Nature  is  only  acquired 
by  a  wholesale  waste  and  sacrifice."  Granted. 
But  if  the  "wholesale  waste  and  sacrifice,"  as 
antecedent,  leads  to  a  "fair  order  of  Nature"  as 
its  consequent,  how  can  it  be  said  that  the 
"wholesale  waste  and  sacrifice"  has  been  a 
failure  ?  Or  how  can  it  be  said  that,  in  point  of 
fact,  there  has  been  a  waste,  or  has  been  a  sacri- 
fice ?  Clearly  such  things  can  only  be  said  when 
our  point  of  view  is  restricted  to  the  means  (i.  e. 
the  wholesale   destruction   of  the   less    fit) ;  not 

1  Proceedings  of  the  Aristotelian  Society  (Williams  &  Norgate), 
vol.  i.  no.  3,  pp.  72,  73. 


INTRODUCTORY   NOTE.  99 

when  we  extend  our  view  to  what,  even  within 
the  limits  of  human  observation,  is  unquestion- 
ably the  end  (i.  e.  the  casual  result  in  an  ever 
improving  world  of  types).  A  candidate  who  is 
plucked  in  a  Civil  Service  examination  because 
he  happens  to  be  one  of  the  less  fitted  to  pass, 
is  no  doubt  an  instance  of  failure  so  far  as  his 
own  career  is  concerned ;  but  it  does  not  there- 
fore follow  that  the  system  of  examination  is  a 
failure  in  its  final  end  of  securing  the  best  men 
for  the  Civil  Service.  And  the  fact  that  the 
general  outcome  of  all  the  individual  failures  in 
Nature  is  that  of  securing  what  Mr.  Alexander 
calls  "the  fair  order  of  Nature,"  is  assuredly 
evidence  that  the  modus  operandi  has  not  been  a 
failure  in  relation  to  what,  if  there  be  any  Design 
in  Nature  at  all,  must  be  regarded  as  the  higher 
purpose  of  such  Design.  Therefore,  cases  of 
individual  or  otherwise  relative  failure  cannot  be 
quoted  as  evidence  against  the  hypothesis  of  there 
being  such  Design.  The  fact  that  the  general 
system  of  natural  causation  has  for  its  eventual 
result  "a  fair  order  of  Nature,"  cannot  of  itself 
be  a  fact  inimical  to  the  hypothesis  of  Design  in 
Nature,  even  though  it  be  true  that  such  causation 
entails  the  continual  elimination  of  the  less 
efficient  types. 

'To  the  best  of  my  judgment,  then,  this  argu- 
ment from  failure,  random  trial,  blind  blundering, 
or  in  whatever  other  terminology  the  argument 


ioo  THOUGHTS   ON    RELIGION. 

■ 

may  be  presented,  is  only  valid  as  against  the 
theory  of  what  Mr.  Alexander  alludes  to  as  a 
"Carpenter-God,"  i.  e.  that  if  there  be  Design  in 
Nature  at  all,  it  must  everywhere  be  special 
Design  ;  so  that  the  evidence  of  it  may  as  well  be 
tested  by  any  given  minute  fragment  of  Nature  — 
such  as  one  individual  organism  or  class  of  organ- 
isms—  as  by  having  regard  to  the  whole  Cosmos. 
The  evidence  of  Design  in  this  sense  I  fully  allow 
has  been  totally  destroyed  by  the  proof  of  natural 
selection.  But  such  destruction  has  only  brought 
into  clearer  relief  the  much  larger  question  that 
rises  behind,  viz.  as  before  phrased,  Is  there  any- 
thing about  the  method  of  natural  causation, 
considered  as  a  whole,  that  is  inimical  to  the 
theory  of  Design  in  Nature,  considered  as  a 
whole  ?  ' 

It  is  true  that  this  argument  does  not  bear 
directly  upon  the  character  of  the  God  whose 
'design'  Nature  exhibits:  but  indirectly  it  does.1 
For  instance,  such  an  argument  as  that  found 
above  (on  p.  83  :  'we  see  a  rabbit,  &c.')  seems  to 
be  only  valid  on  the  postulate  here  described  as 
that  of  the  'Carpenter-God.' 

1 1  ought  also  to  mention  that  Romanes  on  the  Sunday  before 
his  death  expressed  to  me  verbally  his  entire  agreement  with  the 
argument  of  Professor  Knight's  Aspects  of  Theism  (Macmillan, 
1893);  in  which  on  this  subject  see  pp.  184-186,  'A  larger  good 
is  evolved  through  the  winnowing  process  by  which  physical 
nature  casts  its  weaker  products  aside,'  &c. 


INTRODUCTORY    NOTE.  101 

It  is  also  probable  that  Romanes  felt  the  diffi- 
culty arising  from  the  cruelty  of  nature  less,  as  he 
was  led  to  dwell  more  on  humanity  as  the  most 
important  part  of  nature,  and  perceived  the  func- 
tion of  suffering  in  the  economy  of  human  life 
(pp.  152,  164):  and  also  as  he  became  more 
impressed  with  the  positive  evidences  for  Chris- 
tianity as  at  once  the  religion  of  sorrow  and  the 
revelation  of  God  as  Love  (pp.  174,  ff.).  The 
Christian  Faith  supplies  believers  not  only  with 
an  argument  against  pessimism  from  general 
results,  but  also  with  such  an  insight  into  the 
Divine  character  and  method  as  enables  them  at 
least  to  bear  hopefully  the  awful  perplexities 
which  arise  from  the  spectacle  of  individuals 
suffering. 

In  the  last  year  or  two  of  his  life  he  read  very 
attentively  a  great  number  of  books  on  'Christian 
Evidences,'  from  Pascal's  Pense'es  downwards,  and 
studied  carefully  the  appearance  of  'plan'  in  the 
Biblical  Revelation  considered  as  a  whole.  The 
fact  of  this  study  appears  in  fragmentary  remarks, 
indices  and  references,  which  George  Romanes 
left  behind  him  in  note-books.  The  results  of  it 
will  not  be  unapparent  in  the  following  Notes, 
which,  I  need  not  remind  my  readers,  are,  in  spite 
of  their  small  bulk,  the  sole  reason  for  the  exist- 
ence of  this  volume. 

In  reading  these  I  can  hardly  conceive  any  one 
not  being  possessed  with  a  profound  regret  that 


102  THOUGHTS   ON   RELIGION. 

the  author  was  not  allowed  to  complete  his  work. 
And  it  is  only  fair  to  ask  every  reader  of  the  fol- 
lowing pages  to  remember  that  he  is  reading,  in 
the  main,  incomplete  notes  and  not  finished  work. 
This  will  account  for  a  great  deal  that  may  seem 
sketchy  and  unsatisfactory  in  the  treatment  of 
different  points,  and  also  for  repetitions  and  traces 
of  inconsistency.  But  I  can  hardly  think  any  one 
can  read  these  notes  to  the  end  without  agreeing 
with  me  that  if  I  had  withheld  them  from  publi- 
cation, the  world  would  have  lost  the  witness  of 
a  mind,  both  able  and  profoundly  sincere,  feeling 

after  God  and  finding  Him. 

C.  G. 


NOTES  FOR  A  WORK  ON 
A  CANDID  EXAMINATION  OF  RELIGION. 

By  METAPHYSICUS. 

Proposed  Mottoes. 

'I  quite  admit  the  difficulty  of  believing  that  in  every  man 
there  is  an  eye  of  the  soul  which,  when  by  other  pursuits  lost  and 
dimmed,  is  by  this  purified  and  re-illumined  ;  and  is  more  precious 
far  than  ten  thousand  bodily  eyes,  for  by  this  alone  is  truth  seen. 
Now  there  are  two  classes  of  persons,  one  class  who  will  agree 
with  you  and  will  take  your  words  as  a  revelation ;  another  class 
who  have  no  understanding  of  them  and  to  whom  they  will 
naturally  be  as  idle  tales. 

'And  you  had  better  decide  at  once  with  which  of  the  two 
you  are  arguing ;  or,  perhaps,  you  will  say  with  neither,  and  that 
your  chief  aim  in  carrying  on  the  argument  is  your  own  improve- 
ment; at  the  same  time  not  grudging  to  either  any  benefit  which 
they  may  derive.' — Plato. 

'If  we  would  reprove  with  success,  and  show  another  his 
mistake,  we  must  see  from  what  side  he  views  the  matter,  for  on 
that  side  it  is  generally  true  :  and,  admitting  this  truth,  show  him 
the  side  on  which  it  is  false.' — Pascal. 


103 


§  i.   INTRODUCTORY. 

Many  years  ago  I  published  in  Messrs.  Triib- 
ner's '  Philosophical  Series,'  a  short  treatise  entitled 
A  Candid  Examination  of  Tlieism  by  'Physicus.' 
Although  the  book  made  some  stir  at  the  time, 
and  has  since  exhibited  a  vitality  never  anticipated 
by  its  author,  the  secret  of  its  authorship  has  been 
well  preserved.1  This  secret  it  is  my  intention,, 
if  possible,  still  to  preserve ;  but  as  it  is  desirable 
(on  several  accounts  which  will  become  apparent 
in  the  following  pages)  to  avow  identity  of  author- 
ship, the  present  essay  appears  under  the  same 
pseudonym2  as  its  predecessor.  The  reason  why 
the  first  essay  appeared  anonymously  is  truthfully 
stated  in  the  preface  thereof,  viz.  in  order  that  the 
reasoning  should  be  judged  on  its  own  merits, 
without  the  bias  which  is  apt  to  arise  on  the  part 

xThe  first  edition,  which  was  published  in  1878,  was  rapidly 
exhausted,  but,  as  my  object  in  publishing  was  solely  that  of 
soliciting  criticism  for  my  own  benefit,  I  arranged  with  the  pub- 
lishers not  to  issue  any  further  edition.  The  work  has  therefore 
been  out  of  print  for  many  years. 

[This  'arrangement'  was  however  not  actually  made,  or  at 
least  was  unknown  to  the  present  publishing  firm  of  Kegan  Paul, 
Trench,  Triibner  &  Co.  Thus  a  new  edition  of  the  book  was 
published  in  1892,  to  the  author's  surprise. — Ed.] 

2  [Or  rather  it  was  intended  that  it  should  appear  under  the 
pseudonym  of  '  Metaphysicus.' — Ed.] 

104 


A   CANDID   EXAMINATION   OF   RELIGION       1 05 

of  a  reader  from  a  knowledge  of  the  authority  — 
or  absence  of  authority  —  on  the  part  of  a  writer. 
This  reason,  in  my  opinion,  still  holds  good  as 
regards  A  Candid  Examination  of  Tlieism,  and 
applies  in  equal  measure  to  the  present  sequel  in 
A  Candid  Examination  of  Religion. 

It  will  be  shown  that  in  many  respects  the 
negative  conclusions  reached  in  the  former  essay 
have  been  greatly  modified-  by  the  results  of 
maturer  thought  as  now  presented  in  the  second. 
Therefore  it  seems  desirable  to  state  at  the  outset 
that,  as  far  as  I  am  capable  of  judging  the  modi- 
fications in  question  have  not  been  due  in  any 
measure  to  influence  from  without.  They  appear 
to  have  been  due  exclusively  to  the  results  of  my 
own  further  thought,  as  briefly  set  out  in  the 
following  pages,  with  no  indebtedness  to  private 
fnends  and  but  little  to  published  utterances  in 
the  form  of  books,  &c.  Nevertheless,  no  very 
original  ideas  are  here  presented.  Indeed,  I 
suppose  it  would  nowadays  be  impossible  to  pre- 
sent any  idea  touching  religion,  which  has  not  at 
some  time  or  another  been  presented  previously. 
Still  much  may  be  done  in  the  furthering  of  one's 
thought  by  changing  points  of  view,  selecting  and 
arranging  ideas  already  more  or  less  familiar,  so 
that  they  may  be  built  into  new  combinations  ;  and 
this,  I  think,  I  have  in  no  small  degree  accom- 
plished as  regards  the  microcosm  of  my  own 
mind.     But  I  state  this  much  only  for  the  sake  of 


106  THOUGHTS   ON    RELIGION. 

adding  a  confession  that,  as  far  as  introspection 
can  carry  one,  it  does  not  appear  to  me  that  the 
modifications  which  my  views  have  undergone 
since  the  publication  of  my  previous  Candid 
Examination  are  due  so  much  to  purely  logical 
processes  of  the  intellect,  as  to  the  sub-conscious 
(and  therefore  more  or  less  unanalyzable) 
influences  due  to  the  ripening  experience  of  life. 
The  extent  to  which  this  is  true  [i.  e.  the  extent 
to  which  experience  modifies  logic]1  is  seldom, 
if  ever,  realized,  although  it  is  practically 
exemplified  every  day  by  the  sobering  caution 
which  advancing  age  exercises  upon  the  mind. 
Not  so  much  by  any  above-board  play  of 
syllogism  as  by  some  underhand  cheating  of  con- 
sciousness, do  the  accumulating  experiences  of 
life  and  of  thought  slowly  enrich  the  judgment. 
And  this,  one  need  hardly  say,  is  especially  true 
in  such  regions  of  thought  as  present  the  most 
tenuous  media  for  the  progress  of  thought  by  the 
comparatively  clumsy  means  of  syllogistic  loco- 
motion. For  the  further  we  ascend  from  the  solid 
ground  of  verification,  the  less  confidence  should 
we  place  in  our  wings  of  speculation,  while  the 
more  do  we  find  the  practical  wisdom  of  such 
intellectual  caution,  or  distrust  of  ratiocination,  as 
can  be  given  only  by  experience.  Therefore, 
most  of  all  is  this  the  case  in  those  departments 

1  [Words  in  square  brackets  have  been  added  by  me.  But  I 
have  not  introduced  the  brackets  when  I  have  simply  inserted 
single  unimportant  words  obviously  necessary  for  the  sense. — Ed.] 


A   CANDID    EXAMINATION    OF   RELIGION.     107 

of  thought  which  are  furthest  from  the  region  of 
our  sensuous  life  —  viz.  metaphysics  and  religion. 
And,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  it  is  just  in  these  depart- 
ments of  thought  that  we  find  the  rashness  of 
youth  most  amenable  to  the  discipline  in  question 
by  the  experience  of  age. 

However,  in  spite  of  this  confession,  I  have  no 
doubt  that  even  in  the  matter  of  pure  and  con- 
scious reason  further  thought  has  enabled  me  to 
detect  serious  errors,  or  rather  oversights,  in  the 
very  foundations  of  my  Candid  Examination  of 
Theism.  I  still  think,  indeed,  that  from  the 
premises  there  laid  down  the  conclusions  result  in 
due  logical  sequence,  so  that,  as  a  matter  of  mere 
ratiocination,  I  am  not  likely  ever  to  detect  any 
serious  flaws,  especially  as  this  has  not  been  done 
by  anybody  else  during  the  many  years  of  its 
existence.  But  I  now  clearly  perceive  two  well- 
nigh  fatal  oversights  which  I  then  committed. 
The  first  was  undue  confidence  in  merely  syllogistic  \j 
conclusions,  even  when  derived  from  sound 
premises,  in  regions  of  such  high  abstraction. 
The  second  was,  in  not  being  sufficiently  careful 
in  examining  the  foundations  of  my  criticism,  i.  e. 
the  validity  of  its  premises.  I  will  here  briefly 
consider  these  two  points  separately. 

As  regards. the  first  point,  never  was  anyone 
more  arrogant  in  his  claims  for  pure  reason  than 
I  was  —  more  arrogant  in  spirit  though  not  in 
letter,  this  being  due    to   contact  with    science  ; 


108  THOUGHTS    ON    RELIGION. 

without  ever  considering  how  opposed  to  reason 
itself  is  the  unexpressed  assumption  of  my  earlier 
argument  as  to  God  Himself,  as  if  His  existence 
were  a  merely  physical  problem  to  be  solved  by 
man's  reason  alone,  without  reference  to  his  other 
and  higher  faculties.1 

The  second  point  is  of  still  more  importance, 
because  so  seldom,  if  ever,  recognized. 

At  the  time  of  writing  the  Candid Exa?nination 
I  perceived  clearly  how  the  whole  question  of 
Theism  from  the  side  of  reason  turned  on  the 
question  as  to  the  nature  of  natural  causation. 
My  theory  of  natural  causation  obeyed  the  Law 
of  Parsimony,  resolving  all  into  Being  as  such  ; 
but,  on  the  other  hand,  it  erred  in  not  consider- 
ing whether  '  higher  causes  '  are  not  '  necessary ' 
to  account  for  spiritual  facts  —  i.e.  whether  the 
ultimate  Being  must  not  be  at  least  as  high  as  the 
intellectual  and  spiritual  nature  of  man,  i.  e.  higher 
than  anything  merely  physical  or  mechanical. 
The  supposition  that  it  must  does  not  violate  the 
Law  of  Parsimony. 

Pure  agnostics  ought  to  investigate  the  religious 
consciousness  of  Christians  as  a  phenomenon 
which  may  possibly  be  what  Christians  themselves 
believe  it  to  be,  i.  e.  of  Divine  origin.     And  this 

1  [See  p.  30,  quotation  from  Preface  of  'Physicus.'  The 
state  of  mind  expressed  in  the  above  Note  is  a  return  to  the  earlier 
frame  of  mind  of  the  Burney  Essay,  e.g.  p.  20.  That  essay  was 
full  of  the  thought  that  Christian  evidences  are  very  manifold  and 
largely  'extra-scientific' — Ed.1 


A  CANDID  EXAMINATION  OF  RELIGION.       109 

may  be  done  without  entering  into  any  question 
as  to  the  objective  validity  of  Christian  dogmas. 
The  metaphysics  of  Christianity  may  be  false  in 
fact,  and  yet  the  spirit  of  Christianity\may  be  true 
in  substance — i.  e.  it  may  be  the  highest  '  good 
gift  from  above'  as  yet  given  to  man. 

My  present  object,  then,  like  that  of  Socrates, 
is  not  to  impart  any  philosophical  system,  or  even 
positive  knowledge,  but  a  frame  of  mind,  what 
I  may  term,  pure  agnosticism,  as  distinguished 
from  what  is  commonly  so  called. 


§  2.  DEFINITION    OF   TERMS  AND  PUR- 
POSE   OF   THIS    TREATISE. 

[To  understand  George  Romanes'  mind  close 
attention  must  be  paid  to  the  following  section. 
Also  to  the  fact,  not  explicitly  noticed  by  him, 
that  he  uses  the  word  'reason'  (see  p.  118)  in  a 
sense  closely  resembling  that  in  which  Mr.  Kidd 
has  recently  used  it  in  his  Social  Evolutio?i.  He 
uses  it,  that  is,  in  a  restricted  sense  as  equivalent 
to  the  process  of  scie?itific  ratiocination.  His  main 
position  is  therefore  this:  Scientific  ratiocination 
cannot  find  adequate  grounds  for  belief  in  God. 
But  the  pure  agnostic  must  recognize  that  God 
may  have  revealed  Himself  by  other  means  than 
that  of  scientific  ratiocination.  As  religion  is  for 
the  whole  man,  so  all  human  faculties  may  be 
required  to  seek  after  God  and  find  Him — emo- 
tions and  experiences  of  an  extra-'  rational '  kind. 
The  'pure  agnostic'  must  be  prepared  to  wel- 
come evidence  of  all  sorts. — Ed.] 

It  is  desirable  to  be  clear  at  the  outset  as  to 
the  meaning  which  I  shall  throughout  attach  to 
certain  terms  and  phrases. 

THEISM. 

It  will   frequently   be    said,  'on  the   theory  of 

Theism,'  'supposing  Theism   true,'  &c.      By  such 

no 


A   CANDID    EXAMINATION   OF    RELIGION.     Ill 

phrase  my  meaning  will  always  be  equivalent  to — 
'supposing'  for  the  sake  of  argument,  that  the 
nearest  approach  which  the  human  mind  can  make 
to  a  true  notion  of  the  ens  realissimum,  is  that  of 
an  inconceivably  magnified  image  of  itself  at  its 
best.' 

CHRISTIANITY. 

Similarly,  when  it  is  said,  'supposing  Christi- 
an^ true,'  what  will  be  meant  is — 'supposing for 
the  sake  of  argument,  that  the  Christian  system 
as  a  whole,  from  its  earliest  dawn  in  Judaism,  to 
the  phase  of  its  development  at  the  present  time, 
is  the  highest  revelation  of  Himself  which  a  per- 
sonal Deity  has  vouchsafed  to  mankind.'  This  I 
intend  to  signify  an  attitude  of  pure  agnosticism 
as  regards  any  particular  dogma  of  Christianity — 
even  that  of  the  Incarnation. 

Should  it  be  said  that  by  holding  in  suspense 
any  distinctive  dogma  of  Christianity,  I  am  not 
considering  Christianity  at  all,  I  reply,  Not  so; 
I  am  not  writing  a  theological,  but  a  philosophical 
treatise,  and  shall  consider  Christianity  merely  as 
one  of  many  religions,  though,  of  course,  the 
latest,  &c.  Thus  considered,  Christianity  takes 
its  place  as  the  highest  manifestation  of  evolution 
in  this  department  of  the  human  mind;  but  I  am 
not  concerned  even  with  so  important  an  ecclesi- 
astical dogma  as  that  of  the  Incarnation  of  God  in 
Christ.  As  far  as  this  treatise  has  to  go,  that 
dogma  may  or  may  not  be  true.     The  important 


112  THOUGHTS   ON   RELIGION. 

question  for  us  is,  Has  God  spoken  through  the 
medium  of  our  religious  instincts?  And  although 
this  will  necessarily  involve  the  question  whether 
or  how  far  in  the  case  of  Christianity  there  is 
objective  evidence  of  His  having  spoken  by  the 
mouth  of  holy  men  [of  the  Old  Testament]  which 
have  been  since  the  world  began,  such  will  be  the 
case  only  because  it  is  a  question  of  objective 
evidence  whether  or  how  far  the  religious 
instincts  of  these  men,  or  this  race  of  men,  have 
been  so  much  superior  to  those  of  other  men,  or 
races  of  men,  as  to  have  enabled  them  to  predict 
future  events  of  a  religious  character.  And 
whether  or  not  in  these  latter  days  God  has  spoken 
by  His  own  Son  is  not  a  question  for  us,  further 
than  to  investigate  the  higher  class  of  religious 
phenomena  which  unquestionably  have  been  pres- 
ent in  the  advent  and  person  of  Jesus.  The 
question  whether  Jesus  was  the  Son  of  God,  is, 
logically  speaking,  a  question  of  ontology,  which, 
qud  pure  agnostics,  we  are  logically  forbidden  to 
touch. 

But  elsewhere  I  ought  to  show  that,  from  my 
point  of  view  as  to  the  fundamental  question 
being  whether  God  has  spoken  at  all  through  the 
religious  instincts  of  mankind,  it  may  very  well 
be  that  Christ  was  not  God,  and  yet  that  He  gave 
the  highest  revelation  of  God.  If  the 'first  Man' 
was  allegorical,  why  not  the 'second?'  It  is, 
indeed,  an   historical  fact  that  the  'second  Man' 


A   CANDID   EXAMINATION   OF   RELIGION.      113 

existed,  but  so  likewise  may  the  'first.'  And,  as 
regards  the  'personal  claims'  of  Christ,  all  that 
He  said  is  not  incompatible  with  His  having  been 
Gabriel,  and  His  Holy  Ghost,  Michael.1  Or  He 
may  have  been  a  man  deceived  as  to  His  own 
personality,  and  yet  the  vehicle  of  highest  inspi- 
ration. 

RELIGION. 

By  the  term  '  religion,'  I  shall  mean  any  theory 
of  personal  agency  in  the  universe,  belief  in  which 
is  strong  enough  in  any  degree  to  influence  con- 
duct. No  term  has  been  used  more  loosely  of 
late  years,  or  in  a  greater  variety  of  meanings. 
Of  course  anybody  may  use  it  in  any  sense  he 
pleases,  provided  he  defines  exactly  in  what  sense 
he  does  so.  The  above  seems  to  be  most  in 
accordance  with  traditional  usage. 

AGNOSTICISM  'PURE'  AND  'IMPURE.' 
The  modern  and  highly  convenient  term 
'Agnosticism,'  is  used  in  two  very  different  senses. 
By  its  originator,  Professor  Huxley,  it  was  coined 
to  signify  an  attitude  of  reasoned  ignorance 
touching  everything  that  lies  beyond  the  sphere 
of  sense-perception  —  a  professed  inability  to 
found  valid  belief  on  any  other  basis.  It  is  in 
this  its  original  sense  —  and  also,  in  my  opinion, 
its  only  philosophically  justifiable  sense  —  that  I 
shall  understand   the   term.      But  the   other,  and 

1  [i.  e.  Supernatural  but  not  strictly  Divine  Persons.     Surely, 
however,  the  proposition  is  not  maintainable. — Ed.] 


H4  THOUGHTS   ON    RELIGION. 

perhaps  more  popular  sense  in  which  the  word  is 
now  employed,  is  as  the  correlative  of  Mr.  H. 
Spencer's  doctrine  of  the  Unknowable. 

This  latter  term  is  philosophically  erroneous, 
implying  important  negative  knowledge  that  if 
there  be  a  God  we  know  this  much  about  Him  — 
that  He  cannot  reveal  Himself  to  man.1  Pure 
agnosticism  is  as  defined  by  Huxley. 

Of  all  the  many  scientific  men  whom  I  have 
known,  the  most  pure  in  his  agnosticism  —  not 
only  in  profession  but  in  spirit  and  conduct  — 
was  Darwin.  (What  he  says  in  his  autobiography 
about  Christianity2  shows  no  profundity  of  thought 
in  the  direction  of  philosophy  or  religion.  His 
mind  was  too  purely  inductive  for  this.  But,  on 
this  very  account,  it  is  the  more  remarkable  that 
his  rejection  of  Christianity  was  due,  not  to  any 
aprioribidiS  against  the  creed  on  grounds  of  reason 
as  absurd,  but  solely  on  the  ground  of  an  apparent 
moral  objection  a  posteriori?*)  Faraday  and 
many  other  first-rate  originators  in  science  were 
like  Darwin. 

As  an  illustration  of  impure  agnosticism  take 
Hume's  a  priori  argument  against  miracles,  lead- 
ing on  to  the  analogous  case  of  the  attitude  of 
scientific  men  towards  modern  spiritualism.     Not- 

1  [This  is  another  instance  of  recurrence  to  an  earlier  thought ; 
see  Burney  Essay,  p.  25.— Ed.] 

3  Life  and  Letters  of  Charles  Darwin,  i.  308. 

3  [See  further,  p.  194. — Ed.] 


A   CANDID    EXAMINATION   OF   RELIGION.     1 15 

withstanding  that  they  have  the  close  analogy  of 
mesmerism  as  an  object-lesson  to  warn  them, 
scientific  men  as  a  class  are  here  quite  as  dog- 
matic as  the  straightest  sect  of  theologians. 
I  may  give  examples  which  can  cause  no  offence, 
inasmuch  as  the  men  in  question  have  themselves 

made  the  facts  public,  viz. refusing  to  go  to 

[a  famous  spiritualist] ;  refusing  to  try in 

thought-reading.1  These  men  all  professed  to  be 
agnostics  at  the  very  time  when  thus  so  egregrious- 
ly  violating  their  philosophy  by  their  conduct. 

Of  course  I  do  not  mean  to  say  that,  even  to 
a  pure  agnostic,  reason  should  not  be  guided  in 
part  by  antecedent  presumption  —  e.  g.  in  ordi- 
nary life,  the  prima  facie  case,  motive,  &c,  counts 
for  evidence  in  a  court  of  law — and  where  there 
is  a  strong  antecedent  improbability  a  proportion- 
ately greater  weight  of  evidence  a  posteriori  is 
needed  to  counterbalance  it :  so  that,  e.  g.  better 
evidence  would  be  needed  to  convict  the  Arch- 
bishop of  Canterbury  than  a  vagabond  of  pocket- 
picking.  And  so  it  is  with  speculative  philosophy. 
But  in  both  cases  our  only  guide  is  known 
analogy ;  therefore,  the  further  we  are  removed 
from  possible  experience  —  i.  e.  the  more  remote 
from  experience  the  sphere  contemplated — the 
less  value  attaches  to  antecedent  presumptions.2 

1  [On  the  whole  I  have  thought  it  best  to  omit  the  names. — 
Ed.] 

2  [The  MS.  note  here  continues :  '  Here  introduce  all   that  I 


n6  THOUGHTS    ON    RELIGION. 

Maximum  remoteness  from  possible  experience  is 
reached  in  the  sphere  of  the  final  mystery  of 
things  with  which  religion  has  to  do  ;  so  that  here 
all  presumption  has  faded  away  into  a  vanishing 
point,  and  pure  agnosticism  is  our  only  rational  atti- 
tude. In  other  words,  here  we  should  all  alike 
be  pure  agnostics  as  far  as  reason  is  concerned ; 
and,  if  any  of  us  are  to  attain  to  any  information,  it 
can  only  be  by  jneans  of  some  super-added 
faculty  of  our  minds.  The  questions  as  to  whether 
there  are  any  such  super-added  faculties ;  if  so, 
whether  they  ever  appear  to  have  been  acted  upon 
from  without ;  if  they  have,  in  what  manner  they 
have ;  what  is  their  report,  how  far  they  are 
trustworthy  in  that  report,  and  so  on  —  these  are 
the  questions  with  which  this  treatise  is  to  be 
mainly  concerned. 

say  on  the  subject  in  my  Burney  Prize.'  I  have  not,  however, 
introduced  any  quotation  into  the  text  because  (i)  I  think 
Romanes  makes  his  meaning  plain  in  the  text  as  it  stands ;  (2)  I 
cannot  find  in  the  essay  in  question  any  exactly  appropriate  pas- 
sage of  reasonable  length  to  quote.  The  greater  part  of  the  essay 
is,  however,  directed  to  meet  the  scientific  objection  to  the  doctrine 
that  prayer  is  answered  in  the  physical  region,  by  showing  that 
this  objection  consists  in  an  argument  from  the  known  to  the 
unknown,  i.  e.  from  the  known  sphere  of  invariable  physical  laws 
to  the  unknown  sphere  of  God's  relation  to  all  such  laws ;  and  is, 
therefore,  weak  in  proportion  as  the  unknown  sphere  is  remote 
trom  possible  experience  of  a  scientific  kind,  and  admits  of  an 
indefinite  number  of  possibilities,  more  or  less  conceivable  to  our 
imagination,  which  would  or  might  prevent  the  scientific  argu- 
ment from  having  legitimate  application  to  the  question  in 
hand. — Ed]. 


A  CANDID  EXAMINATION  OF  RELIGION.      1 17 

My  own  attitude  may  be  here  stated.  I  do  not 
claim  any  [religious]  certainty  of  an  intuitive  kind 
myself ;  but  am  nevertheless  able  to  investigate  the 
abstract  logic  of  the  matter.  And,  although  this 
may  seem  but  barren  dialectic,  it  may,  I  hope,  be 
of  practical  service  if  it  secures  a  fair  hearing  to 
the  reports  given  by  the  vast  majority  of  mankind 
who  unquestionably  believe  them  to  emanate  from 
some  such  super-added  faculties  —  numerous  and 
diverse  though  their  religions  be.  Besides,  in  my 
youth  I  published  an  essay  (the  Candid  Examina- 
tion) which  excited  a  good  deal  of  interest  at  the 
time,  and  has  been  long  out  of  print.  In  that 
treatise  I  have  since  come  to  see  that  I  was  wrong 
touching  what  I  constituted  the  basal  argument 
for  my  negative  conclusion.  Therefore  I  now 
feel  it  obligatory  on  me  to  publish  the  following 
results  of  my  maturer  thought,  from  the  same 
stand-point  of  pure  reason.  Even  though  I  have 
obtained  no  further  light  from  the  side  of  intui- 
tion, I  have  from  that  of  intellect.  So  that,  if 
there  be  in  truth  any  such  intuition,  I  occupy  with 
regard  to  the  organ  of  it  the  same  position  as 
that  of  the  blind  lecturer  on  optics.  But  on  this 
very  account  I  cannot  be  accused  of  partiality 
towards  it. 

It  is  generally  assumed  that  when  a  man  has 
clearly  perceived  agnosticism  to  be  the  only  legit- 
imate attitude  of  reason  to  rest  in  with  regard  to 
religion  (as  I  will  subsequently  show  that  it  is), 


Ii8  THOUGHTS   ON    RELIGION. 

he  has  thereby  finished  with  the  matter ;  he  can 
go  no  further.  The  main  object  of  this  treatise 
is  to  show  that  such  is  by  no  means  the  case. 
He  has  then  only  begun  his  enquiry  into  the 
grounds  and  justification  of  religious  belief.  For 
reason  is  not  the  only  attribute  of  man,  nor  is  it 
the  only  faculty  which  he  habitually  employs  for 
the  ascertainment  of  truth.  Moral  and  spiritual 
faculties  are  of  no  less  importance  in  their  respec- 
tive spheres  even  of  everyday  life;  faith,  trust, 
taste,  &c,  are  as  needful  in  ascertaining  truth  as 
to  character,  beauty,  &c,  as  is  reason.  Indeed 
we  may  take  it  that  reason  is  concerned  in  ascer- 
taining truth  only  where  causation  is  concerned  ; 
the  appropriate  organs  for  its  ascertainment  where 
anything  else  is  concerned  belong  to  the  moral 
and  spiritual  region. 

As  Herbert  Spencer  says,  'men  of  science 
may  be  divided  into  two  classes,  of  which  the  one, 
well  exemplified  by  Faraday,  keeping  their  reli- 
gion and  their  science  absolutely  separate,  are 
unperplexed  by  any  incongruities  between  them, 
and  the  other  of  which,  occupying  themselves 
exclusively  with  the  facts  of  science,  never  ask 
what  implications  they  have.  Be  it  trilobite  or 
be  it  double  star,  their  thought  about  it  is  much 
like  the  thought  of  Peter  Bell  about  the  prim- 
rose.'1    Now,  both  these  classes  are  logical,  since 

1  Fortnightly  Review,  Feb.  1894. 


A  CANDID  EXAMINATION  OF  RELIGION.      119 

both,  as  to  their  religion,  adopt  an  attitude  of 
pure  agnosticism,  not  only  in  theory,  but  also  in 
practice.  What,  however,  have  we  to  say  of  the 
third  class,  which  Spencer  does  not  mention, 
although  it  is,  I  think,  the  largest,  viz.  of  those 
scientific  men  who  expressly  abstain  from  draw- 
ing a  line  of  division  between  science  and  reli- 
gion [and  then  judge  of  religion  purely  on  the 
principles  and  by  the  method  of  science]?1 

There  are  two  opposite  casts  of  mind  —  the 
mechanical  (scientific,  &c.)  and  the  spiritual 
(artistic,  religious,  &c).  These  may  alternate 
even  in  the  same  individuah  An  'agnostic'  has 
no  hesitation  —  even  though  he  himself  keenly 
experience  the  latter  —  that  the  former  only  is 
worthy  of  trust.  But  a  pttre  agnostic  must  know 
better,  as  he  will  perceive  that  there  is  nothing  to 
choose  between  the  two  in  point  of  trustworthi- 
ness. Indeed,  if  choice  has  to  be  made,  the 
mystic  might  claim  higher  authority  for  his  direct 
intuitions. 

Mr.  Herbert  Spencer  has  well  said,  in  the 
opening  section  of  his  Synthetic  Philosophy,  that 
wherever  human  thought  appears  to  be  radically 
divided,  [there  must  be  truth  on  both  sides  and 
that  the]  'reconciliation'  of  opposing  views  is  to 

1  [Some  such  phrase  is  necessary  to  complete  the  sentence. — 
Ed.] 


120  THOUGHTS   ON    RELIGION. 

be  found  by  emphasizing  that  ultimate  element 
of  truth  which  on  each  side  underlies  manifold 
differences.  More  than  is  generally  supposed 
depends  on  points  of  view,  especially  where  first 
principles  of  a  subject  are  in  dispute.  Opposite 
sides  of  the  same  shield  may  present  wholly  dif- 
ferent aspects.1  Spencer  alludes  to  this  with  spe- 
cial reference  to  the  conflict  between  science  and 
religion ;  and  it  is  in  this  same  connexion  that  I 
also  allude  to  it.  For  it  seems  to  me,  after  many 
years  of  thought  upon  the  subject,  that  the 
'reconciliation'  admits  of  being  carried  much  fur- 
ther than  it  has  been  by  him.  For  he  effects  this 
reconciliation  only  to  the  extent  of  showing  that 
religion  arises  from  the  recognition  of  funda- 
mental mystery — which  it  may  be  proved  that 
science  also  recognizes  in  all  her  fundamental 
ideas.  This,  however,  is  after  all  little  more  than 
a  platitude.  That  our  ultimate  scientific  ideas 
(i.  e.  ultimate  grounds  of  experience)  are  inex- 
plicable, is  a  proposition  which  is  self-evident 
since  the  dawn  of  human  thought.  My  aim  is  to 
carry  the  'reconciliation'  into  much  more  detail 
and  yet  without  quitting  the  grounds  of  pure  rea- 
son. I  intend  to  take  science  and  religion  in 
their  present  highly  developed  states  as  such  and 
show  that  on  a  systematic  examination  of  the  lat- 
ter by  the  methods  of  the  former,  the  'conflict' 
between  the  two  may  be  not  merely  'reconciled' 

1  First  Principles,  Parti,  ch.  I. 


A  CANDID  EXAMINATION  OF  RELIGION.      121 

as  regards  the  highest  generalities  of  each,  but 
entirely  abolished  in  all  matters  of  detail  which 
can  be  regarded  as  of  any  great  importance. 

In  any  methodical  enquiry  the  first  object 
should  be  to  ascertain  the  fundamental  principles 
with  which  the  enquiry  is  concerned.  In  actual 
research,  however,  it  is  by  no  means  always  the 
case  that  the  enquirer  knows,  or  is  able  at  first  to 
ascertain  what  those  principles  are.  In  fact,  it  is 
often  only  at  the  end  of  a  research,  that  they  are 
discovered  to  be  the  fundamental  principles. 
Such  has  been  my  own  experience  with  regard  to 
the  subject  of  the  present  enquiry.  Although  all 
my  thinking  life  has  been  concerned,  off  and  on, 
in  contemplating  the  problem  of  our  religious 
instincts,  the  sundry  attempts  which  have  been 
made  by  mankind  for  securing  their  gratification, 
and  the  important  question  as  to  their  objective 
justification,  it  is  only  in  advanced  years  that  I 
have  clearly  perceived  wherein  the  first  principles 
of  such  a  research  must  consist.  And  I  doubt 
whether  any  one  has  hitherto  clearly  defined  this 
point.  The  principles  in  question  are  the  nature 
of  causation  and  the  nature  of  faith. 

My  objects  then  in  this  treatise  are,  mainly, 
three:  1st,  to  purify  agnosticism;  2nd,  to  con- 
sider more  fully  than  heretofore,  and  from  the 
stand-point   of    pure   agnosticism,   the  nature  of 


122  THOUGHTS   ON   RELIGION. 

natural  causation,  or,  more  correctly,  the  relation 
of  what  we  know  on  the  subject  of  such  causa- 
tion to  the  question  of  Theism ;  and,  3rd,  again 
starting  from  the  same  stand-point,  to  consider 
the  religious  consciousnesses  of  men  as  phenom- 
ena of  experience  (i.  e.  as  regarded  by  us  from 
without),  and  especially  in  their  highest  phase  of 
development  as  exhibited  in  Christianity. 


§  3-  CAUSALITY. 

Only  because  we  are  so  familiar  with  the 
great  phenomenon  of  causality  do  we  take  it  for 
granted,  and  think  that  we  reach  an  ultimate 
explanation  of  anything  when  we  have  succeeded 
in  finding  the  'cause'  thereof:  when,  in  point  of 
fact,  we  have  only  succeeded  in  merging  it  in  the 
mystery  of  mysteries.  I  often  wish  we  could 
have  come  into  the  world,  like  the  young  of  some 
other  mammals,  with  all  the  powers  of  intellect 
that  we  shall  ever  subsquently  attain  already 
developed,  but  without  any  individual  experience, 
and  so  without  any  of  the  blunting  effects  of 
custom.  Could  we  have  done  so,  surely  nothing 
in  the  world  would  more  acutely  excite  our  intel- 
ligent astonishment  than  the  one  universal  fact 
of  causation.  That  everything  which  happens 
should  have  a  cause,  that  this  should  invariably 
be  proportioned  to  its  effect,  so  that,  no  matter 
how  complex  the  interaction  of  causes,  the  same 
interaction  should  always  produce  the  same  result ; 
that  this  rigidly  exact  system  of  energizing  should 
be  found  to  present  all  the  appearances  of  uni- 
versality and  of  eternity,  so  that,  e.  g.  the  motion 
of  the  solar  system  in  space  is  being  determined 
by  some  causes  beyond  human  ken,  and  that  we 
are  indebted  to  billions  of  cellular  unions,  each 

123 


124  THOUGHTS   ON   RELIGION. 

involving  billions  of  separate  causes,  for  our 
hereditary  passage  from  an  invertebrate  ancestry, 
—  that  such  things  should  be,  would  surely  strike 
us  as  the  most  wonderful  fact  in  this  wonderful 
universe. 

Now,  although  familiarity  with  this  fact  has 
made  us  forget  its  wonder  to  the  extent  of  virtu- 
ally assuming  that  we  know  all  about  it,  philo- 
sophical enquiry  shows  that,  besides  empirically 
knowing  it  to  be  a  fact,  we  only  know  one  other 
thing  about  it,  viz. —  that  our  knowledge  of  it  is 
derived  from  our  own  activity  when  we  ourselves 
are  causes.  No  result  of  psychological  analysis 
seems  to  me  more  certain  than  this.1  If  it  were 
not  for  our  own  volitions,  we  should  be  ignorant 
of  what  we  can  now  not  doubt,  on  pain  of  suicidal 
scepticism,  to  be  the  most  general  fact  of  nature. 
Such,  at  least,  seems  to  me  by  far  the  most  rea- 
sonable theory  of  our  idea  of  causality,  and  is 
the  one  now  most  generally  entertained  by  phil- 
osophers of  every  school. 

Now,  to  the  plain  man  it  will  always  seem 
that  if  our  very  notion  of  causality  is  derived 
from  our  own  volition  —  as  our  very  notion  of 
energy  is  derived  from  our  sense  of  effort  in 
overcoming  resistance  by  our  volition — presum- 

x[Here  it  was  intended  to  insert  further  explanation  'show- 
ing that  mere  observation  of  causality  in  external  nature  would 
not  have  yielded  idea  of  anything  further  than  time  and  space 
relations.' — Ed.] 


A  CANDID  EXAMINATION  OF  RELIGION.      125 

ably  the  truest  notion  we  can  form  of  that  in 
which  causation  objectively  consists  is  the  notion 
derived  from  that  known  mode  of  existence 
which  alone  gives  us  the  notion  of  causality  at  all. 
Hence  the  plain  man  will  always  infer  that  all 
energy  is  of  the  nature  of  will-energy,  and  all 
objective  causation  of  the  nature  of  subjective. 
Nor  is  this  inference  confined  to  the  plain  man ; 
the  deepest  philosophical  thinkers  have  arrived 
at  substantially  the  same  opinion,  e.  g.  Hegel, 
Schopenhauer.  So  that  the  direct  and  most 
natural  interpretation  of  causality  in  external 
nature  which  is  drawn  by  primitive  thought  in 
savages  and  young  children,  seems  destined  to 
become  also  the  ultimate  deliverance  of  human 
thought  in  the  highest  levels  of  its  culture.1 

But,  be  this  as  it  may,  we  are  not  concerned 
with  any  such  questions  of  abstract  philosophical 
speculation.  As  pure  agnostics  they  lie  beyond 
our  sphere.  Therefore,  I  allude  to  them  only  for 
the  sake  of  showing  that  there  is  nothing  either 
in  the  science  or  philosophy  of  mankind  inimical 
to  the  theory  of  natural  causation  being  the  ener- 
gizing of  a  will  objective  to  us.  And  we  can 
plainly  see  that  if  such  be  the  case,  and  if  that 
will  be  self-consistent,  its  operations,  as  revealed 

'[This  theory  was  suggested  in  the  Burney  Essay,  p.  136, 
and  ridiculed  in  the  Candid  Exa?nination  ;  see  above,  p.  10. 
Romanes  intended  at  this  point  to  consider  at  greater  length  his 
old  views  'on  causation  as  due  to  being  qua  being.' — Ed.] 


126  THOUGHTS   ON   RELIGION. 

in  natural  causation,  must  appear  to  us  when  con- 
sidered en  bloc  (or  not  piece-meal  as  by  savages), 
non-volitional,  or  mechanical. 

Of  all  philosophical  theories  of  causality  the 
most  repugnant  to  reason  must  be  those  of  Hume, 
Kant  and  Mill,  which  while  differing  from  one 
another  agree  in  this  —  that  they  attribute  the 
principle  of  causality  to  a  creation  of  our  own 
minds,  or  in  other  words  deny  that  there  is  any- 
thing objective  in  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect 

—  i.  e.  in  the  very  thing  which  all  physical  science 
is  engaged  in  discovering  in  particular  cases  of  it. 

The  conflict  of  Science  and  Religion  has 
always  arisen  from  one  common  ground  of  agree- 
ment, or  fundamental  postulate  of  both  parties 

—  without  which,  indeed,  it  would  plainly  have 
been  impossible  that  any  conflict  could  have 
arisen,  inasmuch  as  there  would  then  have  been 
no  field  for  battle.  Every  thesis  must  rest  on 
some  hypothesis ;  therefore,  in  cases  where  two 
or  more  rival  theses  rest  on  a  common  hypoth- 
esis, the  disputes  must  needs  collapse  so  soon  as 
the  common  hypothesis  is  proved  erroneous. 
And  proportionably,  in  whatever  degree  the  pre- 
viously common  hypothesis  is  shown  to  be  dubi- 
ous, in  that  degree  are  the  disputations  shown 
to  be  possibly  unreal.  Now,  it  is  one  of  the 
main  objects  of  this  treatise  to  show  that  the 
common    hypothesis    on  which    all  the  disputes 


A  CANDID  EXAMINATION  OF  RELIGION.      127 

between  Science  and  Religion  have  arisen  is 
highly  dubious.  And  not  only  so,  but  that  quite 
apart  from  modern  science  all  the  difficulties  on  the 
side  of  intellect  (or  reason)  which  religious  belief 
has  ever  encountered  in  the  past,  or  can  ever 
encounter  in  the  future,  whether  in  the  individual 
or  the  race,  arise,  and  arise  exclusively,  from  the 
self-same  ground  of  this  highly  dubious  hypothesis. 

The  hypothesis,  or  fundamental  postulate,  in 
question  is,  If  there  be  a  personal  God,  He  is  not 
immediately  concerned  with  natural  causation.  It  is 
assumed  that  qua  'first  cause,'  He  can  in  no  way 
be  concerned  with  'second  causes,'  further  than 
by  having  started  them  in  the  first  instance  as  a 
great  machinery  of  'natural  causation,'  working 
under  'general  laws.'  True,  the  theory  of  Deism, 
which  entertains  more  or  less  expressly  this 
hypothesis  of  '  Deus  ex  machina,'  has  during  the 
present  century  been  more  and  more  superseded 
by  that  of  Theism,  which  entertains  also  in  some 
indefinable  measure  the  doctrine  of  '  immanence  ; ' 
as  well  as  by  that  of  Pantheism,  which  expressly 
holds  this  doctrine  to  the  exclusion  in  toto  of  its 
rival.  But  Theism  has  never  yet  entertained  it 
sufficiently  or  up  to  the  degree  required  by  the 
pure  logic  of  the  case,  while  Pantheism  has  but 
rarely  considered  the  rival  doctrine  of  personal- 
ity— or  the  possible  union  of  immanence  with 
personality.1 

1  See,  however,  Aubrey  Moore  in  Lux  Mundi,  pp.  94-96,  and 


128  THOUGHTS   ON   RELIGION. 

Now  it  is  the  object  of  this  book  to  go  much 
further  than  any  one  has  hitherto  gone  in  proving 
the  possibility  of  this  union.  For  I  purpose  to 
show  that,  provided  only  we  lay  aside  all  preju- 
dice, sentiment,  &c,  and  follow  to  its  logical 
termination  the  guidance  of  pure  reason,  there 
are  no  other  conclusions  to  be  reached  than 
these.  Namely,  [A)  That  if  there  be  a  personal 
God,  no  reason  can  be  assigned  why  He  should 
not  be  immanent  in  nature,  or  why  all  causation 
should  not  be  the  immediate  expression  of  His 
will.  (B)  That  every  available  reason  points  to 
the  inference  that  He  probably  is  so.  (C)  That 
if  He  is  so,  and  if  His  will  is  self-consistent,  all 
natural  causation  must  needs  appear  to  us 
'mechanical.'  Therefore  (Z>)  that  it  is  no  argu- 
ment against  the  divine  origin  of  a  thing,  event, 
&c,  to  prove  it  due  to  natural  causation. 

After  having  dealt  briefly  with  {A),  (B)  and 
(C),  I  would  show  that  (D)  is  the  most  practi- 
cally important  of  these  four  conclusions.  For 
the  fundamental  hypothesis  which  I  began  by 
mentioning  is  just  the  opposite  of  this.  Whether 
tacitly  or  expressed,  it  has  always  been  assumed 
by  both  sides  in  the  controversy  between  Science 
and  Religion,  that  as  soon  as  this,  that  and  the 
other  phenomenon  has  been  explained  by  means 

Le  Conte,  Evolution  in  its  Relation  to  Religious  Thought,  pp. 
335,  ff.  [N.B.  The  references  not  enclosed  in  brackets  are  the 
author's,  not  mine.— Ed.] 


A  CANDID  EXAMINATION  OF  RELIGION.      129 

of  natural  causation,  it  has  thereupon  ceased  to 
be  ascribable  [directly]  to  God.  The  distinction 
between  the  natural  and  the  supernatural  has 
always  been  regarded  by  both  sides  as  indisput- 
ably sound,  and  this  fundamental  agreement  as 
to  ground  of  battle  has  furnished  the  only  possi- 
ble condition  to  fighting.  It  has  also  furnished 
the  condition  of  all  the  past,  and  may  possibly 
furnish  the  condition  of  all  the  future,  discomfit- 
ures of  religion.  True  religion  is  indeed  learn- 
ing her  lesson  that  something  is  wrong  in  her 
method  of  fighting,  and  many  of  her  soldiers  are 
now  waking  up  to  the  fact  that  it  is  here  that  her 
error  lies  —  as  in  past  times  they  woke  up  to  see 
the  error  of  denying  the  movement  of  the  earth, 
the  antiquity  of  the  earth,  the  origin  of  species 
by  evolution,  &c.  But  no  one,  even  of  her  cap- 
tains and  generals,  has  so  far  followed  up  their 
advantage  to  its  ultimate  consequences.  And 
this  is  what  I  want  to  do.  The  logical  advantage 
is  clearly  on  their  side ;  and  it  is  their  own  fault 
if  they  do  not  gain  the  ultimate  victory, —  not 
only  as  against  science,  but  as  against  intellectual 
dogmatism  in  every  form.  This  can  be  routed 
all  along  the  line.  For  science  is  only  the  organ- 
ized study  of  natural  causation,  and  the  experi- 
ence of  every  human  being,  in  so  far  as  it  leads 
to  dogmatism  on  purely  intellectual  grounds,  does 
so  on  account  of  entertaining  the  fundamental 
postulate  in  question.     The  influence  of  custom 


130  THOUGHTS   ON    RELIGION. 

and  want  of  imagination  is  here  very  great.  But 
the  answer  always  should  be  to  move  the  ulterior 
question — what  is  the  nature  of  natural  causation? 

Now  I  propose  to  push  to  its  full  logical  con- 
clusion the  consequence  of  this  answer.  For  no 
one,  even  the  most  orthodox,  has  as  yet  learnt 
this  lesson  of  religion  to  anything  like  fullness. 
God  is  still  grudged  His  own  universe,  so  to 
speak,  as  far  and  as  often  as  He  can  possibly  be. 
As  examples  we  may  take  the  natural  growth  of 
Christianity  out  of  previous  religions ;  the  natural 
spread  of  it ;  the  natural  conversion  of  St.  Paul, 
or  of  anybody  else.  It  is  still  assumed  on  both 
sides  that  there  must  be  something  inexplicable 
or  miraculous  about  a  phenomenon  in  order  to  its 
being  divine. 

What  else  have  science  and  religion  ever  had 
to  fight  about  save  on  the  basis  of  this  common 
hypothesis,  and  hence  as  to  whether  the  causa- 
tion of  such  and  such  a  phenomenon  has  been 
'natural'  or  'super-natural.'  For  even  the  dis- 
putes as  to  science  contradicting  scripture,  ulti- 
mately turn  on  the  assumption  of  inspiration 
(supposing  it  genuine)  being  'super-natural'  as  to 
its  causation.  Once  grant  that  it  is  'natural'  and 
all  possible  ground  of  dispute  is  removed. 

I  can  well  understand  why  infidelity  should 
make  the  basal  assumption  in  question,  because 
its  whole  case  must  rest  thereon.  But  surely  it 
is  time  for  theists  to  abandon  this  assumption. 


A  CANDID  EXAMINATION  OF  RELIGION.      131 

The  assumed  distinction  between  causation  as 
natural  and  super-natural  no  doubt  began  in 
superstition  in  prehistoric  time,  and  throughout 
the  historical  period  has  continued  from  a  vague 
feeling  that  the  action  of  God  must  be  mysteri- 
ous, and  hence  that  the  province  of  religion  must 
be  within  the  super-sensuous.  Now,  it  is  true 
enough  that  the  finite  cannot  comprehend  the 
infinite,  and  hence  the  feeling  in  question  is  log- 
ically sound.  But  under  the  influence  of  this 
feeling,  men  have  always  committed  the  fallacy 
of  concluding  that  if  a  phenomenon  has  been 
explained  in  terms  of  natural  causation,  it  has 
thereby  been  explained  in  toto  —  forgetting  that  it 
has  only  been  explained  up  to  the  point  where 
such  causation  is  concerned,  and  that  the  real 
question  of  ultimate  causation  has  merely  been 
thus  postponed.  And  assuredly  beyond  this 
point  there  is  an  infinitude  of  mystery  sufficient 
to  satisfy  the  most  exacting  mystic.  For  even 
Herbert  Spencer  allows  that  in  ultimate  analysis 
all  natural  causation  is  inexplicable. 

Logically  regarded,  the  advance  of  science, 
far  from  having  weakened  religion,  has  immeasur- 
ably strengthened  it.  For  it  has  proved  the 
uniformity  of  natural  causation.  The  so-called 
natural  sphere  has  increased  at  the  expense  of  the 
'super-natural.'  Unquestionably.  But  although 
to  lower  grades  of  culture  this  always  seems  a 
fact  inimical  to  religion,  we  may  now  perceive  it 


132  THOUGHTS   ON    RELIGION. 

is  quite  the  reverse,  since  it  merely  goes  to  abolish 
the  primitive  or  uncultured  distinction  in  question. 

It  is  indeed  most  extraordinary  how  long  this 
distinction  has  held  sway,  or  how  it  is  the  ablest 
men  of  all  generations  have  quietly  assumed  that 
when  once  we  know  the  natural  causation  of  any 
phenomenon,  we  therefore  know  all  about  it  —  or, 
as  it  were,  have  removed  it  from  the  sphere  of 
mystery  altogether,  when,  in  point  of  fact,  we 
have  only  merged  it  in  a  much  greater  mystery 
than  ever. 

But  the  answer  to  our  astonishment  how  this 
distinction  has  managed  to  survive  so  long  lies  in 
the  extraordinary  effect  of  custom,  which  here 
seems  to  slay  reason  altogether ;  and  the  more  a 
man  busies  himself  with  natural  causes  (e.  g.  in 
scientific  research)  the  greater  does  this  slavery 
to  custom  become,  till  at  last  he  seems  positively 
unable  to  perceive  the  real  state  of  the  case  — 
regarding  any  rational  thinking  thereon  as  chi- 
merical, so  that  the  term  'meta-physical,'  even  in 
its  etymological  sense  as  super-sensuous  or  beyond 
physical  causation,  becomes  a  term  of  rational 
reproach.  Obviously  such  a  man  has  written 
himself  down,  if  not  an  ass,  at  all  events  a  crea- 
ture wholly  incapable  of  rationally  treating  any 
of  the  highest  problems  presented  either  by 
nature  or  by  man. 

On  any  logical  theory  of  Theism  there  can  be 
no  such  distinction  between  'natural'  and  'super- 


A  CANDID  EXAMINATION  OF  RELIGION.      133 

natural '  as  is  usually  drawn,  since  on  that  theory 
all  causation  is  but  the  action  of  the  Divine  Will. 
And  if  we  draw  any  distinction  between  such 
action  as  'immediate'  or  'mediate,'  we  can  only 
mean  this  as  valid  in  relation  to  mankind — i.  e. 
in  relation  to  our  experience.  For,  obviously,  it 
would  be  wholly  incompatible  with  pure  agnosti- 
cism to  suppose  that  we  are  capable  of  drawing 
any  such  distinction  in  relation  to  the  Divine 
activity  itself.  Even  apart  from  the  theory  of 
Theism,  pure  agnosticism  must  take  it  that  the 
real  distinction  is  not  between  natural  and  super- 
natural, but  between  the  explicable  and  the 
inexplicable  —  meaning  by  those  terms  that  which 
is  and  that  which  is  not  accountable  by  such 
causes  as  fall  within  the  range  of  human  observa- 
tion. Or,  in  other  words,  the  distinction  is  really 
between  the  observable  and  the  unobservable 
causal  processes  of  the  universe. 

Although  science  is  essentially  engaged  in 
explaining,  her  work  is  necessarily  confined  to  the 
sphere  of  natural  causation ;  beyond  that  sphere 
(i.  e.  the  sensuous)  she  can  explain  nothing.  In 
other  words,  even  if  she  were  able  to  explain  the 
natural  causation  of  everything,  she  would  be 
unable  to  assign  the  ultimate  raison  detre  of 
anything. 

It  is  not  my  intention  to  write  an  essay  on  the 
nature  of  causality,  or  even  to  attempt  a  survey 


134  THOUGHTS   ON    RELIGION. 

of  the  sundry  theories  which  have  been  pro- 
pounded on  this  subject  by  philosophers.  Indeed, 
to  attempt  this  would  be  little  less  than  to  write 
a  history  of  philosophy  itself.  Nevertheless  it  is 
necessary  for  my  purpose  to  make  a  few  remarks 
touching  the  main  branches  of  thought  upon  the 
matter.1 

The  remarkable  nature  of  the  facts.  These  are 
remarkable,  since  they  are  common  to  all  human 
experience.  Everything  that  happens  has  a  cause. 
The  same  happening  has  always  the  same  cause 
—  or  the  same  consequent  the  same  antecedent. 
It  is  only  familiarity  with  this  great  fact  that 
prevents  universal  wonder  at  it,  for,  notwithstand- 
ing all  the  theories  upon  it,  no  one  has  ever  really 
shown  why  it  is  so.  That  the  same  causes  always 
produce  the  same  effects  is  a  proposition  which 
expresses  a  fundamental  fact  of  our  knowledge, 
but  the  knowledge  of  this  fact  is  purely  empirical ; 
we  can  show  no  reason  why  it  should  be  a  fact. 
Doubtless,  if  it  were  not  a  fact,  there  could  be  no 
so-called  'Order  of  Nature,'  and  consequently  no 
science,  no  philosophy,  or  perhaps  (if  the  irreg- 
ularity were  sufficiently  frequent)  no  possibility 
of  human  experience.  But  although  this  is  easy 
enough  to  show,  it  in  no  wise  tends  to  show  why 
the  same  causes  should  always  produce  the  same 
effects. 

1  [Nothing   more   however   was   written    than  what    follows 
immediately. — Ed.] 


A  CANDID  EXAMINATION  OF  RELIGION.      135 

So  manifest  is  it  that  our  knowledge  of  the 
fact  in  question  is  only  empirical,  that  some  of 
our  ablest  thinkers,  such  as  Hume  and  Mill,  have 
failed  to  perceive  even  so  much  as  the  intel- 
lectual necessity  of  looking  beyond  our  empirical 
knowledge  of  the  fact  to  gain  any  explanation  of 
the  fact  itself.  Therefore  they  give  to  the  world 
the  wholly  vacuous,  or  merely  tautological  theory 
of  causation  —  viz.  that  of  constancy  of  sequence 
within  human  observation.1 

If  it  be  said  of  my  argument  touching  caus- 
ality, that  it  is  naturalizing  or  materializing  the 
super-natural  or  spiritual  (as  most  orthodox 
persons  will  feel),  my  reply  is  that  deeper 
thought  will  show  it  to  be  at  least  as  susceptible 
of  the  opposite  view  —  viz.  that  it  is  subsuming 
the  natural  into  the  super-natural,  or  spiritualizing 
the  material :  and  a  pure  agnostic,  least  of  all, 
should  have  anything  to  say  as  against  either  of 
these  alternative  points  of  view.  Or  we  may 
state  the  matter  thus :  in  as  far  as  pure  reason 
can  have  anything  to  say  in  the  matter,  she 
ought  to  incline  towards  the  view  of  my  doctrine 
spiritualizing  the  material,  because  it  is  pretty 
certain  that  we  could  know  nothing  about  natural 

'[The  author  intended  further  to  show  the  vacuity  of  this 
theory  and  point  out  how  Mill  himself  appears  to  perceive  it  by 
his  introduction  after  the  term  'invariably'  of  the  term  'uncon- 
ditionally;' he  refers  also  to  Martineau,  Study  of  Religion,  i.  pp. 
152,  3.— Ed.] 


136  THOUGHTS   ON   RELIGION. 

causation — even  so  much  as  its    existence — but 
for  our  own  volitions. 

FREE   WILL.1 

Having  read  all  that  is  said  to  be  worth  read- 
ing on  the  Free  Will  controversy,  it  appears  to 
me  that  the  main  issues  and  their  logical  conclu- 
sions admit  of  being  summed  up  in  a  very  few 
words,  thus : — 

1.  A  writer,  before  he  undertakes  to  deal  with 
this  subject  at  all,  should  be  conscious  of  fully 
perceiving  the  fundamental  distinction  between 
responsibility  as  merely  legal  and  as  also  moral ; 
otherwise  he  cannot  but  miss  the  very  essence  of 
the  question  in  debate.  No  one  questions  the 
patent  fact  of  responsibility  as  legal ;  the  only 
question  is  touching  responsibility  as  moral.  Yet 
the  principal  bulk  of  literature  on  Free  Will  and 
Necessity  arises  from  disputants  on  both  sides 
failing  to  perceive  this  basal  distinction.  Even 
such  able  writers  as  Spencer,  Huxley  and  Clifford 
are  in  this  position. 

2.  The  root  question  is  as  to  whether  the  will 
is  caused  or  un-caused.  For  however  much  this 
root-question  may  be  obscured  by  its  own  abun- 
dant foliage,  the  latter  can  have  no  existence  but 
that  which  it  derives  from  the  former. 

x[This  Note  on  Free  Will  is  exceedingly  incomplete  and  con- 
sequently obscure.  But  it  seemed  to  me  on  the  whole  to  be 
sufficiently  intelligible  to  admit  of  publication.  — Ed.] 


A  CANDID  EXAMINATION  OF  RELIGION.      137 

3.  Consequently,  if  libertarians  grant  causality 
as  appertaining  to  the  will,  however  much  they 
may  beat  about  the  bush,  they  are  surrendering 
their  position  all  along  the  line,  unless  they  fall 
back  upon  the  more  ultimate  question  as  to  the 
nature  of  natural  causation.  Now  it  can  be 
proved  that  this  more  ultimate  question  is  [scien- 
tifically] unanswerable.  Therefore  both  sides 
may  denominate  natural  causations — an  unknown 
quantity. 

4.  Hence  the  whole  controversy  ought  to  be 
seen  by  both  sides  to  resolve  itself  into  this — is 
or  is  not  the  will  determined  by  xl  And,  if  this 
seems  but  a  barren  question  to  debate,  I  do  not 
undertake  to  deny  the  fact.  At  the  same  time 
there  is  clearly  this  real  issue  remaining — viz.  Is 
the  will  self-determining,  or  is  it  determined — i.  e. 
from  without? 

5.  If  determined  from  without,  is  there  any 
room  for  freedom,  in  the  sense  required  for  sav- 
ing the  doctrine  of  moral  responsibility  ?  And  I 
think  the  answer  to  this  must  be  an  unconditional 
negative. 

6.  But,  observe,  it  is  not  one  and  the  same 
thing  to  ask,  Is  the  will  entirely  determined  from 
without  ?  and  Is  the  will  entirely  determined  by 
natural  causation  (x)  ?  For  the  unknown  quan- 
tity x  may  very  well  include  x' ,  if  by  x'  we  under- 
stand all  the  unknown  ingredients  of  per- 
sonality. 


138  THOUGHTS   ON   RELIGION. 

7.  Hence,  determinists  gain  no  advantage  over 
their  adversaries  by  any  possible  proof  (at  pres- 
ent impossible)  that  all  acts  of  will  are  due  to 
natural  causation,  unless  they  can  show  the  nature 
of  the  latter,  and  that  it  is  of  such  nature  as  sup- 
ports their  conclusion.  For  aught  we  at  present 
know,  the  will  may  very  well  be  free  in  the  sense 
required,  even  though  all  its  acts  are  due  to  x. 

8.  In  particular,  for  aught  we  know  to  the 
contrary,  all  may  be  due  to  x\  i.  e.  all  causation 
may  be  of  the  nature  of  will  (as,  indeed,  many 
systems  of  philosophy  maintain),  with  the  result 
that  every  human  will  is  of  the  nature  of  a  First 
Cause.  In  support  of  which  possibility  it  maybe 
remarked  that  most  philosophies  are  led  to  the 
theory  of  a  causa  causarum  as  regards  x. 

9.  To  the  obvious  objection  that  with  a  plu- 
rality of  first  causes — each  the  fo?is  et  origo  of  a 
new  and  never-ending  stream  of  causality — the 
cosmos  must  sooner  or  later  become  a  chaos  by 
cumulative  intersection  of  the  streams,  the  answer 
is  to  be  found  in  the  theory  of  monism.1 

10.  Nevertheless,  the  ultimate  difficulty 
remains  which  is  depicted  in  my  essay  on  the 
'World  as  an  Eject.'2     But  this,  again,  is  merged 

1  [See  above,  p.  32. — Ed.] 

2 Contemporary  Review,  July,  1886.  [But  the  'ultimate  diffi- 
culty' referred  to  above  would  seem  to  be  the  relation  of  manifold 
dependent  human  wills  to  the  One  Ultimate  and  All-embracing 
Will.— Ed.] 


A  CANDID  EXAMINATION  OF  RELIGION.      139 

in  the  mystery  of  Personality,  which  is  only 
known  as  an  inexplicable,  and  seemingly  ulti- 
mate fact. 

II.  So   that  the    general    conclusion   of    the 
whole  matter  must  be  —  pure  agnosticism. 


§  4.     FAITH. 

Faith  in  its  religious  sense  is  distinguished  not 
only  from  opinion  (or  belief  founded  on  reason 
alone),  in  that  it  contains  a  spiritual  element;  it 
is  further  distinguished  from  belief  founded  on 
the  affections,  by  needing  an  active  co-operation 
of  the  will.  Thus  all  parts  of  the  human  mind 
have  to  be  involved  in  faith  —  intellect,  emotions, 
will.  We  'believe'  in  the  theory  of  evolution  on 
grounds  of  reason  alone;  we  'believe*  in  the 
affection  of  our  parents,  children,  &c,  almost  (or 
it  may  be  exclusively)  on  what  I  have  called 
spiritual  grounds  —  i.  e.  on  grounds  of  spiritual 
experience ;  for  this  we  need  no  exercise  either 
of  reason  or  of  will.  But  no  one  can  'believe' 
in  God,  or  a  fortiori  in  Christ,  without  also  a 
severe  effort  of  will.  This  I  hold  to  be  a  matter 
of  fact,  whether  or  not  there  be  a  God  or  a  Christ. 

Observe  will  is  to  be  distinguished  from  desire. 
It  matters  not  what  psychologists  may  have  to 
say  upon  this  subject.  Whether  desire  differs  from 
will  in  kind  or  only  in  degree  —  whether  will  is 
desire  in  action,  so  to  speak,  and  desire  but  incipi- 
ent will  —  are  questions  with  which  we  need  not 
trouble  ourselves.  For  it  is  certain  that  there 
are  agnostics  who  would  greatly  prefer  being  the- 

140 


A  CANDID  EXAMINATION  OF  RELIGION.      141 

ists,  and  theists  who  would  give  all  they  possess 
to  be  Christians,  if  they  could  thus  secure  pro- 
motion by  purchase  —  i.  e.  by  one  single  act  of 
will.  But  yet  the  desire  is  not  strong  enough  to 
sustain  the  will  in  perpetual  action,  so  as  to  make 
the  continual  sacrifices  which  Christianity  entails. 
Perhaps  the  hardest  of  these  sacrifices  to  an 
intelligent  man  is  that  to  his  own  intellect.  At 
least  I  am  certain  that  this  is  so  in  my  own  case. 
I  have  been  so  long  accustomed  to  constitute  my 
reason  my  sole  judge  of  truth,  that  even  while 
reason  itself  tells  me  it  is  not  unreasonable  to 
expect  that  the  heart  and  the  will  should  be 
required  to  join  with  reason  in  seeking  God  (for 
religion  is  for  the  whole  man),  I  am  too  jealous 
of  my  reason  to  exercise  my  will  in  the  direction 
of  my  most  heart-felt  desires.  For  assuredly  the 
strongest  desire  of  my  nature  is  to  find  that  that 
nature  is  not  deceived  in  its  highest  aspirations. 
Yet  I  cannot  bring  myself  so  much  as  to  make 
a  venture  in  the  direction  of  faith.  For  instance, 
regarded  from  one  point  of  view  it  seems  reason- 
able enough  that  Christianity  should  have  enjoined 
the  doing  of  the  doctrine  as  a  necessary  condition 
to  ascertaining  (i.  e.  'believing')  its  truth.  But 
from  another,  and  my  more  habitual  point  of  view, 
it  seems  almost  an  affront  to  reason  to  make 
any  such  'fool's  experiment' — just  as  to  some 
scientific  men  it  seems  absurd  and  childish  to  ex- 
pect them  to  investigate  the  '  superstitious  '  follies 


142  THOUGHTS   ON   RELIGION. 

of  modern  spiritualism.     Even  the   simplest  act 
of  will  in  regard   to  religion  —  that  of  prayer  — 
has    not    been  performed   by   me  for    at   least  a 
quarter  of  a  century,  simply  because  it  has  seemed 
so  impossible  to  pray,  as  it  were,  hypothetically, 
that  much  as  I  have  always  desired  to  be  able  to 
pray,     I     cannot    will    the    attempt.     To    justify 
myself  for  what  my  better  judgment  has  often 
seen  to  be  essentially  irrational,  I  have  ever  made 
sundry  excuses.     The  chief  of  them  has  run  thus. 
Even  supposing  Christianity  true,  and  even  sup- 
posing that  after  having  so  far  sacrificed  my  reason 
to  my  desire  as    to  have  satisfied   the  supposed 
conditions  to  obtaining 'grace'   or  direct   illumi- 
nation from  God,  —  even  then  would  not  my  reason 
turn  round  and  revenge  herself  upon  me  ?      For 
surely  even  then  my  habitual  scepticism  would 
make  me  say  to  myself  —  'this  is  all  very  sublime 
and  very   comforting  ;  but  what  evidence    have 
you  to  give  me  that  the  whole  business  is  any- 
thing more  than   self-delusion  ?     The    wish   was 
probably  father  to  the   thought,  and  you  might 
much  better  have  performed  your  "  act  of  will "  by 
going  in  for  a  course  of  Indian  hemp.'    Of  course 
a  Christian  would  answer  to  this  that  the  internal 
light  would  not  admit  of  such   doubt,    any  more 
than  seeing  the  sun  does  —  that  God  knows  us  well 
enough  to  prevent  that,  &c,  and  also    that   it  is 
unreasonable  not  to  try  an   experiment    lest  the 
result  should  prove  too  good  to  be  credible  and 


A  CANDID  EXAMINATION  OF  RELIGION.      143 

so  on.  And  I  do  not  dispute  that  the  Christian 
would  be  justified  in  so  answering,  but  I  only 
adduce  the  matter  as  an  illustration  of  the  dif- 
ficulty which  is  experienced  in  conforming  to  all 
the  conditions  of  attaining  to  Christian  faith — 
even  supposing  it  to  be  sound.  Others  have 
doubtless  other  difficulties,  but  mine  is  chiefly,  I 
think,  that  of  an  undue  regard  to  reason,  as 
against  heart  and  will — undue,  I  mean,  if  so  it  be 
that  Christianity  is  true,  and  the  conditions  to 
faith  in  it  have  been  of  divine  ordination. 

This  influence  of  will  on  belief,  even  in  matters 
secular,  is  the  more  pronounced  the  further  re- 
moved these  matters  may  be  from  demonstration 
(as  already  remarked);  but  this  is  most  of  all  the 
case  where  our  personal  interests  are  affected — 
whether  these  be  material  or  intellectual,  such  as 
credit  for  consistency,  &c.  See,  for  example,  how 
closely,  in  the  respects  we  are  considering,  polit- 
ical beliefs  resemble  religious.  Unless  the  points 
of  difference  are  such  that  truth  is  virtually 
demonstrable  on  one  side,  so  that  adhesion  to  the 
opposite  is  due  to  conscious  sacrifice  of  integrity 
to  expediency,  we  always  find  that  party-spec- 
tacles so  colour  the  view  as  to  leave  reason  at  the 
mercy  of  will,  custom,  interest,  and  all  the  other 
circumstances  which  similarly  operate  on  religious 
beliefs.  It  seems  to  make  but  little  difference 
in  either  case  what  level  of  general  education, 
mental  power,  special  training,  &c,  is  brought  to 


144  THOUGHTS   ON   RELIGION. 

bear  upon  the  question  under  judgment.  From 
the  Premier  to  the  peasant  we  find  the  same  dif- 
ference of  opinion  in  politics  as  we  do  in  religion. 
And  in  each  case  the  explanation  is  the  same. 
Beliefs  are  so  little  dependent  on  reason  alone 
that  in  such  regions  of  thought — i.  e.  where  per- 
sonal interests  are  affected  and  the  evidences  of 
truth  are  not  in  their  nature  demonstrable — it 
really  seems  as  if  reason  ceases  to  be  a  judge 
of  evidence  or  guide  to  truth,  and  becomes  a 
mere  advocate  of  opinion  already  formed  on 
quite  other  grounds.  Now  these  other  grounds 
are,  as  we  have  seen,  mainly  the  accidents  of 
habits  or  custom,  wish  being  father  to  the 
thought,  &c. 

Now  this  may  be  all  deplorable  enough  in 
politics,  and  in  all  other  beliefs  secular ;  but  who 
shall  say  it  is  not  exactly  as  it  ought  to  be  in 
the  matter  of  beliefs  religious?  For,  unless  we 
beg  the  question  of  a  future  life  in  the  negative, 
we  must  entertain  at  least  the  possibility  of  our 
being  in  a  state  of  probation  in  respect  of  an 
honest  use  not  only  of  our  reason,  but  probably 
still  more  of  those  other  ingredients  of  human 
nature  which  go  to  determine  our  beliefs  touching 
this  most  important  of  all  matters. 

It  is  remarkable  how  even  in  politics  it  is  the 
moral  and  spiritual  elements  of  character  which 
lead  to  success  in  the  long  run,  even  more  than 
intellectual   ability  —  supposing,   of    course,   that 


A  CANDID  EXAMINATION  OF  RELIGION.      145 

the  latter  is  not  below  the  somewhat  high  level  of 
our  Parliamentary  assemblies. 

As  regards  the  part  that  is  played  by  will  in  the 
determining  of  belief,  one  can  show  how  uncon- 
sciously large  this  is  even  in  matters  of  secular 
interest.  Reason  is  very  far  indeed  from  being 
the  sole  guide  of  judgment  that  it  is  usually 
taken  to  be  —  so  far,  indeed,  that,  save  in  matters 
approaching  down-right  demonstration  where  (of 
course  there  is  no  room  for  any  other  ingredient) 
it  is  usually  hampered  by  custom,  prejudice,  dis- 
like, &c,  to  a  degree  that  would  astonish  the  most 
sober  philosopher  could  he  lay  bare  to  himself  all 
the  mental  processes  whereby  the  complex  act  of 
assent  or  dissent  is  eventually  determined.1 

xCf.  Pascal,  Pensees.  'For  we  must  not  mistake  ourselves, 
we  have  as  much  that  is  automatic  in  us  as  intellectual,  and 
hence  it  comes  that  the  instrument  by  which  persuasion  is  brought 
about  is  not  demonstration  alone.  How  few  things  are  demon- 
strated !  Proofs  can  only  convince  the  mind;  custom  makes  our 
strongest  proofs,  and  those  which  we  hold  most  firmly,  it  sways 
the  automaton,  which  draws  the  unconscious  intellect  after  it.  .  . 
It  is  then  custom  that  makes  so  many  men  Christians,  custom  that 
makes  them  Turks,  heathen,  artisans,  soldiers,  &c.  Lastly  we 
must  resort  to  custom  when  once  the  mind  has  seen  where  truth  is, 
in  order  to  slake  our  thirst  and  steep  ourselves  in  that  belief  which 
escapes  us  at  every  hour,  for  to  have  proofs  always  at  hand  were 
too  onerous.  We  must  acquire  a  more  easy  belief,  that  of  custom, 
which  without  violence,  without  art,  without  argument,  causes  our 
assent  and  inclines  all  our  powers  to  this  belief,  so  that  our  soul 
naturally  falls  into  it.  .  .  . 

'  It  is  not  enough  to  believe  only  by  force  of  conviction  if  the 
automaton  is  inclined  to  believe  the  contrary.  Both  parts  of  us 
then  must  be  obliged  to  believe,  the  intellect  by  arguments  which 


146  THOUGHTS   ON   RELIGION. 

As  showing  how  little  reason  alone  has  to  do 
with  the  determining  of  religious  belief,  let  us 
take  the  case  of  mathematicians.  This  I  think 
is  the  fairest  case  we  can  take,  seeing  that  of  all 
intellectual  pursuits  that  of  mathematical  research 
is  the  most  exact,  as  well  as  the  most  exclusive 
in  its  demand  upon  the  powers  of  reason,  and 
hence  that,  as  a  class,  the  men  who  have  achieve. . 
highest  eminence  in  that  pursuit  may  be  fairly 
taken  as  the  fittest  representatives  of  our  species 
in  respect  to  the  faculty  of  pure  reason.  Yet 
whenever  they  have  turned  their  exceptional 
powers  in  this  respect  upon  the  problems  of  reli- 
gion, how  suggestively  well  balanced  are  their 
opposite  conclusions  —  so  much  so  indeed  that 
we  can  only  conclude  that  reason  counts  for  very 
little  in  the  complex  of  mental  processes  which 
here  determine  judgment. 

Thus,  if  we  look  to  the  greatest  mathematicians 
in  the  world's  history,  we  find  Kepler  and  Newton 
as  Christians ;  La  Place,  on  the  other  hand,  an 
infidel.  Or,  coming  to  our  own  times,  and  con- 
fining our  attention  to  the  principal  seat  of  mathe- 
matical study:  —  when  I  was  at  Cambridge,  there 
was  a  galaxy  of  genius  in  that  department  emanat- 
ing from  that  place  such  as  had  never  before  been 

it  is  enough  to  have  admitted  once  in  our  lives,  the  automaton  by 
custom,  and  by  not  allowing  it  to  incline  in  the  contrary  direction. 
Inclina   cor   meum    Deus?     See   also    Newman's    Grammar    of 
Assent,  chap.  vi.  and  Church's  Human   Life  and  its   Conditions, 
pp.  67-9. 


A  CANDID  EXAMINATION  OF  RELIGION.      147 

equalled.  And  the  curious  thing  in  our  present 
connexion  is  that  all  the  most  illustrious  names 
were  ranged  on  the  side  of  orthodoxy.  Sir  W. 
Thomson,  Sir  George  Stokes,  Professors  Tait, 
Adams,  Clerk-Maxwell,  and  Cayley —  not  to  men- 
tion a  number  of  lesser  lights,  such  as  Routh, 
Todhunter,  Ferrers,  &c, — were  all  avowed  Chris- 
tians. Clifford  had  only  just  moved  at  a  bound 
from  the  extreme  of  asceticism  to  that  of  infidelity 
—  an  individual  instance  which  I  deem  of  particu- 
lar interest  in  the  present  connexion,  as  showing 
the  dominating  influence  of  a  forcedly  emotional 
character  even  on  so  powerful  an  intellectual  one, 
for  the  rationality  of  the  whole  structure  of  Chris- 
tian belief  cannot  have  so  reversed  its  poles  within 
a  few  months. 

Now  it  would  doubtless  be  easy  to  find  else- 
where than  in  Cambridge  mathematicians  of  the 
first  order  who  in  our  own  generation  are,  or  have 
been,  professedly  anti-Christian  in  their  beliefs, — 
although  certainly  not  so  great  an  array  of  such 
extraordinary  powers.  But,  be  this  as  it  may,  the 
case  of  Cambridge  in  my  own  time  seems  to  me 
of  itself  enough  to  prove  that  Christian  belief  is 
neither  made  nor  marred  by  the  highest  powers  of 
reasoning,  apart  from  other  and  still  more  potent 
factors. 

FAITH  AND  SUPERSTITION. 

Whether  or  not  Christianity  is  true,  there  is 
a  great  distinction  between  these  two  things.     For 


148  THOUGHTS   ON    RELIGION. 

while  the  main  ingredient  of  Christian  faith  is  the 
moral  element,  this  has  no  part  in  superstition. 
In  point  of  fact,  the  only  point  of  resemblance  is 
that  both  present  the  mental  state  called  belief. 
It  is  on  this  account  they  are  so  often  confounded 
by  anti-Christians,  and  even  by  non-Christians ; 
the  much  more  important  point  of  difference  is  not 
noted,  viz.  that  belief  in  the  one  case  is  purely 
intellectual,  while  in  the  other  it  is  chiefly  moral. 
Qua  purely  intellectual,  belief  may  indicate  noth- 
ing but  sheer  credulity  in  absence  of  evidence ; 
but  where  a  moral  basis  is  added,  the  case  is 
clearly  different ;  for  even  if  it  appears  to  be  sheer 
credulity  to  an  outsider,  that  may  be  because  he 
does  not  take  into  account  the  additional  evidence 
supplied  by  the  moral  facts. 

Faith  and  superstition  are  often  confounded, 
or  even  identified.  And,  unquestionably,  they 
are  identical  up  to  a  certain  point — viz.  they  both 
present  the  mental  state  of  belief.  All  people  can 
see  this  ;  but  not  all  people  can  see  further,  or 
define  the  differentiae.  These  are  as  follows : 
First,  supposing  Christianity  true,  there  is  the 
spiritual  verification.  Second,  supposing  Chris- 
tianity false,  there  is  still  the  moral  ingredient, 
which  ex  hypothesi  is  absent  in  superstition.  In 
'other  words,  both  faith  and  superstition  rest  on 
an  intellectual  basis  (which  may  be  pure  credulity ) ; 
but  faith  rests  also  on  a  moral,  even  if  not  like- 


A  CANDID  EXAMINATION  OF  RELIGION.      149 

wise  on  a  spiritual.  Even  in  human  relations  there 
is  a  wide  difference  between  'belief  in  a  scientific 
theory  and  '  faith '  in  a  personal  character.  And 
the  difference  is  in  the  latter  comprising  a  moral 
element. 

1  Faith-healing,'  therefore,  has  no  real  point  of 
resemblance  with  '  thy  faith  hath  saved  thee '  of 
the  New  Testament,  unless  we  sink  the  personal 
differences  between  a  modern  faith-healer  and 
Jesus  Christ  as  objects  of  faith. 

Belief  is  not  exclusively  founded  on  objective 
evidence  appealing  to  reason  (opinion),  but 
mainly  on  subjective  evidence  appealing  to  some 
altogether  different  faculty  (faith) .  Now,  whether 
Christians  are  right  or  wrong  in  what  they  believe, 
I  hold  it  as  certain  as  anything  can  be  that  the 
distinction  which  I  have  just  drawn,  and  which 
they  all  implicitly  draw  for  themselves,  is  log- 
ically valid.  For  no  one  is  entitled  to  deny  the 
possibility  of  what  may  be  termed  an  organ  of 
spiritual  discernment.  In  fact  to  do  so  would  be 
to  vacate  the  position  of  pure  agnosticism  in  toto 
—  and  .this  even  if  there  were  no  objective,  or 
strictly  scientific,  evidences  in  favour  of  such  an 
organ,  such  as  we  have  in  the  lives  of  the  saints, 
and  in  a  lower  degree,  in  the  universality  of  the 
religious  sentiment.  Now,  if  there  be  such  an 
organ,  it  follows  from  preceding  paragraphs,  that 
not  only  will  the  main  evidences  for  Christianity 
be  subjective,  but  that  they  ought  to  be  so  :  they 


15°  THOUGHTS   ON    RELIGION. 

ought  to  be  so,  I  mean,  on  the  Christian  suppo- 
sition of  the  object  of  Christianity  being  moral 
probation,  and  '  faith '  both  the  test  and  the 
reward. 

From  this  many  practical  considerations  ensue. 
E.g.  the  duty  of  parents  to  educate  their  children 
in  what  they  believe  as  distinguished  from  what 
they  know.  This  would  be  unjustifiable  if  faith 
were  the  same  as  opinion.  But  it  is  fully  justifi- 
able if  a  man  not  only  knows  that  he  believes 
(opinion)  but  believes  that  he  knows  (faith). 
Whether  or  not  the  Christian  differs  from  the 
'natural  man'  in  having  a  spiritual  organ  of 
cognition,  provided  he  honestly  believes  such  is 
the  case,  it  would  be  immoral  in  him  not  to 
proceed  in  accordance  with  what  he  thus  believes 
to  be  his  knowledge.  This  obligation  is  recognized 
in  education  in  every  other  case.  He  is  morally 
right  even  if  mentally  deluded. 

Huxley,  in  Lay  Sermons,  says  that  faith  has 
been  proved  a 'cardinal  sin'  by  science.  Now, 
this  is  true  enough  of  credulity,  superstition,  &c, 
and  science  has  done  no  end  of  good  in  develop- 
ing our  ideas  of  method,  evidence,  &c.  But  this 
is  all  on  the  side  of  intellect.  '  Faith  '  is  not 
touched  by  such  facts  or  considerations.  And 
what  a  terrible  hell  science  would  have  made  of 
the  world,  if  she  had  abolished  the  '  spirit  of  faith  ' 
even  in  human   relations.     The    fact  is,  Huxley 


A  CANDID  EXAMINATION  OF  RELIGION.      151 

falls  into  the  common  error  of  identifying  '  faith ' 
with  opinion. 


Supposing  Christianity  true,  it  is  very  reason- 
able that  faith  in  the  sense  already  explained 
should  be  constituted  the  test  of  divine  acceptance. 
If  there  be  such  a  thing  as  Christ's  winnowing 
fan,  the  quality  of  sterling  weight  for  the  dis- 
covery of  which  it  is  adapted  cannot  be  conceived 
as  anything  other  than  this  moral  quality.  No 
one  could  suppose  a  revelation  appealing  to  the 
mere  intellect  of  man,  since  acceptance  would  thus 
become  a  mere  matter  of  prudence  in  subscribing 
to  a  demonstration  made  by  higher  intellects. 

It  is  also  a  matter  of  fact  that  if  Christianity 
is  truthful  in  representing  this  world  as  a  school 
of  moral  probation,  we  cannot  conceive  a  system 
better  adapted  to  this  end  than  is  the  world,  or 
a  better  schoolmaster  than  Christianity.  This  is 
proved  not  only  by  general  reasoning,  but  also 
by  the  work  of  Christianity  in  the  world,  its 
adaptation  to  individual  needs, &c.  Consider  also 
the  extraordinary  diversity  of  human  characters 
in  respect  both  of  morality  and  spirituality  though 
all  are  living  in  the  same  world.  Out  of  the  same 
external  material  or  environment  such  astonish- 
ingly diverse  products  arise  according  to  the  use 
made  of  it.  Even  human  suffering  in  its  worst 
forms  can  be  welcome  if  justified  by  faith  in  such 


152  THOUGHTS   ON    RELIGION. 

an  object."  'Ills  have  no  weight,  and  tears  no 
bitterness,'  but  are  rather  to  be  'gloried  in1.' 

It  is  a  further  fact  that  only  by  means  of  this 
theory  of  probation  is  it  possible  to  give  any  mean- 
ing to  the  world,  i.  e.  any  raison  d'etre  of  human 
existence. 

Supposing  Christianity  true,  every  man  must 
stand  or  fall  by  the  results  of  his  own  conduct,  as 
developed  through  his  own  moral  character. 
(This  could  not  be  so  if  the  test  were  intellectual 
ability.)  Yet  this  does  not  hinder  that  the  exer- 
cise of  will  in  the  direction  of  religion  should  need 
help  in  order  to  attain  belief.  Nor  does  it  hinder 
that  some  men  should  need  more  help  and  others 
less.  Indeed,  it  may  well  be  that  some  men  are 
intentionally  precluded  from  receiving  any  help, 
so  as  not  to  increase  their  responsibility,  or  receive 
but  little,  so  as  to  constitute  intellectual  difficulties 
a  moral  trial.  But  clearly,  if  such  things  are  so, 
we  are  inadequate  judges. 

It  is  a  fact  that  we  all  feel  the  intellectual  part 
of  man  to  be  'higher'  than  the  animal,  whatever 
our  theory  of  his  origin.  It  is  a  fact  that  we  all 
feel  the  moral  part  of  man  to  be  '  higher  '  than  the 
intellectual,  whatever  our  theory  of  either  may  be. 
It  is   also   a   fact   that   we  all  similarly  feel   the 

1  [The  author  has  added,  "For  suffering  in  brutes  see  further 
on,"  but  nothing  further  on  the  subject  appears  to  have  been 
written.-ED.] 


Human 


i 


A  CANDID  EXAMINATION  OF  RELIGION.      153 

spiritual  to  be  'higher'  than  the  moral,  whatever 
our  theory  of  religion  may  be.  It  is  what  we 
understand  by  man's  moral,  and  still  more  his 
spiritual,  qualities  that  go  to  constitute  '  character. 
And  it  is  astonishing  how  in  all  walks  of  life  it 
is  character  that  tells  in  the  long  run. 

It  is  a  fact  that  these  distinctions  are  all  well 
marked  and  universally  recognized — viz. 

Animality. 
Intellectuality. 
Morality. 
(^Spirituality. 

Morality  and  spirituality  are  to  be  distinguished 
as  two  very  different  things.  A  man  may  be 
highly  moral  in  his  conduct  without  being  in  any 
degree  spiritual  in  his  nature,  and,  though  to 
a  lesser  extent,  vice  versa.  And,  objectively,  we 
see  the  same  distinction  between  morals  and  reli- 
gion. By  spirituality  I  mean  the  religious  tem- 
perament, whether  or  not  associated  with  any  par- 
ticular creed  or  dogma. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  intellectual  pleasures 
are  more  satisfying  and  enduring  than  sensual  — 
or  even  sensuous.  And,  to  those  who  have  experi- 
enced them,  so  it  is  with  spiritual  over  intellectual, 
artistic,  &c.  This  is  an  objective  fact,  abundantly 
testified  to  by  every  one  who  has  had  experience  : 
and  it  seems  to  indicate  that  the  spiritual  nature 
of  man  is  the  highest  part  of  man  —  the  [culmi- 
nating] point  of  his  being. 


154  THOUGHTS   ON   RELIGION. 

It  is  probably  true,  as  Renan  says  in  his  post- 
humous work,  that  there  will  always  be  material- 
ists and  spiritualists,  inasmuch  as  it  will  always 
be  observable  on  the  one  hand  that  there  is  no 
thought  without  brain,  while,  on  the  other  hand, 
instincts  of  man  will  always  aspire  to  higher 
beliefs.  But  this  is  just  what  ought  to  be  if  reli- 
gion is  true,  and  we  are  in  a  state  of  probation. 
And  is  it  not  probable  that  the  materialistic  posi- 
tion (discredited  even  by  philosophy)  is  due  sim- 
ply to  custom  and  want  of  imagination?  Else 
why  the  inextinguishable  instincts? 

It  is  much  more  easy  to  disbelieve  than  to 
believe.  This  is  obvious  on  the  side  of  reason, 
but  it  is  also  true  on  that  of  spirit,  for  to  disbe- 
lieve is  in  accordance  with  environment  or  custom, 
while  to  believe  necessitates  a  spiritual  use  of  the 
imagination.  For  both  these  reasons,  very  few 
unbelievers  have  any  justification,  either  intellec- 
tual or  spiritual,  for  their  own  unbelief. 

Unbelief  is  usually  due  to  indolence,  often  to 
prejudice,  and  never  a  thing  to  be  proud  of. 

'Why  should  it  be  thought  a  thing  incredible 
with  you  that  God  should  raise  the  dead?'  Clearly 
no  answer  can  be  given  by  the  pure  agnostic. 
But  he  will  naturally  say  in  reply,  'the  question 
rather  is,  why  should  it  be  thought  credible  with 
you  that  there  is  a  God,  or,  if  there  is,  that  he 


A  CANDID  EXAMINATION  OF  RELIGION.      155 

should  raise  the  dead?'  And  I  think  the  wise 
Christian  will  answer,  '  I  believe  in  the  resurrec- 
tion of  the  dead,  partly  on  grounds  of  reason, 
partly  on  those  of  intuition,  but  chiefly  on  both 
combined  ;  so  to  speak,  it  is  my  whole  character 
which  accepts  the  whole  system  of  which  the 
doctrine  of  personal  immortality  forms  an  essen- 
tial part.'  And  to  this  it  may  be  fairly  added 
that  the  Christian  doctrine  of  the  resurrection  of 
our  bodily  form  cannot  have  been  arrived  at  for 
the  purpose  of  meeting  modern  materialistic 
objections  to  the  doctrine  of  personal  immortality; 
hence  it  is  certainly  a  strange  doctrine  to  have  been 
propounded  at  that  time,  together  with  its  com- 
panion, and  scarcely  less  distinctive,  doctrine  of 
the  vileness  of  the  body.  Why  was  it  not  said 
that  the  'soul'  alone  should  survive  as  a  disem- 
bodied '  spirit?  '  Or  if  form  were  supposed  neces- 
sary for  man  as  distinguished  from  God,  that  he 
was  to  be  an  angel?  But,  be  this  as  it  may,  the 
doctrine  of  the  resurrection  seems  to  have  fully 
met  beforehand  the  materialistic  objection  to  a 
future  life,  and  so  to  have  raised  the  ulterior  ques- 
tion with  which  this  paragraph  opens. 

We  have  seen  in  the  Introduction  that  all  first 
principles  even  of  scientific  facts  are  known  by 
intuition  and  not  by  reason.  No  one  can  deny 
this.  Now,  if  there  be  a  God,  the  fact  is  certainly 
of  the  nature  of  a  first  principle ;  for  it  must  be 


156  THOUGHTS   ON   RELIGION. 

the  first  of  all  first  principles.  No  one  can  dispute 
this.  No  one  can  therefore  dispute  the  necessary 
conclusion,  that,  if  there  be  a  God,  He  is  knowable 
(if  knowable  at  all) by  intuition  and  not  by  reason. 

Indeed  a  little  thought  is  enough  to  show  that 
from  its  very  nature  as  such,  reason  must  be 
incapable  of  adjudicating  on  the  subject,  for  it  is 
a  process  of  inferring  from  the  known  to  the  un- 
known. 

Or  thus.  It  would  be  against  reason  itself  to 
suppose  that  God,  even  if  He  exists,  can  be 
known  by  reason ;  He  must  be  known,  if  knowa- 
ble at  all,  by  intuition.1 

Observe,  although  God  might  give  an  objec- 
tive revelation  of  Himself,  e.  g.  as  Christians 
believe  He  has,  even  this  would  not  give  knowl- 
edge of  Him  save  to  those  who  believe  the  revela- 
tions genuine  ;  and  I  doubt  whether  it  is  logically 
possible  for  any  form  of  objective  revelation  of 
itself  to  compel  belief  in  it.  Assuredly  one  rising 
from  the  dead  to  testify  thereto  would  not,  nor 
would  letters  of  fire  across  the  sky  do  so.  But, 
even  if  it  were  logically  possible,  we  need  not 
consider  the  abstract  possibility,  seeing  that,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  no  such  demonstrative  revelation 
has  been  given. 

1  [In  this  connexion  I  may  again  notice  that  two  days  before 
his  death  George  Romanes  expressed  his  cordial  approval  of  Pro- 
fessor Knight's  Aspects  of  Theism — a  work  in  which  great  stress  is 
laid  on  the  argument  from  intuition  in  different  forms. — Ed.] 


A  CANDID  EXAMINATION  OF  RELIGION.      157 

Hence,  the  only  legitimate  attitude  of  pure 
reason  is  pure  agnosticism.  No  one  can  deny 
this.  But,  it  will  be  said,  there  is  this  vast  differ- 
ence between  our  intuitive  knowledge  of  all  other 
first  principles  and  that  alleged  of  the  '  first  of  all 
first  principles,'  viz.  that  the  latter  is  confessedly 
?iot  known  to  all  men.  Now,  assuredly,  there  is 
here  a  vast  difference.  But  so  there  ought  to  be, 
if  we  are  here  in  a  stat^joi_gro^»atiori,  as  before  & 
explained.  And  that  we  are  in  such  a  state  is  not 
only  the  hypothesis  of  religion,  but  the  sole 
rational  explanation  as  well  as  moral  justification  of 
our  existence  as  rational  beings  and  moral  agents.1 

It  is  not  necessarily  true,  as  J.  S.  Mill  and  all 
other  agnostics  think,  that  even  if  internal  intui- 
tion be  of  divine  origin,  the  illumination  thus 
furnished  can  only  be  of  evidential  value  to  the 
individual  subject  thereof.  On  the  contrary,  it 
may  be  studied  objectively,  even  if  not  experi- 
enced subjectively ;  and  ought  to  be  so  studied 
by  a  pure  agnostic  desirous  of  light  from  any 
quarter.  Even  if  he  does  not  know  it  as  a 
noumenon  he  can  investigate  it  as  a  phenomenon. 
And,  supposing  it  to  be  of  divine  origin,  as  its 
subjects  believe  and  he  has  no  reason  to  doubt, 
he  may  gain  much  evidence  against  its  being  a 
mere  psychological  illusion  from  identical  reports 
of  it  in  all  ages.    Thus,  if  any  large  section  of  the 

1On  this  subject  see  Pascal,  Pensees  (Kegan  Paul's  trans.) 
p.  103. 


158  THOUGHTS   ON   RELIGION. 

race  were  to  see  flames  issuing  from  magnets, 
there  would  be  no  doubt  as  to  their  objective 
reality. 

The  testimony  given  by  Socrates  to  the  occur- 
rence in  himself  of  an  internal  Voice,  having  all 
the  definiteness  of  an  auditory  hallucination,  has 
given  rise  to  much  speculation  by  subsequent 
philosophers. 

Many  explanations  are  suggested,  but  if  we 
remember  the  critical  nature  of  Socrates'  own 
mind,  the  literal  nature  of  his  mode  of  teaching, 
and  the  high  authority  which  attaches  to  Plato's 
opinion  on  the  subject,  the  probability  seems  to 
incline  towards  the  'Demon'  having  been,  in 
Socrates'  own  consciousness,  an  actual  auditory 
sensation.  Be  this  however  as  it  may,  I  suppose 
there  is  no  question  that  we  may  adopt  this  view 
of  the  matter  at  least  to  the  extent  of  classifying 
Socrates  with  Luther,  Pascal,  &c,  not  to  mention 
all  the  line  of  Hebrew  and  other  prophets,  who 
agree  in  speaking  of  a  Divine  Voice. 

If  so,  the  further  question  arises  whether  we 
are  to  classify  all  these  with  lunatics  in  whom  the 
phenomena  of  auditory  hallucination  are  habitual. 

Without  doubt  this  hypothesis  is  most  in 
accordance  with  the  temper  of  our  age,  partly 
because  it  obeys  the  law  of  parsimony,  and  partly 
because  it  [negatives]  a  priori  the  possibility  of 
revelation. 


A  CANDID  EXAMINATION  OF  RELIGION.      159 

But  if  we  look  at  the  matter  from  the  point  of 
view  of  pure  agnosticism,  we  are  not  entitled  to 
adopt  so  rough  and  ready  an  interpretation. 

Suppose  then  that  not  only  Socrates  and  all 
great  religious  reformers  and  founders  of  religious 
systems  both  before  and  after  him  were  similarly 
stricken  with  mental  disease,  but  that  similar 
phenomena  had  occurred  in  the  case  of  all  scien- 
tific discoverers  such  as  Galileo,  Newton,  Darwin, 
&c. — supposing  all  these  men  to  have  declared 
that  their  main  ideas  had  been  communicated  by 
subjective  sensations  as  of  spoken  language,  so 
that  all  the  progress  of  the  world's  scientific 
thought  had  resembled  that  of  the  world's  reli- 
gious thought,  and  had  been  attributed  by  the 
promoters  thereof  to  direct  inspirations  of  this 
kind — would  it  be  possible  to  deny  that  the  testi- 
mony thus  afforded  to  the  fact  of  subjective  reve- 
lation would  have  been  overwhelming  ?  Or  could 
it  any  longer  have  been  maintained  that  suppos- 
ing a  revelation  to  be  communicated  subjectively 
the  fact  thereof  could  only  be  of  any  evidential 
value  to  the  recipient  himself?  To  this  it  will  no 
doubt  be  answered,  'No,  but  in  the  case  supposed 
the  evidence  arises  not  from  the  fact  of  their 
subjective  intuition  but  from  that  of  its  objective 
verification  in  the  results  of  science.'  Quite  so ; 
but  this  is  exactly  the  test  appealed  to  by  the 
Hebrew  prophets — the  test  of  true  and  lying 
prophets  being  in  the  fulfilment  or  non-fulfilment 


160  THOUGHTS   ON   RELIGION. 

of  their  prophecies  and  '  By  their  fruits  ye  shall 
know  them.' 

Therefore  it  is  as  absurd  to  say  that  the  reli- 
gious consciousness  of  minds  other  than  our  own 
can  be  barred  antecedently  as  evidence,  as  it  is 
to  say  that  testimony  to  the  miraculous  is  simi- 
larly barred.  The  pure  agnostic  must  always 
carefully  avoid  the  'high  priori  road.'  But,  on 
the  other  hand,  he  must  be  all  the  more  assiduous 
in  estimating  fairly  the  character,  both  as  to 
quantity  and  quality,  of  evidence  a  posteriori. 
Now  this  evidence  in  the  present  case  is  twofold, 
positive  and  negative.  It  will  be  convenient  to 
consider  the  negative  first. 

The  negative  evidence  is  furnished  by  the 
nature  of  man  without  God.  It  is  thoroughly 
miserable,  as  is  well  shown  by  Pascal,  who  has 
1  devoted  the  whole  of  the  first  part  of  his  treatise 
to  this  subject.  I  need  not  go  over  the  ground 
which  he  has  already  so  well  traversed. 

Some  men  are  not  conscious  of  the  cause  of 
this  misery:  this,  however,  does  not  prevent  the 
fact  of  their  being  miserable.  For  the  most 
part  they  conceal  the  fact  as  well  as  possible 
from  themselves,  by  occupying  their  minds  with 
society,  sport,  frivolity  of  all  kinds,  or,  if  intel- 
lectually disposed,  with  science,  art,  literature, 
business,  &c.  This  however  is  but  to  fill  the 
starving  belly  with  husks.  I  know  from  experi- 
ence   the    intellectual   distractions    of    scientific 


A  CANDID  EXAMINATION  OF  RELIGION.      161 

research,  philosophical  speculation,  and  artistic 
pleasures  ;  but  am  also  well  aware  that  even  when 
all  are  taken  together  and  well  sweetened  to 
taste,  in  respect  of  consequent  reputation,  means, 
social  position,  &c,  the  whole  concoction  is  but 
as  high  confectionery  to  a  starving  man.  He 
may  cheat  himself  for  a  time  —  especially  if  he 
be  a  strong  man  —  into  the  belief  that  he  is  nour- 
ishing himself  by  denying  his  natural  appetite ; 
but  soon  finds  he  was  made  for  some  altogether 
different  kind  of  food,  even  though  of  much  less 
tastefulness  as  far  as  the  palate  is  concerned. 

Some  men  indeed  never  acknowledge  this 
articulately  or  distinctly  even  to  themselves,  yet 
always  show  it  plainly  enough  to  others.  Take, 
e.  g.  'that  last  infirmity  of  noble  minds.'  I  sup- 
pose the  most  exalted  and  least  '  carnal '  of 
worldly  joys  consists  in  the  adequate  recognition 
by  the  world  of  high  achievement  by  ourselves. 
Yet  it  is  notorious  that  — 

'It  is  by  God  decreed 
Fame  shall  not  satisfy  the  highest  need.' 

It  has  been  my  lot  to  know  not  a  few  of  the 
famous  men  of  our  generation,  and  I  have  always 
observed  that  this  is  profoundly  true.  Like  all 
Other  'moral'  satisfactions,  this  soon  palls  by 
custom,  and  as  soon  as  one  end  of  distinction  is 
reached,  another  is  pined  for.  There  is  no  final- 
ity to  rest  in,  while  disease  and  death  are  always 
standing  in  the  background.     Custom   may  even 


1 62  THOUGHTS   ON   RELIGION. 

blind  men  to  their  misery,  so  far  as  not  to  make 
them  realize  what  is  wanting ;  yet  the  want  is 
there. 

I  take  it  then  as  unquestionably  true  that 
this  whole  negative  side  of  the  subject  proves  a 
vacuum  in  the  soul  of  man  which  nothing  can 
fill  save  faith  in  God. 

Now  take  the  positive  side.  Consider  the 
happiness  of  religious  —  and  chiefly  of  the  high- 
est religious,  i.  e.  Christian  —  belief.  It  is  a  mat- 
ter of  fact  that  besides  being  most  intense,  it  is 
most  enduring,  growing,  and  never  staled  by  cus- 
tom. In  short,  according  to  the  universal  testi- 
mony of  those  who  have  it,  it  differs  from  all 
other  happiness  not  only  in  degree  but  in  kind. 
Those  who  have  it  can  usually  testify  to  what 
they  used  to  be  without  it.  It  has  no  relation  to 
intellectual  status.  It  is  a  thing  by  itself  and 
supreme." 

So  much  for  the  individual.  But  positive  evi- 
dence does  not  end  here.  Look  at  the  effects  of 
Christian  belief  as  exercised  on  human  society — 
1st,  by  individual  Christians  on  the  family,  &c; 
and,  2nd,  by  the  Christian  Church  on  the  world. 

All  this  may  lead  on  to  an  argument  from  the 
adaptation  of  Christianity  to  human  higher  needs. 
All  men  must  feel  these  needs  more  or  less  in  pro- 
portion as  their  higher  natures,  moral  and  spiritual, 
are  developed.  Now  Christianity  is  the  only 
religion   which    is   adapted  to  meet    them,  and, 


A  CANDID  EXAMINATION  OF  RELIGION.      163 

according  to  those  who  are  alone  able  to  testify, 
does  so  most  abundantly.  All  these  men,  of  every 
sect,  nationality,  &c,  agree  in  their  account  of 
their  subjective  experience  ;  so  as  to  this  there 
can  be  no  question.  The  only  question  is  as  to 
whether  they  are  all  deceived. 

PEU  DE  CHOSE. 

'  La  vie  est  vaine  : 

Un  peu  d'amour, 
Un  peu  de  haine  .  .  . 

Et  puis — bon  jour  ! 

La  vie  est  breve  : 

Un  peu  d'espoir, 
Un  peu  de  reve  .  .  . 

Et  puis — bon  soir  ! ' 

The  above  is  a  terse  and  true  criticism  of  this 
life  without  hope  of  a  future  one.  Is  it  satis- 
factory ?  But  Christian  faith,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
changes  it  entirely. 

'  The  night  has  a  thousand  eyes, 

And  the  day  but  one  ; 
Yet  the  light  of  a  whole  world  dies 

With  the  setting  sun. 

The  mind  has  a  thousand  eyes, 

And  the  heart  but  one  ; 
Yet  the  light  of  a  whole  life  dies 

When  love  is  done.' 

Love  is  known  to  be  all  this.  How  great,  then, 
is  Christianity,  as  being  the  religion  of  love,  and 
causing  men  to  believe  both  in  the  cause  of  love's 
supremacy  and  the  infinity  of  God's  love  to  man. 


§  5-  FAITH   IN   CHRISTIANITY. 

Christianity  comes  up  for  serious  investigation 
in  the  present  treatise,  because  this  Exami?iation 
of  Religio?i  [i.  e.  of  the  validity  of  the  religious 
consciousness]  has  to  do  with  the  evidences  of 
Theism  presented  by  man,  and  not  only  by  nature 
minus  man.  Now  of  the  religious  consciousness 
Christianity  is  unquestionably  the  highest  product. 

When  I  wrote  the  preceding  treatise  [the 
Candid  Examination^ ,  I  did  not  sufficiently  appre- 
ciate the  immense  importance  of  human  nature,  as 
distinguished  from  physical  nature,  in  any  enquiry 
touching  Theism.  But  since  then  I  have  seri- 
ously studied  anthropology  (including  the  science 
of  comparative  religions),  psychology  and  meta- 
physics, with  the  result  of  clearly  seeing  that 
human  nature  is  the  most  important  part  of  nature 
as  a  whole  whereby  to  investigate  the  theory  of 
Theism.  This  I  ought  to  have  anticipated  on 
merely  a  priori  grounds,  and  no  doubt  should 
have  perceived,  had  I  not  been  too  much  immersed 
in  merely  physical  research. 

Moreover,  in  those  days  I  took  it  for  granted 
that  Christianity  was  played  out,  and  never  con- 
sidered it  at  all  as  having  any  rational  bearing  on 

the  question  of  Theism.     And,  though   this  was 

164 


A  CANDID  EXAMINATION  OF  RELIGION.      165 

doubtless  inexcusable,  I  still  think  that  the 
rational  standing  of  Christianity  has  materially  *r 
improved  since  then.  For  then  it  seemed  that 
Christianity  was  destined  to  succumb  as  a  rational 
system  before  the  double  assault  of  Darwin  from 
without  and  the  negative  school  of  criticism  from 
within.  Not  only  the  book  of  organic  nature,  but 
likewise  its  own  sacred  documents,  seemed  to  be 
declaring  against  it.  But  now  all  this  has  been 
very  materially  changed.  We  have  all  more  or 
less  grown  to  see  that  Darwinism  is  like  Coperni- 
canism,  &c,  in  this  respect;1  while  the  outcome 
of  the  great  textual  battle2  is  impartially  consid- 
ered a  signal  victory  for  Christianity.  Prior  to 
the  new  [Biblical]  science,  there  was  really  no 
rational  basis  in  thoughtful  minds,  either  for  the 
date  of  any  one  of  the  New  Testament  books,  or, 
consequently,  for  the  historical  truth  of  any  one 
of  the  events  narrated  in  them.  Gospels,  Acts 
and  Epistles  were  all  alike  shrouded  in  this  uncer- 
tainty. Hence  the  validity  of  the  eighteenth- 
century  scepticism.  But  now  all  this  kind  of 
scepticism  has  been  rendered  obsolete,  and  for- 
ever impossible  ;  while  the  certainty  of  enough  of 
St.  Paul's  writings  for  the  practical  purpose  of 
displaying  the    belief  of  the   apostles  has  been 

1  [i.  e.  A  theory  which  comes  at  first  as  a  shock  to  the 
current  teaching  of  Christianity,  but  is  finally  seen  to  be  in  no 
antagonism  to  its  necessary  principles. — Ed.] 

2  [i.  e.  The  battle  in  regard  to  the  Christian  texts  or  documents. 
—Ed.] 


1 66  THOUGHTS   ON   RELIGION. 

established,  as  well  as  the  certainty  of  the  publi- 
cation of  the  Synoptics  within  the  first  century. 
An  enormous  gain  has  thus  accrued  to  the 
objective  evidences  of  Christianity.  It  is  most 
important  that  the  expert  investigator  should  be 
exact,  and,  as  in  any  other  science,  the  lay  public 
must  take  on  authority  as  trustworthy  only  what 
both  sides  are  agreed  upon.  But,  as  in  any  other 
science,  experts  are  apt  to  lose  sight  of  the  impor- 
tance of  the  main  results  agreed  upon,  in  their 
fighting  over  lesser  points  still  in  dispute.  Now 
it  is  enough  for  us  that  the  Epistles  to  the  Romans, 
Galatians,  and  Corinthians,  have  been  agreed 
upon  as  genuine,  and  that  the  same  is  true  of  the 
Synoptics  so  far  as  concerns  the  main  doctrine  of 
Christ  Himself. 

The  extraordinary  candour  of  Christ's  biog- 
raphers must  not  be  forgotten.1  Notice  also 
such  sentences  as  '  but  some  doubted,'  and  (in 
the  account  of  Pentecost)  'these  men  are  full  of 
new  wine.'2  Such  observations  are  wonderfully 
true  to  human  nature  ;  but  no  less  wonderfully 
opposed  to  any  '  accretion  '  theory. 

Observe,  when  we  become  honestly  pure  agnos- 
tics the  whole  scene  changes  by  the  change  in  our 
point  of  view.  We  may  then  read  the  records 
impartially,  or  on  their  own   merits,  without  any 

1  See  Gore's  Bampton  Lectures,  pp.  74  ff. 

2  Matt,  xxviii.  17;  Acts  ii.  13. 


A  CANDID  EXAMINATION  OF  RELIGION.      167 

antecedent  conviction  that  they  must  be  false. 
It  is  then  an  open  question  whether  they  are  not 
true  as  history. 

There  is  so  much  to  be  said  in  objective 
evidence  for  Christianity  that  were  the  central 
doctrines  thus  testified  to  anything  short  of 
miraculous,  no  one  would  doubt.  But  we  are  not 
competent  judges  a  priori  of  what  a  revelation 
should  be.  If  our  agnosticism  be  pure,  we  have 
no  right  to  prejudge  the  case  on  prima  facie 
grounds. 

One  of  the  strongest  pieces  of  objective 
evidence  in  favour  of  Christianity  is  not  sufficiently 
enforced  by  apologists.  Indeed,  I  am  not  aware 
that  I  have  ever  seen  it  mentioned.  It  is  the 
absence  from  the  biography  of  Christ  of  any 
doctrines  which  the  subsequent  growth  of  human 
knowledge  —  whether  in  natural  science,  ethics, 
political  economy,  or  elsewhere  —  has  had  to  dis- 
-^ount.  This  negative  argument  is  really  almost 
as  strong  as  is  the  positive  one  from  what  Christ 
did  teach.  For  when  we  consider  what  a  large 
number  of  sayings  are  recorded  of  —  or  at  least 
attributed  to  —  Him,  it  becomes  most  remarkable 
that  in  literal  truth  there  is  no  reason  why  any  of 
His  words  should  ever  pass  away  in  the  sense  of 
becoming  obsolete.  '  Not  even  now  could  it  be 
easy,'  says  John  Stuart  Mill,  '  even  for  an 
unbeliever,  to  find  a  better  translation  of  the  rule 


168  THOUGHTS   ON    RELIGION. 

of  virtue  from  the  abstract  into  the  concrete,  than 
to  endeavour  so  to  live  that  Christ  would  approve 
our  life.'1  Contrast  Jesus  Christ  in  this  respect 
with  other  thinkers  of  like  antiquity.  Even  Plato, 
who,  though  some  400  years  B.  C.  in  point  of 
time,  was  greatly  in  advance  of  Him  in  respect  of 
philosophic  thought  —  not  only  because  Athens 
then  presented  the  extraordinary  phenomenon 
which  it  did  of  genius  in  all  directions  never  since 
equalled,  but  also  because  he,  following  Socrates, 
was,  so  to  speak,  the  greatest  representative  of 
human  reason  in  the  direction  of  spirituality  — 
even  Plato,  I  say,  is  nowhere  in  this  respect  as 
compared  with  Christ.  Read  the  dialogues,  and 
see  how  enormous  is  the  contrast  with  the  Gospels 
in  respect  of  errors  of  all  kinds  —  reaching  even 
to  absurdity  in  respect  of  reason,  and  to  sayings 
shocking  to  the  moral  sense.  Yet  this  is  con- 
fessedly the  highest  level  of  human  reason  on  the 
lines  of  spirituality,  when  unaided  by  alleged 
revelation. 

Two  things  may  be  said  in  reply.  First,  that 
the  Jews  (Rabbis)  of  Christ's  period  had  enunci- 
ated most  of  Christ's  ethical  sayings.  But,  even  so 
far  as  this  is  true,  the  sayings  were  confessedly 
extracted  or  deduced  from  the  Old  Testament,  and 
so  ex  hypothesi  due  to  original  inspiration.  Again, 
it  is  not  very  far  true,  because,  as  Ecce  Homo  says, 
the  ethical   sayings  of  Christ,  even  when  antici- 

1  Three  Essays  on  Theism,  p.  255* 


A  CANDID  EXAMINATION  OF  RELIGION.      169 

pated  by  Rabbis   and  the   Old  Testament,  were 
selected  by  Him. 

It  is  a  general,  if  not  a  universal,  rule  that  those 
who  reject  Christianity  with  contempt  are  those 
who  care  not  for  religion  of  any  kind.  'Depart 
from  us'  has  always  been  the  sentiment  of  such. 
On  the  other  hand,  those  in  whom  the  religious 
sentiment  is  intact,  but  who  have  rejected  Chris- 
tianity on  intellectual  grounds,  still  almost  deify 
Christ.     These  facts  are  remarkable. 

If  we  estimate  the  greatness  of  a  man  by  the 
influence  which  he  has  exerted  on  mankind,  there 
can  be  no  question,  even  from  the  secular  point 
of  view,  that  Christ  is  much  the  greatest  man  who 
has  ever  lived. 

It  is  on  all  sides  worth  considering  (blatant 
ignorance  or  base  vulgarity  alone  excepted)  that 
the  revolution  effected  by  Christianity  in  human 
life  is  immeasurable  and  unparalleled  by  any  other 
movement  in  history ;  though  most  nearly  ap- 
proached by  that  of  the  Jewish  religion,  of  which, 
however,  it  is  a  development,  so  that  it  may  be 
regarded  as  of  a  piece  with  it.  If  thus  regarded, 
this  whole  system  of  religion  is  so  immeasurably 
in  advance  of  all  others,  that  it  may  fairly  be  said, 
if  it  had  not  been  for  the  Jews,  the  human  race 
would  not  have  had  any  religion  worth  our  serious' 
attention  as  such.  The  whole  of  that  side  of  human 
nature  would  never  have  been  developed  in  civil- 


V 


170  THOUGHTS   ON   RELIGION. 

ized  life.  And  although  there  are  numberless 
individuals  who  are  not  conscious  of  its  develop- 
ment in  themselves,  yet  even  these  have  been 
influenced  to  an  enormous  extent  by  the  atmos- 
phere of  religion  around  them. 

But  not  only  is  Christianity  thus  so  immeas- 
urably in  advance  of  all  other  religions.  It  is  no 
less  so  of  every  other  system  of  thought  that  has 
ever  been  promulgated  in  regard  to  all  that  is 
moral  and  spiritual.  Whether  it  be  true  or  false, 
it  is  certain  that  neither  philosophy,  science  nor 
poetry  has  ever  produced  results  in  thought,  con- 
duct, or  beauty  in  any  degree  to  be  compared 
with  it.  This  I  think  will  be  on  all  hands  allowed 
as  regards  conduct.  As  regards  thought  and 
beauty  it  may  be  disputed.  But,  consider,  what 
has  all  the  science  or  all  the  philosophy  of  the 
world  done  for  the  thought  of  mankind  to  be 
compared  with  the  one  doctrine,  'God  is  love?' 
Whether  or  not  true,  conceive  what  belief  in  it 
has  been  to  thousands  of  millions  of  our  race  — 
i.  e.  its  influence  on  human  thought,  and  thence 
on  human  conduct.  Thus  to  admit  its  incom- 
parable influence  in  conduct  is  indirectly  to  admit 
it  as  regards  thought.  Again,  as  regards  beauty, 
the  man  who  fails  to  see  its  incomparable  excel- 
lence in  this  respect  merely  shows  his  own  defi- 
ciency in  the  appreciation  of  all  that  is  noblest  in 
man.  True  or  not  true,  the  entire  Story  of  the  Cross, 
from  its  commencement  in  prophetic  aspiration 


A  CANDID  EXAMINATION  OF  RELIGION.      171 

to  its  culmination  in  the  Gospel,  is  by  far  the  most 
magnificent  [presentation]  in  literature.  And 
surely  the  fact  of  its  having  all  been  lived  does 
not  detract  from  its  poetic  value.  Nor  does  the 
fact  of  its  being  capable  of  appropriation  by  the 
individual  Christian  of  to-day  as  still  a  vital  reli- 
gion detract  from  its  sublimity.  Only  to  a  man 
wholly  destitute  of  spiritual  perception  can  it  be 
that  Christianity  should  fail  to  appear  the  greatest 
exhibition  of  the  beautiful,  the  sublime,  and  of  all 
else  that  appeals  to  our  spiritual  nature,  which 
has  ever  been  known  upon  our  earth. 

Yet  this  side  of  its  adaptation  is  turned  only 
towards  men  of  highest  culture.  The  most  re- 
markable thing  about  Christianity  is  its  adapta- 
tion to  all  sorts  and  conditions  of  men.  Are  you 
highly  intellectual?  There  is  in  its  problems, 
historical  and  philosophical,  such  worlds  of  mate- 
rial as  you  may  spend  your  life  upon  with  the 
same  interminable  interest  as  is  open  to  the  stu- 
dents of  natural  science.  Or  are  you  but  a  peas- 
ant in  your  parish  church,  with  knowledge  of  little 
else  than  your  Bible?     Still  are  you   .   .   .x 

REGENERATION. 

How  remarkable  is  the  doctrine  of  Regenera- 
tion per  se,  as  it  is  stated  in  the  New  Testament,2 
and  how  completely  it  fits  in  with  the  non-demon- 

x[Note  unfinished. — Ed.] 

2  [George  Romanes  began  to  make  a  collection  of  N.  T.  texts 
bearing  on  the  subject. — Ed.] 


I72  THOUGHTS   ON    RELIGION. 

strative  character  of  Revelation  to  reason  alone, 
with  the  hypothesis  of  moral  probation,  &c.  Now 
this  doctrine  is  one  of  the  distinctive  notes  of 
Christianity.  That  is,  Christ  foretold  repeatedly 
and  distinctly  —  as  did  also  His  apostles  after 
Him  —  that  while  those  who  received  the  Holy 
Ghost,  who  came  to  the  Father  through  faith  in 
the  Son,  who  were  born  again  of  the  Spirit,  (and 
many  other  synonymous  phrases,)  would  be  abso- 
lutely certain  of  Christian  truth  as  it  were  by 
direct  vision  or  intuition,  the  carnally  minded  on 
the  other  hand  would  not  be  affected  by  any 
amount  of  direct  evidence,  even  though  one  rose 
from  the  dead  —  as  indeed  Christ  shortly  after- 
wards did,  with  fulfilment  of  this  prediction. 
Thus  scepticism  may  be  taken  by  Christians  as 
corroborating  Christianity. 

By  all  means  let  us  retain  our  independence  of 
judgment ;  but  this  is  pre-eminently  a  matter  in 
which  pure  agnostics  must  abstain  from  arrogance 
and  consider  the  facts  impartially  as  unquestion- 
able phenomena  of  experience. 

Shortly  after  the  death  of  Christ,  this  phenom- 
enon which  had  been  foretold  by  Him  occurred, 
and  appears  to  have  done  so  for  the  first  time. 
It  has  certainly  continued  to  manifest  itself  ever 
since,  and  has  been  attributed  by  professed  his- 
torians to  that  particular  moment  in  time  called 
Pentecost,  producing  much  popular  excitement 
and  a  large  number  of  Christian  believers. 


A  CANDID  EXAMINATION  OF  RELIGION.      173 

But,  whether  or  not  we  accept  this  account,  it 
is  unquestionable  that  the  apostles  were  filled 
with  faith  in  the  person  and  office  of  their  Master, 
which  is  enough  to  justify  His  doctrine  of  regene- 
ration. 

CONVERSIONS. 

St.  Augustine  after  thirty  years  of  age,  and 
other  Fathers,  bear  testimony  to  a  sudden,  endur- 
ing and  extraordinary  change  in  themselves,  called 
conversio?i? 

Now  this  experience  has  been  repeated  and 
testified  to  by  countless  millions  of  civilized  men 
and  women  in  all  nations  and  all  degrees  of  cul- 
ture. It  signifies  not  whether  the  conversion  be 
sudden  or  gradual,  though,  as  a  psychological 
phenomenon,  it  is  more  remarkable  when  sudden 
and  there  is  no  symptom  of  mental  aberration 
otherwise.  But  even  as  a  gradual  growth  in 
mature  age,  its  evidential  value  is  not  less.  (Cf. 
Bunyan,  &c.) 

In  all  cases  it  is  not  a  mere  change  of  belief  or 
opinion  ;  this  is  by  no  means  the  point ;  the  point  is 
that  it  is  a  modification  of  character,  more  or  less 
profound. 

Seeing  what  a  complex  thing  is  character,  this 
change  therefore  cannot  be  simple.  That  it  may 
all  be  due  to  so-called  natural  causes  is  no  evi- 
dence against   its   so-called  supernatural  course, 

xSee  Pascal,  Pensees,  p.  245. 


174  THOUGHTS   ON    RELIGION. 

unless  we  beg  the  whole  question  of  the  Divine 
in  nature.  To  pure  agnostics  the  evidence  from 
conversions  and  regeneration  lies  in  the  bulk  of 
these  psychological  phenomena,  shortly  after  the 
death  of  Christ,  with  their  continuance  ever  since, 
their  general  similarity  all  over  the  world,  &c,  &c. 

CHRISTIANITY  AND   PAIN. 

Christanity,  from  its  foundation  in  Judaism, 
has  throughout  been  a  religion  of  sacrifice  and 
sorrow.  It  has  been  a  religion  of  blood  and  tears, 
and  yet  of  profoundest  happiness  to  its  votaries. 
The  apparent  paradox  is  due  to  its  depth,  and  to 
the  union  of  these  seemingly  diverse  roots  in  Love. 
It  has  been  throughout  and  growingly  a  religion 
—  or  rather  let  us  say  the  religion  —  of  Love,  with 
these  apparently  opposite  qualities.  Probably  it 
is  only  those  whose  characters  have  been  deep- 
ened by  experiences  gained  in  this  religion  itself 
who  are  so  much  as  capable  of  intelligently  resolv- 
ing this  paradox. 

Fakirs  hang  on  hooks,  Pagans  cut  themselves 
and  even  their  children,  sacrifice  captives,  &c,  for 
the  sake  of  propitiating  diabolical  deities.  The 
Jewish  and  Christian  idea  of  sacrifice  is  doubtless 
a  survival  of  this  idea  of  God  by  way  of  natural 
causation,  yet  this  is  no  evidence  against  the  com- 
pleted idea  of  the  Godhead  being  [such  as  the 
Christian  belief  represents  it],  for  supposing  the 
completed  idea  to  be  true,  the  earlier  ideals  would 


A  CANDID  EXAMINATION  OF  RELIGION.      175 

have  been  due  to  the  earlier  inspirations,  in  accor- 
dance with  the  developmental  method  of  Revela- 
tion hereafter  to  be  discussed.1 

But  Christianity,  with  its  roots  in  Judaism,  is, 
as  I  have  said,  par  excellence  the  religion  of  sor- 
row, because  it  reaches  to  truer  and  deeper  levels 
of  our  spiritual  nature,  and  therefore  has  capa- 
bilities both  of  sorrow  and  joy  which  are  presum- 
ably non-existent  except  in  civilized  man.  I 
mean  the  sorrows  and  joys  of  a  fully  evolved 
spiritual  life  —  such  as  were  attained  wonderfully 
early,  historically  speaking,  in  the  case  of  the 
Jews,  and  are  now  universally  diffused  through- 
out Christendom.  In  short,  the  sorrows  and  the 
joys  in  question  are  those  which  arise  from  the 
fully  developed  consciousness  of  sin  against  a 
God  of  Love,  as  distinguished  from  propitiation 
of  malignant  spirits.  These  joys  and  sorrows 
are  wholly  spiritual,  not  merely  physical,  and 
culminate  in  the  cry,  '  Thou  desirest  no  sacrifice. 
.   .  .  The  sacrifice  of  God  is   a  troubled  spirit.'2 

I  agree  with  Pascal3  that  there  is  virtually 
nothing  to  be  gained  by  being  a  theist  as  dis- 
tinguished from  a  Christian.  Unitarianism  is 
only  an  affair  of  the  reason  —  a  merely  abstract 
theory  of    the  mind,  having  nothing  to  do  with 

x[The  notes  on  this  subject  were  often  too   fragmentary  for 
publication. —  Ed,] 
2Ps.  li. 
ifensees,  pp.  91-93. 


176  THOUGHTS   ON   RELIGION. 

the  heart,  or  the  real  needs  of  mankind.  It  is 
only  when  it  takes  the  New  Testament,  tears  out 
a  few  of  its  leaves  relating  to  the  divinity  of 
Christ,  and  appropriates  all  the  rest,  that  its  sys- 
tem becomes  in  any  degree  possible  as  a  basis 
for  personal  religion. 

If  there  is  a  Deity  it  seems  to  be  in  some 
indefinite  degree  more  probable  that  He  should 
impart  a  Revelation  than  that  He  should 
not. 

Women,  as  a  class,  are  in  all  countries  much 
more  disposed  to  Christianity  than  men.  I 
think  the  scientific  explanation  of  this  is  to  be 
found  in  the  causes  assigned  in  my  essay  on 
Mental  differences  between  Me?i  and  Women?  But, 
if  Christianity  be  supposed  true,  there  would,  of 
course,  be  a  more  ultimate  explanation  of  a  reli- 
gious kind  —  as  in  all  other  cases  where  causation 
is  concerned.  And,  in  that  case  I  have  no  doubt 
that  the  largest  part  of  the  explanation  would 
consist  in  the  passions  of  women  being  less 
ardent  than  those  of  men,  and  also  much  more 
kept  under  restraint  by  social  conditions  of  life. 
This  applies  not  only  to  purity,  but  likewise 
to  most  of  the  other  psychological  differentiae 
between  the  sexes,  such  as  ambition,  selfishness, 
pride  of  power,  and  so  forth.  In  short,  the 
whole  ideal   of  Christian   ethics   is  of  a  feminine 

1  See  Nineteenth  Century,  May,  1887. 


A  CANDID  EXAMINATION  OF  RELIGION.      177 

as  distinguished  from  a  masculine  type.1  Now 
nothing  is  so  inimical  to  Christian  belief  as 
un-Christian  conduct.  This  is  especially  the 
case  as  regards  impurity  ;  for  whether  the  fact  be 
explained  on  religious  or  non-religious  grounds,  it 
has  more  to  do  with  unbelief  than  has  the  specu- 
lative reason.  Consequently,  woman  is,  for  all 
these  reasons  the  'fitter'  type  for  receiving  and 
retaining  Christian  belief. 

Modern  agnosticism  is  performing  this  great 
service  to  Christian  faith ;  it  is  silencing  all 
rational  scepticism  of  the  a  priori  kind.  And  this 
it  is  bound  to  do  more  and  more  the  purer  it 
becomes.  In  every  generation  it  must  henceforth 
become  more  and  more  recognized  by  logical 
thinking,  that  all  antecedent  objections  to  Chris- 
tianity founded  on  reason  alone  are  ipso  facto 
nugatory.  Now,  all  the  strongest  objections  to 
Christianity  have  ever  been  those  of  the  ante- 
cedent kind  ;  hence  the  effect  of  modern  thinking 
is  that  of  more  and  more  diminishing  the  purely 
speculative  difficulties,  such  as  that  of  the  Incar- 
nation, &c.     In  other  words,  the  force  of  Butler's 

1  [The  essay  mentioned  above  should  be  read  in  explanation 
of  this  expression.  George  Romanes'  meaning  would  be  more 
accurately  expressed,  I  think,  had  he  said:  'The  ideal  of  Chris- 
tian character  holds  in  prominence  the  elements  which  we  regard 
as  characteristically  feminine,  e.  g.  development  of  affections, 
readiness  of  trust,  love  of  service,  readiness  to  suffer,  &c.' — 
Ed.] 


178  THOUGHTS   ON    RELIGION. 

argument  about  our  being  incompetent  judges1  is 
being  more  and  more  increased. 

And  the  logical  development  of  this  lies  in 
the  view  already  stated  about  natural  causation. 
For,  just  as  pure  agnosticism  must  allow  that 
reason  is  incompetent  to  adjudicate  a  priori  for  or 
against  Christian  miracles,  including  the  Incarna- 
tion, so  it  must  further  allow  that,  if  they  ever 
took  place,  reason  can  have  nothing  to  say  against 
their  being  all  of  one  piece  with  causation  in  gen- 
eral. Hence,  so  far  as  reason  is  concerned,  pure 
agnosticism  must  allow  that  it  is  only  the  event 
which  can  ultimately  prove  whether  Christianity 
is  true  or  false.  '  If  it  be  of  God  we  cannot  over- 
throw it,  lest  haply  we  be  found  even  to  fight 
against  God.'  But  the  individual  cannot  wait  for 
this  empirical  determination.  What  then  is  he  to 
do  ?  The  unbiassed  answer  of  pure  agnosticism 
ought  reasonably  to  be,  in  the  words  of  John 
Hunter,  '  Do  not  think ;  try.'  That  is,  in  this 
case,  try  the  only  experiment  available  —  the 
experiment  of  faith.  Do  the  doctrine,  and  if 
Christianity  be  true,  the  verification  will  come, 
not  indeed  mediately  through  any  course  of  spec- 
ulative reason,  but  immediately  by  spiritual 
intuition.  Only  if  a  man  has  faith  enough  to 
make  this  venture  honestly,  will  he  be  in  a  just 
position  for  deciding  the  issue.  Thus  viewed  it 
would  seem  that  the   experiment  of  faith  is  not  a 

xSee  Analogy  part  i.  ch.  7  ;  part  ii.  ch.  3,  4,  &c. 


A  CANDID  EXAMINATION  OF  RELIGION.      179 

'fool's  experiment;'  but,  on  the  contrary,  so  that 
there  is  enough  prima  facie  evidence  to  arrest 
serious  attention,  such  an  experimental  trial 
would  seem  to  be  the  rational  duty  of  a  pure 
agnostic. 

It  is  a  fact  that  Christian  belief  is  much  more 
due  to  doing  than  to  thinking,  as  prognosticated 
by  the  New  Testament.  'If  any  man  will  do  His 
will  he  shall  know  of  the  doctrine,  whether  it  be 
of  God'  (St.  John  vii.  17).  And  surely,  even  on 
grounds  of  reason  itself,  it  should  be  allowed  that, 
supposing  Christianity  to  be  'of  God,'  it  ought  to 
appeal  to  the  spiritual  rather  than  to  the  rational 
side  of  our  nature. 

Even  within  the  region  of  pure  reason  (or  the 
'prima  facie  case')  modern  science,  as  directed  on 
the  New  Testament  criticism,  has  surely  done 
more  for  Christianity  than  against  it.  For,  after 
half  a  century  of  battle  over  the  text  by  the  best 
scholars,  the  dates  of  the  Gospels  have  been  fixed 
within  the  first  century,  and  at  least  four  of  St. 
Paul's  epistles  have  had  their  authenticity  proved 
beyond  doubt.  Now  this  is  enough  to  destroy 
all  eighteenth-century  criticism  as  to  the  doubt- 
fulness of  the  historical  existence  of  Christ  and 
His  apostles,  'inventions  of  priests,'  &c,  which 
was  the  most  formidable  kind  of  criticism  of  all. 
There  is  no  longer  any  question  as  to  historical 
facts,  save  the  miraculous,   which,   however,  are 


180  THOUGHTS   ON    RELIGION. 

ruled  out  by  negative  criticism  on  merely  a  prion 
grounds.  This  remaining — and,  ex  hypothesis 
necessary  —  doubt  is  of  very  different  importance 
from  the  other. 

Again,  the  Pauline  epistles  of  proved  authen- 
ticity are  enough  for  all  that  is  wanted  to  show 
the  belief  of  Christ's  contemporaries. 

These  are  facts  of  the  first  order  of  importance 
to  have  proved.  Old  Testament  criticism  is  as 
yet  too  immature  to  consider. 

PLAN  IN  REVELATION. 

The  views  which  I  entertained  on  this  subject 
when  an  undergraduate  [i.  e.  the  ordinary  ortho- 
dox views]  were  abandoned  in  presence  of  the 
theory  of  Evolution — i.  e.  the  theory  of  nat- 
ural causation  as  probably  furnishing  a  scientific 
explanation  [of  the  religious  phenomena  of  Juda< 
ism]  or,  which  is  the  same  thing,  an  explanation 
in  terms  of  ascertainable  causes  up  to  some  certain 
point ;  which  however  in  this  particular  case  can- 
not be  determined  within  wide  limits,  so  that  the 
history  of  Israel  will  always  embody  an  element 
of  'mystery'  much  more  than  any  other  history. 

It  was  not  until  twenty-five  years  later  that  I 
saw  clearly  the  full  implications  of  my  present 
views  on  natural  causation.  As  applied  to  this 
particular  case  these  views  show  that  to  a  theist, 
at  all  events  (i.e.  to  any  one  who  on  independent 
grounds  has   accepted   the  theory  of  Theism),  it 

/ 


A  CANDID  EXAMINATION  OF  RELIGION.      181 

ought  not  to  make  much  difference  to  the  evi- 
dential value  of  the  Divine  Plan  of  Revelation  as 
exhibited  in  the  Old  and  New  Testaments,  even 
if  it  be  granted  that  the  whole  has  been  due  to 
so-called  natural  causes  only.  I  say,  'not  much 
difference,'  for  that  it  ought  to  make  some  dif- 
ference I  do  not  deny.  Take  a  precisely  anal- 
ogous case.  The  theory  of  evolution  by  natural 
causes  is  often  said  to  make  no  logical  difference 
in  the  evidence  of  plan  or  design  manifested  in 
organic  nature — it  being  only  a  question  of  modus 
operandi  whether  all  pieces  of  organic  machinery 
were  produced  suddenly  or  by  degrees  ;  the 
evidence  of  design  is  equally  there  in  either 
case.  Now  I  have  shown  elsewhere  that  this  is 
wrong. s 

It  may  not  make  much  difference  to  a  man  who 
is  already  a  theist,  for  then  it  is  but  a  question 
of  modus,  but  it  makes  a  great  difference  to  the 
evidence  of  Theism. 

So  it  is  in  evidence  of  plan  in  proof  of  a  reve- 
lation. If  there  had  been  no  alleged  revelation 
up  to  the  present  time,  and  if  Christ  were  now  to 
appear  suddenly  in  His  first  advent  in  all  the 
power  and  glory  which  Christians  expect  for  His 
'second,  the  proof  of  His  revelation  would  be 
demonstrative.  So  that,  as  a  mere  matter  of 
evidence,  a  sudden  revelation  might  be  much 
more  convincing  than  a  gradual  one.    But  it  would 

1  See  Conclusion  of  Darwin  and  After  Darwin,  part  I. 


1 82  THOUGHTS   ON   RELIGION. 

be  quite  out  of  analogy  with  causation  in  nature. r 
Besides,  even  a  gradual  revelation  might  be  given 
easily,  which  would  be  of  demonstrative  value — 
as  by  making  prophecies  of  historical  events, 
scientific  discoveries,  &c,  so  clear  as  to  be  un- 
mistakable. But,  as  before  shown  a  demon- 
strative revelation  has  not  been  made,  and  there 
may  well  be  good  reasons  why  it  should  not. 
Now,  if  there  are  such  reasons  (e.  g.  our  state  of 
probation),  we  can  well  see  that  the  gradual  un- 
folding of  a  plan  of  revelation,  from  earliest  dawn 
of  history  to  the  end  of  the  world  ('I  speak  as  a 
fool')  is  much  preferable  to  a  sudden  manifesta- 
tion sufficiently  late  in  the  world's  history  to  be 
historically  attested  for  all  subsequent  time.    For 

I  st.  Gradual  evolution  is  in  analogy  with  God's 
other  work. 

2nd.  It  does  not  leave  Him  without  witness 
at  any  time  during  the  historical  period. 

3rd.  It  gives  ample  scope  for  persevering 
research  at  all  times — i.  e.  a  moral  test,  and  not 
merely  an  intellectual  assent  to  some  one  (ex 
hypothesi)  unequivocally  attested  event  in  history. 

The  appeara?ice  of  plan  in  revelation  is  in 
fact,  certainly  remarkable  enough  to  arrest  seri- 
ous attention. 

If  revelation   has  been   of  a  progressive  char- 
acter, then  it  follows  that  it  must  have  been  so, 

1  I  should  somewhere  show  how  much  better  a  treatise  Butler 
might  have  written  had  he  known  about  evolution  as  the  general 
law  of  nature. 


A  CANDID  EXAMINATION  OF  RELIGION.      183 

not  only  historically,  but  likewise  intellectually, 
morally,  and  spiritually.  For  thus  only  could  it 
be  always  adapted  to  the  advancing  conditions  of 
the  human  race.  This  reflection  destroys  all  those 
numerous  objections  against  Scripture  on  account 
of  the  absurdity  or  immorality  of  its  statements 
or  precepts,  unless  it  can  be  shown  that  the  modi- 
fications suggested  by  criticism  as  requisite  to 
bring  the  statements  or  precepts  into  harmony 
with  modern  advancement  would  have  been  as 
well  adapted  to  the  requirements  of  the  world  at 
the  date  in  question,  as  were  the  actual  state- 
ments or  precepts  before  us. 

Supposing  Christianity  true,  it  is  certain  that 
the  revelation  which  it  conveys  has  been  prede- 
termined at  least  since  the  dawn  of  the  historical 
period.  This  is  certain  because  the  objective 
evidences  of  Christianity  as  a  revelation  have 
their  origin  in  that  dawn.  And  these  objective 
evidences  are  throughout  [evidence]  of  a  scheme, 
in  which  the  end  can  be  seen  from  the  beginning. 
And  the  very  methods  whereby  this  scheme  is 
itself  revealed  are  such  (still  supposing  that  it  is 
a  scheme)  as  present  remarkable  evidences  of 
design.  These  methods  are,  broadly  speaking, 
miracles,  prophecy  and  the  results  of  the  teach- 
ing, &c,  upon  mankind.  Now  one  may  show 
that  no  better  methods  could  conceivably  have 
been  designed  for  the  purpose  of  latter-day  evi- 


1 84  THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION. 

dence,  combined  with  moral  and  religious  teach- 
ing throughout.  The  mere  fact  of  it  being  so 
largely  incorporated  with  secular  history  renders 
the  Christian  religion  unique :  so  to  speak,  the 
world,  throughout  its  entire  historical  period,  has 
been  constituted  the  canvas  on  which  this  divine 
revelation  has  been  painted — and  painted  so  grad- 
ually that  not  until  the  process  had  been  going 
on  for  a  couple  of  thousand  years  was  it  possible 
to  perceive  the  subject  thereof. 

CHRISTIAN  DOGMAS. 
Whether  or  not  Christ  was  Himself  divine 
would  make  no  difference  so  far  as  the  considera- 
tion of  Christianity  as  the  highest  phase  of  evolu- 
tion is  concerned,  or  from  the  purely  secular  [scien- 
tific] point  of  view.  From  the  religious  point  of 
view,  or  that  touching  the  relation  of  God  to  man, 
it  would  of  course  make  a  great  difference  ;  but 
the  difference  belongs  to  the  same  region  of 
thought  as  that  which  applies  to  all  the  previous 
moments  of  evolution.  Thus  the  passage  from 
the  non-moral  to  the  moral  appears,  from  the 
secular  or  scientific  point  of  view,  to  be  due,  as 
far  as  we  can  see,  to  mechanical  causes  in  natural 
selection  or  what  not.  But,  just  as  in  the  case  of 
the  passage  from  the  non-mental  to  the  mental, 
&c,  this  passage  may  have  been  ultimately  due  to 
divine  volition,  and  must  have  been  so  due  on  the 
theory  of  Theism.  Therefore,  I  say,  it  makes  no 
difference   from  a  secular   or  scientific   point   of 


A  CANDID  EXAMINATION  OF  RELIGION.      185 

view  whether  or  not  Christ  was  Himself  divine ; 
since,  in  either  case,  the  movement  which  He 
inaugurated  was  the  proximate  or  phenomenal 
cause  of  the  observable  results. 

Thus,  even  the  question  of  the  divinity  of  Christ 
ultimately  resolves  itself  into  the  question  of  all 
questions — viz.  is  or  is  not  mechanical  causation 
'the  outward  and  visible  form  of  an  inward  and 
spiritual  grace  ?'  Is  it  phenomenal  or  ontological ; 
ultimate  or  derivative  ? 

Similarly  as  regards  the  redemption.  Whether 
or  not  Christ  was  really  divine,  in  as  far  as  a  belief 
in  His  divinity  has  been  a  necessary  cause  of  the 
moral  and  religious  evolution  which  has  resulted 
from  His  life  on  earth,  it  has  equally  and  so  far 
'saved  His  people  from  their  sins';  that  is,  of 
course,  it  has  saved  them  from  their  own  sense  of 
sin  as  an  abiding  curse.  Whether  or  not  He  has 
effected  any  corresponding  change  of  an  objective 
character  in  the  ontological  sphere,  again  depends 
on  the  'question  of  questions'  just  stated. 

REASONABLENESS  OF  THE  DOCTRINES  OF  THE 
INCARNATION  AND  THE  TRINITY. 

Pure  agnostics  and  those  who  search  for  God 
in  Christianity  should  have  nothing  to  do  with 
metaphysical  theology.  That  is  a  department  of 
enquiry  which,  ex  hypothesis  is  transcendental,  and 
is  only  to  be  considered  after  Christianity  has  been 
accepted.     The  doctrines  of  the  Incarnation  and 


1 86  THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION. 

the  Trinity  seemed  to  me  most  absurd  in  my 
agnostic  days.  But  now,  as  a  pure  agnostic,  I  see 
in  them  no  rational  difficulty  at  all.  As  to  the 
Trinity,  the  plurality  of  persons  is  necessarily 
implied  in  the  companion  doctrine  of  the  Incar- 
nation. So  that  at  best  there  is  here  but  one  dif- 
ficulty, since,  duality  being  postulated  in  the  doc- 
trine of  the  Incarnation,  there  is  no  further  diffi- 
culty for  pure  agnosticism  in  the  doctrine  of 
plurality.  Now  at  one  time  it  seemed  to  me 
impossible  that  any  proposition,  verbally  intelli- 
gible as  such,  could  be  more  violently  absurd  than 
that  of  the  doctrine  [of  the  Incarnation].  Now 
I  see  that  this  standpoint  is  wholly  irrational, 
due  only  to  the  blindness  of  reason  itself  promoted 
by  [purely]  scientific  habits  of  thought.  '  But  it 
is  opposed  to  common  sense.'  No  doubt,  utterly 
so  ;  but  so  it  ought  to  be  if  true.  Common  sense 
is  merely  a  [rough]  register  of  common  experi- 
ence ;  but  the  Incarnation,  if  it  ever  took  place, 
whatever  else  it  may  have  been,  at  all  events 
cannot  have  been  a  common  event.  '  But  it  is 
derogatory  to  God  to  become  man.'  How  do  you 
know  ?  Besides,  Christ  was  not  an  ordinary  man. 
Both  negative  criticism  and  the  historical  effects 
of  His  life  prove  this ;  while,  if  we  for  a  moment 
adopt  the  Christian  point  of  view  for  the  sake  of 
argument,  the  whole  raiso?i  d'etre  of  mankind  is 
bound  up  in  Him.  Lastly,  there  are  considerations 
per  co?itra,  rendering  an  incarnation  antecedently 


A  CANDID  EXAMINATION  OF  RELIGION.      187 

probable.1  On  antecedent  grounds  there  must 
be  mysteries  unintelligible  to  reason  as  to  the 
nature  of  God,  &c.,  supposing  a  revelation  to  be 
made  at  all.  Therefore  their  occurrence  in  Chris- 
tianity is  no  proper  objection  to  Christianity. 
Why,  again,  stumble  a  priori  over  the  doctrine  of 
the  Trinity  —  especially  as  man  himself  is  a  tri- 
une being,  of  body,  mind  (i.  e.  reason),  and  spirit 
(i.  e.  moral,  aesthetic,  religious  faculties)?  The 
unquestionable  union  of  these  no  less  unquestion- 
ably distinct  orders  of  being  in  man  is  known 
immediately  as  a  fact  of  experience,  but  is  as 
unintelligible  by  any  process  of  logic  or  reason 
as  is  the  alleged  triunity  of  God. 

ADAM,  THE  FALL,  THE  ORIGIN  OF  EVIL. 

These,  all  taken  together  as  Christian  dogmas, 
are  undoubtedly  hard  hit  by  the  scientific  proof 
of  evolution  (but  are  the  only  dogmas  which  can 
fairly  be  said  to  be  so),  and,  as  constituting  the 
logical  basis  of  the  whole  plan,  they  certainly  do 
appear  at  first  sight  necessarily  to  involve  in  their 
destruction  that  of  the  entire  superstructure.  But 
the  question  is  whether,  after  all,  they  have  been 
destroyed  for  a  pure  agnostic.  In  other  words, 
whether  my  principles  are  not  as  applicable  in 
turning  the  flank  of  infidelity  here  as  everywhere 
else. 

First,  as  regards  Adam  and  Eve,  observe  to 

1  See  Gore's  Bampton  Lectures,  lect.  ii. 


1 88  THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION. 

begin  with,  that  long  before  Darwin  the  story  of 
man  in  Paradise  was  recognized  by  thoughtful 
theologians  as  allegorical.  Indeed,  read  with  un- 
prejudiced eyes,  the  first  chapters  of  Genesis 
ought  always  to  have  been  seen  to  be  a  poem  as 
distinguished  from  a  history :  nor  could  it  ever 
have  been  mistaken  for  a  history,  but  for  precon- 
ceived ideas  on  the  matter  of  inspiration.  But  to 
pure  agnostics  there  should  be  no  such  precon- 
ceived ideas ;  so  that  nowadays  no  presumption 
should  be  raised  against  it  as  inspired,  merely 
because  it  has  been  proved  not  to  be  a  history — 
and  this  even  though  we  cannot  see  of  what  it  is 
allegorical.  For,  supposing  it  inspired,  it  has 
certainly  done  good  service  in  the  past  and  can 
do  so  likewise  in  the  present,  by  giving  an  alle- 
gorical, though  not  a  literal,  starting-point  for  the 
Divine  Plan  of  Redemption. 

THE  EVIDENCE  OF  NATURAL  AND  REVEALED 
RELIGION  COMPARED. 

It  is  often  said  that  evolution  of  organic  forms 
gives  as  good  evidence  of  design  as  would  their 
special  creation,  inasmuch  as  all  the  facts  of 
adaptation,  in  which  the  evidence  consists,  are 
there  in  either  case.  But  here  it  is  overlooked 
that  the  very  question  at  issue  is  thus  begged. 
The  question  is,  Are  these  facts  of  adaptation  per 
se  sufficient  evidence  of  design  as  their  cause  ? 
But  if  it  be  allowed,  as  it  must  be,  that  under 


A  CANDID  EXAMINATION  OF  RELIGION.      189 

hypothesis  of  evolution  by  natural  causes  the 
facts  of  adaptation  belong  to  the  same  category 
as  all  the  other  facts  of  nature,  no  more  special 
argument  for  design  can  be  founded  on  these 
facts  than  on  any  others  in  nature.  So  that  the 
facts  of  adaptation,  like  all  other  facts,  are  only 
available  as  arguments  for  design  when  it  is 
assumed  that  all  natural  causation  is  of  a  mental 
character :  which  assumption  merely  begs  the 
question  of  design  anywhere.  Or,  in  other 
words,  on  the  supposition  of  their  having  been 
due  to  natural  causes,  the  facts  of  adaptation  are 
only  then  available  as  per  se  good  evidence  of 
design,  when  it  has  already  been  assumed  that, 
qua  due  to  natural  causes,  they  are  due  to  design. 

Natural  religion  resembles  Revealed  religion 
in  this.  Supposing  both  divine,  both  have  been 
arranged  so  that,  as  far  as  reason  can  lead  us, 
there  is  only  enough  evidence  of  design  to  arouse 
serious  attention  to  the  question  of  it.  In  other 
words,  as  regards  both,  the  attitude  of  pure 
reason  ought  to  be  that  of  pure  agnosticism. 
(Observe  that  the  inadequacy  of  teleology,  or 
design  in  nature,  to  prove  Theism  has  been  ex- 
pressly recognized  by  all  the  more  intellectual 
Christians  of  all  ages,  although  such  recognition 
has  become  more  general  since  Darwin.  On  this 
point  I  may  refer  to  Pascal  especially,1  and  many 
other  authors.)      This  is  another  striking  analogy 

1  Pensies,  pp.  205  ff. 


190  THOUGHTS  ON  RELIGION. 

¥ 

between  Nature  and  Revelation,  supposing  both 
to  have  emanated  from  the  same  author — i.  e. 
quite  as  much  so  as  identity  of  developmental 
method  in  both. 

Supposi?ig  the  hypothesis  of  design  i?i  both  to  be 
true,  it  follows  that  in  both  this  hypothesis  can  be 
alike  verified  only  by  the  organ  of  immediate 
intuition  —  i.  e.  that  other  mode  of  human  appre- 
hension which  is  supplementary  to  the  rational. 
Here  again  we  note  the  analogy.  And  if  a  man 
has  this  supplementary  mode  of  apprehending  the 
highest  truth  (by  hypothesis  such),  it  will  be  his 
duty  to  exercise  his  spiritual  eyesight  in  search- 
ing for  God  in  nature  as  in  revelation,  when  (still 
on  our  present  hypothesis  that  '  God  is,  and  is  the 
rewarder  of  them  who  seek  Him  diligently')  he 
will  find  that  his  subjective  evidence  of  God  in 
Nature  and  in  Revelation  will  mutually  corrobor- 
ate one  another  —  so  yielding  additional  evidence 
to  his  reason. 

The  teleology  of  Revelation  supplements  that 
of  Nature,  and  so,  to  the  spiritually  minded  man, 
they  logically  and  mutually  corroborate  one 
another. 

Paley's  writings  form  an  excellent  illustration 
of  the  identity  of  the  teleological  argument  from 
Nature  and  from  Revelation ;  though  a  very 
imperfect  illustration  of  the  latter  taken  by  itself, 
inasmuch  as  he  treats  only  of  the  New  Testament, 
and  even  of  that  very  partially  —  ignoring  all  that 


A  CANDID  EXAMINATION  OF  RELIGION.      191 

went  before  Christ,  and  much  of  what  happened 
after  the  apostles.  Yet  Paley  himself  does  not 
seem  to  have  observed  the  similarity  of  the  argu- 
ment, as  developed  in  his  Natural  Theology  and 
Evidences  of  Christianity  respectively.  But  no  one 
has  developed  the  argument  better  in  both  cases. 
His  great  defect  was  in  not  perceiving  that  this 
teleological  argument,  per  sey  is  not  in  either  case 
enough  to  convince,  but  only  to  arouse  serious 
attention.  Paley  everywhere  represents  that  such 
an  appeal  to  reason  alone  ought  to  be  sufficient. 
He  fails  to  see  that  if  it  were,  there  could  be  no 
room  for  faith.  In  other  words,  he  fails  to 
recognize  the  spiritual  organ  in  man,  and  its  com- 
plementary object,  grace  in  God.  So  far  he  fails 
to  be  a  Christian.  And,  whether  Theism  and 
Christianity  be  true  or  false,  it  is  certain  that  the 
teleological  argument  alone  ought  to  result,  not  in 
conviction,  but  in  agnosticism. 

The  antecedent  improbability  against  a  mira- 
cle being  wrought  by  a  man  without  a  moral 
object  is  apt  to  be  confused  with  that  of  its  being 
done  by  God  with  an  adequate  moral  object.  The 
former  is  immeasurably  great ;  the  latter  is  only 
equal  to  that  of  the  theory  of  Theism  —  i.  e.  nil. 
CHRISTIAN  DEMONOLOGY.0 

It  will  be  said,  '  However  you   may  seek  to 
explain  away  a  priori  objections  to  miracles  on  a 

0  [Romane's  line  of  argument  in  this  note  seems  to  me  impossi- 


192  THOUGHTS   ON    RELIGION. 

priori  grounds,  there  remains  the  fact  that  Christ 
accepted  the  current  superstition  in  regard  to 
diabolic  possession.  Now  the  devils  damn  the 
doctrine'.  For  you  must  choose  the  horn  of  your 
dilemma,  either  the  current  theory  was  true  or 
it  was  not.  If  you  say  true,  you  must  allow  that 
the  same  theory  is  true  for  all  similar  stages  of 
culture,  [but  not  for  the  later  stages,]  and  there- 
fore that  the  most  successful  exorcist  is  Science, 
albeit  Science  works  not  by  faith  in  the  theory, 
but  by  rejection  of  it.  Observe,  the  diseases  are 
so  well  described  by  the  record  that  there  is  no 
possibility  of  mistaking  them.  Hence  you  must 
suppose  that  they  were  due  to  devils  in  a.d.  30, 
and  to  nervous  disorders  imA.D.  1894.  On  the  other 
hand,  if  you  choose  the  other  horn,  you  must 
accept  either  the  hypothesis  of  the  ignorance  or 
that  of  the  mendacity  of  Christ.' 

The  answer  is,  that  either  hypothesis  may  be 
accepted  by  Christianity.  For  the  sake  of  argu- 
ment we  may  exclude  the  question  whether  the 
acceptance  of  the  devil  theory  by  Christ  was  really 
historical,  or  merely  attributed  to  Him  by  His 
biographers  after  His  death.     If  Christ  knew  that 

ble  to  maintain.  The  emphasis  which  Jesus  Christ  lays  on  dia- 
bolic agency  is  so  great  that,  if  it  is  not  a  reality,  He  must  be 
regarded  either  as  seriously  misled  about  realities  which  concern 
the  spiritual  life,  or  else  as  seriously  misleading  others.  And  in 
neither  case  could  He  be  even  the  perfect  Prophet.  I  think  I  am 
justified  in  explaining  my  disagreement  with  Romanes'  argument 
at  this  point  particularly. — Ed.] 


A  CANDID  EXAMINATION  OF  RELIGION.      193 

the  facts  were  not  due  to  devils,  He  may  also  have 
known  it  was  best  to  fall  in  with  current  theory, 
rather  than  to  puzzle  the  people  with  a  lecture  on 
pathology.  If  He  did  not  know,  why  should  He, 
if  he  had  previously  'emptied  Himself  of  omnis- 
cience? In  either  case,  if  He  had  denied  the  cur- 
rent theory,  he  would  have  been  giving  evidence 
of  scientific  knowledge  or  of  scientific  intuition 
beyond  the  culture  of  His  time,  and  this,  as  in 
countless  other  cases,  was  not  in  accordance  with 
His  method,  which,  whether  we  suppose  it  divine 
or  human,  has  nowhere  proved  His  divine  mission 
by  foreknowledge  of  natural  science. 

The  particular  question  of  Christ  and  demon- 
ology  is  but  part  of  a  much  larger  one. 


DARWIN'S  DIFFICULTY.1 

The  answer  to  Darwin's  objection  about  so 
small  a  proportion  of  mankind  having  ever  heard 
of  Christ,  is  manifold  : — 

1.  Supposing  Christianity  true,  it  is  the  highest 
and  final  revelation ;  i.  e.  the  scheme  of  revelation 
has  been  developmental.  Therefore  it  follows 
from  the  very  method  that  the  larger  proportion 

1  [There  is  nothing  in  Darwin's  writings  which  seems  to  me 
to  justify  Romanes  in  attributing  this  difficulty  to  him  specially. 
But  he  knew  Darwin  so  intimately  and  reverenced  him  so  pro- 
foundly that  he  is  not  likely  to  have  been  in  error  on  this  sub- 
ject.— Ed.] 


194  THOUGHTS   ON    RELIGION. 

of  mankind  should  never  hear  of  Christ,  i.  e.  all 
who  live  before  his  advent. 

2.  But  these  were  not  left  'without  witness.' 
They  all  had  their  religion  and  their  moral  sense, 
each  at  its  appropriate  stage  of  development. 
Therefore  'the  times  of  ignorance  God  winked 
at'   (Acts  xvii.  30). 

3.  Moreover  these  men  were  not  devoid  of 
benefit  from  Christ,  because  it  is  represented  that 
He  died  for  all  men  —  i.  e.  but  for  Him  [i.  e. 
apart  from  the  knowledge  of  what  was  to  come] 
God  would  not  have  'winked  at  the  times  of 
ignorance.'  The  efficacy  of  atonement  is  repre- 
sented as  transcendental,  and  not  dependent  on 
the  accident  of  hearing  about  the  Atoner. 

4.  It  is  remarkable  that  of  all  men  Darwin 
should  have  been  worsted  by  this  fallacious  argu- 
ment. For  it  has  received  its  death-blow  from 
the  theory  of  evolution :  i.  e.  if  it  be  true  that 
evolution  has  been  the  method  of  natural  causa- 
tion, and  if  it  be  true  that  the  method  of  natural 
causation  is  due  to  a  Divinity,  then  it  follows  that 
the  lateness  of  Christ's  appearance  on  earth  must 
have  been  designed.  For  it  is  certain  that  He 
could  not  have  appeared  at  any  earlier  date  with- 
out having  violated  the  method  of  evolution. 
Therefore,  on  the  theory  of  Theism,  He  ought  to 
have  appeared  when  he  did  —  i.  e.  at  the  earliest 
possible  moment  in  history. 

So  as    to  the    suitability   of  the    moment   of 


A  CANDID  EXAMINATION  OF  RELIGION.      195 

Christ's  appearance  in  other  respects.  Even  sec- 
ular historians  are  agreed  as  to  the  suitability  of 
the  combinations,  and  deduce  the  success  of  His 
system  of  morals  and  religion  from  this  fact.  So 
with  students  of  comparative  religions. 


CONCLUDING  NOTE  BY  THE  EDITOR. 

The  intellectual  attitude  towards  Christianity 
expressed  in  these  notes  may  be  described  as  — 
(i)  'pure  agnosticism'  in  the  region  of  the  scien- 
tific 'reason,'  coupled  with  (2)  a  vivid  recognition 
of  the  spiritual  necessity  of  faith  and  of  the 
legitimacy  and  value  of  its  intuitions;  (3)  a 
perception  of  the  positive  strength  of  the  histori- 
cal and  spiritual  evidences  of  Christianity. 

George  Romanes  came  to  recognize,  as  in 
these  written  notes  so  also  in  conversation,  that 
it  was  'reasonable  to  be  a  Christian  believer' 
before  the  activity  or  habit  of  faith  had  been 
recovered.  His  life  was  cut  short  very  soon  after 
this  point  was  reached  ;  but  it  will  surprise  no  one 
to  learn  that  the  writer  of  these  'Thoughts' 
returned  before  his  death  to  that  full,  deliberate 
communion  with  the  Church  of  Jesus  Christ  which 
he  had  for  so  many  years  been  conscientiously 
compelled  to  forego.  In  his  case  the  'pure  in 
heart'  was  after  a  long  period  of  darkness  allowed, 
in  a  measure  before  his  death,  to  'see  God.' 

Fecisti  nos  ad  te,  Domine ;  et  ijiquietum  est  cor 
nostrum  donee  requiescat  i?i  te. 

C.  G. 


196 


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